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SUMMARY
We study the design of optimal pricing mechanisms in the presence of rational customers
with multi-unit demands.
First, we analyze the optimal design of a markdown pricing mechanism with pre-
announced prices. In the presence of limited supply, buyers who choose to purchase at
a lower price may face a scarcity in supply. Our focus is on the structure of the optimal
markdown mechanisms in the presence of rational or “strategic” buyers who demand mul-
tiple units. We first examine a complete information setting where the set of customer
valuations is known but the seller does not know the valuation of each individual customer
(i.e., cannot exercise perfect price discrimination). We then generalize our analysis to an
incomplete valuation information setting where customer valuations are drawn from known
distributions. For both settings, we compare the seller’s profit resulting from the optimal
markdown mechanism and the optimal single price. We provide a number of managerial
insights into designing profitable markdown mechanisms.
Next chapter focuses on the purchasing behavior of the customers and the optimal
pricing decisions of the seller assuming that the seller has incomplete information about the
customer demand. Each buyer demands multiple units of the homogeneous product that
the seller is offering via a priority pricing mechanism with multiple prices, where the only
difference is the availability/scarcity of the supply at each price. We provide managerial
insights based on the results from a stylized model.
Final chapter builds on the incomplete demand information setting and focuses on the
value of improved information about the customer demand to the seller. We investigate
whether improved information benefits the seller and if the seller would prefer to share the
improved demand information with the customers.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Until late 1800’s, the standard method for determining how much one should pay for a
product or service was bargaining. Final prices were determined based on what the seller and
the buyer considered a reasonable payment at the time of transaction. Then came the age
of supermarkets and mass marketing with fixed/static prices, as the advances in production
and distribution technologies made it impractical to bargain before every purchase [53].
Abundance of information and the advance of data processing technologies has led to
a trend where sellers started to explore pricing mechanisms other than charging the same
fixed/static price at any time. Widespread use of the Internet and reduced transaction
costs associated with changing prices enable the sellers to experiment with pricing practices
where they change fixed/static prices rapidly or offer the same product/service at multiple
prices as they take advantage of increased data availability for the markets they operate in.
How sellers price their products or services is not the only impact of the recent advances
in information technology. Contemporary consumers have more to choose from and they can
gather more information about these alternatives before they make their decision. Thanks
to the tools provided by accessible computing technology, today’s customers are shopping
experts who are making “strategic” purchasing decisions instead of just satisfying their
demand. They are trying very hard to get the best “bang for their buck” [41].
Motivated by these trends, we analyze the pricing decision of a seller (monopolist),
who has K identical units of a product or service for sale. Initially, K is assumed to be
exogenously given; this would be the case, for example, if the K units were comprised of
excess inventory for an end-of-season item or service capacity that cannot be easily adjusted
in the short run. Later we explore relaxing this assumption under some information settings.
In its most general form, the seller would like to implement anm-step pricing mechanism
with price pk at step k, where p1 > p2 > .. > pm. The seller faces N rational buyers with
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valuations (per unit) v1 > v2 > . . . > vN where buyer j wishes to purchase at most Dj > 0
units, ∀j. Given all the prices, the buyers decide how much to buy at a given price.
The goal of the seller is to design a pricing mechanism such that high(er) valuation
customers purchase at high(er) prices. The seller allocates the existing capacity to customers
starting from the requests at the highest price and following with lower prices. If the total
bids/requests at any price step exceeds availability, the seller uses a random allocation
scheme, where she picks a buyer randomly and satisfies his request and repeats this process
until all units are allocated.
We assume that customers facing a mechanism with multiple price/availability options
make their purchases/bids with the objective of maximizing their individual surpluses, i.e.,
they act strategically. We consider a business-to-business market which consists of a small
number of customers hence, each customer’s demand, valuation and bidding strategy has
an impact on the decisions of the other customers.
In the following chapters, we analyze versions of this base model under different infor-
mation settings with the objective of providing answers to the following questions.
• How will rational buyers behave (bid) when facing multiple prices?
• How many price steps should there be and what should those prices be?
• Under what conditions would the seller be better off using a single price?
Complete information (CI) (Chapter 2): Both the buyers and the seller know the
set of customer valuations but the seller cannot associate them with individual customers.
Incomplete valuation information (IV) (Chapter 2): The seller does not know
the customers’ valuations, but knows their cumulative distribution (CDF) and probability
density (pdf) functions, Fi(vi) and fi(vi), respectively, with support over [vi, v¯i], ∀i, where
the support intervals for any two customers i, j do not overlap, i.e., vi < v¯i < vj < v¯j . Each
customer knows his own valuation with certainty and also knows the pdf and CDF of the
other customer valuations.
Incomplete demand information (ID) (Chapter 3): Exact demands of the cus-
tomers are not known by the seller. She believes that each customer’s private demand is
drawn from a common distribution, with density function fi(D) ∀i, with support over the
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interval [Li,Hi]. Each customer shares this belief with the seller regarding the demand of
the other customers but knows his own exact demand realization.
In Chapter 4, we investigate the value of improved information on customer demands to
the seller based on the insights gained from analyzing pricing mechanism under incomplete
demand information.
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CHAPTER II
DESIGNING OPTIMAL PRE-ANNOUNCED MARKDOWNS IN THE
PRESENCE OF RATIONAL CUSTOMERS WITH MULTI-UNIT
DEMANDS
2.1 Introduction
‘Pricing has traditionally been a high-stakes game based on guesses about costs and com-
petitive activities, resulting in either money left on the table or lost sales’ [53]. In recent
years, advances in technology have opened the door for companies to turn their “pricing
game” into an intelligent and more profitable strategy with the use of price optimization
software [13, 15]. Price optimization software assists sellers to intelligently execute various
pricing strategies by studying a wide variety of data, ranging from historical sales to de-
mographics. The increased information available about customers, as well as the reduced
transaction costs associated with changing prices over time, is enabling sellers to explore a
variety of pricing schemes aside from the commonly used traditional single (static) pricing
policy.
When the seller does not know the identity of a buyer – i.e., cannot exercise first or third
degree price discrimination – but knows that she is facing a market where customers differ
by their willingness to pay, a markdown pricing strategy offers a way to potentially improve
profits above single-price levels. The idea behind a markdown mechanism is to segment
or differentiate customers with diverse valuations by offering different prices over time so
as to create scarcity at lower prices, with the goal of inducing high-valuation customers to
purchase at higher prices. It is clear that the structure of a markdown mechanism influences
buyer behavior and, in turn, the seller’s profits.
The rationale behind and, the advantages of, markdown pricing are well known in the
fashion apparel industry, as well as many other business-to-consumer (B2C) markets that
sell highly seasonal or short-lived products. As companies begin to explore alternative
4
pricing mechanisms, it is imperative that we understand how they will perform under various
market settings. In this chapter, we consider a markdown mechanism where the price of a
good decreases over time according to a pre-announced schedule. For example, a seller posts
a group of items for an opening price, say, $800 per item; and buyers bid the quantities they
want at that price. After a short duration – e.g., two days, the price drops according to a
pre-announced schedule, e.g., to $600, per item, and then to $300, and then $100. That is,
markdowns continue until all the items are sold or until the price drops to the minimum
level set by the seller. While there may be only a few buyers interested in purchasing
at $800, the threat of many more customers who are willing to pay $300 or $100 may
induce the high-valuation buyers to purchase at a higher price. Retailers who have been
using preannounced markdowns for decades (e.g., Filene’s Basement) are now being joined
by others (e.g., Sam’s Club) as a result of the ease of use provided by the Internet and
increased sophistication of buyers. (An example from Sam’s Club web site and an excerpt
from Filene’s Basement’s web site are presented in Appendix A.)
Companies operating in business-to-business (B2B) markets are also seeing the potential
advantages of price optimization and markdown pricing, as seen by the pricing tools offered
by pricing software vendor Zilliant [51] among others [15]. The majority of the previous
research on retail price markdowns and clearance sales assumes that customers are myopic,
that is, a customer will make a purchase immediately without considering future prices
if the price is below his valuation. While a plausible assumption for some B2C markets,
an analysis of B2B markets requires a richer characterization of customer behavior; under
B2B settings, customers often act rationally (or strategically), taking into account the entire
(expected) price path while deciding when to buy. Furthermore, most papers that previously
addressed markdown pricing assume single-unit demand; again, a characterization that is
less likely to hold in B2B markets.
In this chapter, we analyze the optimal design of a pre-announced markdown mechanism
by exploring a setting where strategic/rational customers have multi-unit demands [18, 28,
46, 47] and the seller may have a limited supply of goods [7, 20, 22]. Our goal is to shed
light on three fundamental questions by combining research streams from economics and
5
operations management.
• How will rational buyers behave (bid) when facing a markdown?
• What is the optimal markdown, i.e., how many price steps should it have and what
should those prices be? What is the impact of strategic customers with multi-unit
(versus single-unit) demands on the design of the optimal markdown?
• Under what conditions would the seller be better off using a single price versus mark-
down pricing?
We initially study a markdown mechanism under a setting where the seller has complete
information (CI) about the buyers’ valuations and demands (Section 2.3). Under CI, we
find that for N ≥ 2 buyers, the optimal markdown has two steps and buyers submit all-
or-nothing bids at each price step (Section 2.3). That is, a buyer never finds it optimal to
bid only a portion of his demand at any one price step. We find this to be the case under
constant, decreasing, or discounted valuations over time. In Section 2.3.1, we derive the
optimal markdown prices when there are two buyers and identify the circumstances under
which a markdown pricing strategy is more profitable for the seller than the optimal single
price. In Section 2.3.2, we extend our analysis to N > 2 buyers and characterize the buyers’
equilibrium bidding strategies, and use numerical examples to illustrate the structure of the
optimal markdown.
While a CI assumption may appear restrictive, we demonstrate that many of the prop-
erties of the optimal markdown and equilibrium bidding behavior of the buyers carry over
to a more general incomplete information (IV) setting (Section 2.4). Under the IV setting,
each customer’s valuation is private information (drawn randomly from non-overlapping
intervals), and the cumulative distribution (CDF) and probability density (pdf) functions
from which it is drawn are common knowledge. As before, we examine the design of the op-
timal markdown mechanism, but this time we consider markdowns where there is at most
one price step in any one valuation interval (to be referred to as INT markdowns). We
then characterize the buyers’ equilibrium bidding behavior, and compare the performance
of the optimal markdown with the optimal single-price policy. As was the case under CI,
we find that the optimal markdown has very few steps. We find that the seller should never
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use more than three price steps in an INT markdown; furthermore, customers continue to
submit all-or-nothing bids at each price step. We conclude with a discussion of managerial
insights and future research directions in Section 2.5.
2.1.1 Placement in Literature
Several branches of the economics literature analyze declining price mechanisms, considering
(i) myopic customers [30, 37, 38, 49, 50]; (ii) rational/strategic customers [4, 6, 24, 43]; and
(iii) quantity bid auctions [11, 25, 27, 33].
The assumption of myopic (nonstrategic) customer behavior allows the seller to ignore
the effect of decreasing prices on customer purchases early on, which is detrimental to
the seller’s revenue. In many settings, customers act strategically (rationally), taking into
account the future path of prices when making purchasing decisions. In such cases, we need
to incorporate customer rationality or strategic behavior into the seller’s pricing decisions.
Recently, [3] investigated the impact of using standard revenue management techniques,
which ignore strategic behavior of customers, on airline revenues. They consider the case
where the airline sets protection levels based on expected marginal seat revenue assuming
customers will behave myopically and proceed to show how strategic customers can calculate
sellout probabilities at different fare classes and make strategic purchasing decisions. They
find that the loss of the airline is higher when the expected demand over capacity ratio is
low and when the number of times the allocation decisions are reset during the sales horizon
is low. They conclude that airlines should explicitly consider strategic customer behavior
when making pricing decisions. The bulk of the operations management literature has
focused on the optimal pricing policy of a seller who has a limited supply (with a possibility
of replenishment); [7], [19] [22] assuming myopic customer behavior.
One of the first papers that considers strategic (rational) customer behavior in a posted
price mechanism is [43]. She studies the case of a seller facing a fixed number of poten-
tial customers and analyzes the optimal markdown structure. Customers have single-unit
demands and the seller (monopolist) has unlimited capacity. [6] extend Stokey’s model by
assuming that the seller can only make a finite number of price adjustments, i.e, the price
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Table 1: Summary of research on dynamic posted pricing mechanisms with myopic cus-
tomers
Capacity Demand Information Setting Properties of the
Structure Demand Valuations Pricing Mechanism
Lazear (1986) Single unit Single unit Complete Incomplete (known Two step markdown
common distribution) mechanism
Pashigian (1988) Identical to Lazear (1986), the same setting considered in a perfectly competitive market
Pashigian, Empirical study, no theoretical model for markdowns
Bowen (1991)
Wang (1993) Single unit Single unit Incomplete Incomplete (known Posted single price
(Poisson process common distribution) and Vickrey auction
with known rate)
Gallego, Multi-unit Aggregate Incomplete Individual customer Continuous time
van Ryzin (1994) level (Poisson process valuations are not price function, not
demand with known modeled explicitly necessarily
model intensity, which is decreasing
a function of price)
Warner, Empirical study, no theoretical model for markdowns
Barsky (1995)
Feng, Multi-unit Aggregate Incomplete Individual customer A sequence of two
Gallego (1995) level (Poisson process valuations are not prices, not
demand with known modeled explicitly necessarily in
model intensity) decreasing order
Bitran, Multi-unit Single unit Incomplete Incomplete (known Continuous time
Mondschein (Poisson process common distribution) price function,
(1997) with known not necessarily
intensity) decreasing
Federgruen, Multi-unit Aggregate Incomplete Individual customer A fixed price for each
Heching (1999) level (general stochastic valuations are not period which is
demand function of price) modeled explicitly determined at the
model beginning of the period
path is no longer continuous. As in [43], customers want to purchase at most one unit and
the seller has unlimited capacity. These papers conclude that a markdown pricing scheme
is optimal. Furthermore, they find that the seller strictly prefers that the number of price
adjustments be as few as possible. [24] also analyze a setting where the seller faces a fixed
number of strategic buyers with single-unit demands and endogenously derives the form of
an optimal pricing mechanism, given that the seller may have capacity constraints. They
assume that customers’ valuations are private information and find that the determining
factor in the structure of the optimal markdown is the seller’s capacity constraint. If capac-
ity is exogenously determined and exceeds market demand, then a single price is optimal.
If capacity is less than the total demand, then a markdown or Vickrey auction is optimal.
If the seller can determine capacity endogenously, then the optimal action is to set capacity
equal to the market demand and use a single-price mechanism.
[4] study a model where the seller has a fixed initial inventory. Customers have single-
unit demands and they arrive randomly over time according to a Poisson process. The
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valuation of a customer who arrives at time t is modeled by a known, deterministic decreas-
ing function. Upon arrival, customers decide whether to buy the product at the time of
arrival, return later for a lower price, or not to buy at all. They first consider a model where
the seller announces the price path and commits to it. They then consider an alternative
model where the seller can choose the timing of when to announce the discount (assuming
only one price change is allowed) and the discounted price considering the inventory level
(optimal dynamic pricing policy with a single price change). They find that the benefits to
the seller from employing this sophisticated strategy are minimal, and hence it is unlikely
that the expected benefits merit its implementation. More recently, [44] has investigated
pricing in a deterministic setting where a monopolist faces a continuous arrival of customers
with single-unit demands who have low or high valuations and are myopic (who make a pur-
chase or leave immediately) or strategic (stay in the system with the goal of maximizing
their surplus through purchasing decisions). When supply is exogenous, whether the opti-
mal policy is a markup or a markdown depends on whether the high- or low-type customers
are relatively more strategic. When supply is endogenously determined, the optimal policy
is either to use a single price or to set the price high until the very end of the sales horizon,
and then drop it to capture the strategic low types.
[52] considers a setting where a monopolist faces a known downward-sloping demand
curve, comprised of a fixed and large number of customers who arrive in random order.
Before any of the customers arrive, the seller puts a separate price tag on each unit for
sale; these are fixed prices that remain valid until the item is sold. Customers may desire
more than one unit and, upon arrival, will purchase the units at the lowest available price,
provided that the marginal benefit of doing so is positive. Although he does not consider
a dynamic pricing markdown setting, [52] finds that the seller never needs to charge more
than two prices to maximize his revenues. The result we establish for a setting where
prices are time-dependent, i.e., the price of each unit changes over time and customers are
strategic, resonates with this result. In [52], rational or myopic customers’ behavior would
be identical, due to the static nature of the prices. The same is not true when prices of
individual items change over time, as is the case in our model.
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[32] consider a monopolist who uses a two-step markdown with exogenous prices in a
market whereN risk-averse customers each have a single-unit demand. The seller’s goal is to
maximize her profit by deciding on the initial stocking quantity, and implicitly determining
the rationing at the second step. The main differences between [32] and our work is that
they ignore the strategic interactions among individual customers (and hence do not solve
for an equilibrium); assuming that price is given they solve for the seller’s optimal quantity
decisions.
Table 2: Summary of research on dynamic posted pricing mechanisms with strategic
customers
Demand Structure Valuations
Stokey (1979) Single unit Complete (known valuations over time)
Besanko, Winston (1990) Single unit Incomplete (known common distribution)
Harris, Raviv (1981) Single unit Incomplete (known common distribution)
Aviv, Pazgal (2004) Single unit Complete (known valuations over time)
Su (2005) Single unit Complete (known fixed valuations)
Liu, van Ryzin (2005) Single unit Incomplete (known common distribution)
Our work Multi-unit Complete (known valuations) and
Incomplete (known common distribution)
Cannot be associated with individuals
Our work also departs from the papers above by considering a multi-unit demand set-
ting. Tables 1 and 2 summarize relevant research with myopic and strategic customers,
respectively. With the goal of complementing the papers from economics and operations
management, we seek to characterize the optimal markdown mechanism when the seller
has a fixed capacity and faces a (fixed) number of rational customers who demand multiple
units.
2.2 Model
We analyze the pricing decision of a seller (monopolist) who has K identical units of an
item for sale. The seller’s starting inventory is assumed to be exogenously given; this would
be the case, for example, if the K units were comprised of excess inventory for an end-
of-season item. We consider mechanisms where the seller announces the prices and the
inventory before the sales begin. (The assumption of pre-announced price is an innocuous
one under CI, since buyers will rationally solve for equilibrium prices. The same is not true
under IV.) We assume that the valuations of the buyers are constant over time and there
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is no discounting. (In Section 2.3, we show that our results easily extend to the case of
discounting under CI.) In addition, we assume that all the buyers are present at the start of
the markdown, and that each buyer remains until the markdown is over or until his entire
demand is satisfied. This implies that it is never optimal for the seller to increase prices over
time, in contrast to pricing policies that could emerge if customers arrived stochastically
over time, e.g. [44]. Hence, in our model the seller’s main decisions are the number of price
steps and the price at each step.
The seller wishes to implement an m-step markdown mechanism with price pk at step k,
where p1 > p2 > .. > pm. The seller faces N rational buyers with valuations (per unit) v1 >
v2 > . . . > vN . Buyer j wishes to purchase at most Dj > 0 units, ∀j, where Dj , j = 1 . . . N ,
is common knowledge. (The assumption of known (or deterministic) demand is commonly
used in the pricing literature in order to highlight the strategic interplay between pricing
decisions and sales [5, 26, 42].) We define D[p] =
∑
{j|vj≥p}Dj and refer to it as the ‘market
demand’ at price p, i.e., D[p] is the maximum possible demand at price p. At any (price)
step k, buyer j submits a quantity bid, qjk, indicating the number of units he wishes to
purchase at the current price, pk. Let q¯jk denote the quantity awarded to buyer j; note
that q¯jk may be smaller than qjk if the total bid quantity (
∑N
j=1 qjk) is greater than the
remaining inventory at step k. In that case, the seller uses the following random rationing
rule: Randomly choose a bidder j and assign him the minimum of qjk and the remaining
inventory. If there are remaining units, again randomly choose another bidder, and repeat
this procedure until the inventory is exhausted. As noted by [35] and [17], this random
allocation rule is consistent with the situation when all markdown items are sold on a first-
come-first-serve basis at the end of the season when all customers with unsatisfied demand
return to the store at the markdown price. It also has the advantage of circumventing the
strategic bid inflation that may occur in quantity-proportional allocation rules [9].
Both the seller and the buyers are risk neutral and want to maximize their expected
profits. The expected profit (or surplus) of buyer j is the difference between his valuation
for the item and the purchase price; that is, Πj =
∑m
k=1(vj − pk)q¯jk, j = 1, . . . , N, where∑m
k=1 q¯jk ≤ Dj . The seller’s expected revenue (or profit) is given by ΠS =
∑m
k=1
∑N
j=1 pkq¯jk.
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We make the following assumptions, commonly adopted in game-theoretic analysis,
concerning buyer behavior:
A1. In the last price step, if a buyer is indifferent between purchasing and not purchasing
(i.e., vj = pm and the buyer’s expected profit is the same under both alternatives), the
buyer prefers to purchase.
A2. If a buyer is indifferent between bidding his entire demand at step k or k′ > k, he
prefers to bid at step k.
Observation 1. In an m-step markdown mechanism, all customers with vj ≥ pm bid all
their remaining demand at step m, i.e., customers do not benefit from withholding any of
their demand at the last price step.
2.3 Markdown Mechanisms under Complete Information (CI)
In designing the optimal markdown mechanism, a seller who has K units for sale must
answer the following two questions: (1) How many price steps should there be? (2) What
should the price be at each step? In this section, we address these questions under the CI
setting.
We call a markdown mechanism effective if it induces positive bids at each price step.
Note that if the seller knows ex ante that a price step in a markdown mechanism will be
ineffective, then she can remove that price step at which no bids will occur and still obtain
the same revenue. We say that there is a scarcity of supply at price pk if the market demand
at that price is higher than the number of units available, i.e., D[pk] > K, or equivalently, if
pk ≤ pc, where pc is the clearing price, which is the highest price at which market demand
exceeds supply.
Observation 2. If pk > pc and the customers know pc, then customers have no incentive
to buy at any step i < k, i.e., at any price higher than pk.
This result is quite intuitive, since any customer j can postpone his purchases until
price step pk, without the risk of facing a scarcity in supply and receiving less than Dj .
In particular, if D[pm] ≤ K, then customers can postpone their purchases until the lowest
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price step pm. In such a case, the markdown mechanism is no different than a single-price
mechanism with price pm.
Based on Observation 2, a markdown mechanism cannot be effective if D[pm] ≤ K.
Similarly, the seller would have no need for a markdown if D1 > K since she could sell all
of her units to Customer 1 at a price of p = v1. Therefore, as we search for the optimal
markdown and markets in which it may be an appropriate pricing strategy, it is sufficient
to focus on market settings and markdowns satisfying the following conditions.
A3-CI. D1 < K, D[vN ] > K, i.e., the total market demand exceeds supply, and
D[pm] > K, i.e., there is scarcity at the lowest price step.
Two markdown pricing mechanisms are said to be equivalent if the mechanisms yield
the same profits (for both the buyers and the seller). A markdown mechanism M is said to
dominate a markdown mechanism L if M generates more (expected) profits for the seller
than L.
Theorem 1. For any m-step markdown mechanism, m > 2, there exists a two-step mark-
down mechanism that dominates or is equivalent to it, if the customers know the clearing
price pc.
Proof: Consider an m-step mechanism with prices p1, . . . , pm.
Case 1: pc ≥ p1. In this case, the maximum profit the seller can obtain is p1K. Consider
an alternative markdown with two steps, where p¯1 = pc +  ( → 0 can be thought of as
the minimum possible price increment), and p¯2 = pc. Under this two-step markdown, the
minimum profit of the seller is pcK ≥ p1K. Hence, the seller is no worse off, and may be
better off under the alternative two-step markdown.
Case 2: pc ≤ pm. Under the m-step markdown, the seller’s profit is given by pmK
(by Observation 2). The same level of profit can be obtained by a two-step markdown
mechanism with prices p¯1 = pm−1 and p¯2 = pm.
Case 3: p1 > pc > pm. Let pk be the largest price where pk ≤ pc. If k > 2, i.e., D[pi] ≤ K
∀i < k, buyers have no incentive to buy until pk−1 since they do not expect a scarcity of
supply before the price reaches pk. Hence, a markdown mechanism with prices pk−1, . . . , pm
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would result in the same profit for the seller (Observation 2). Now suppose that k < m, i.e.,
D[pi] > K, i = k, . . . ,m. (Note that the cases k > 2 and k < m are not necessarily mutually
exclusive.) We claim that the seller would be better off by eliminating the last price step
pm. Since D[pi] > K ∀pi ≤ pk, eliminating pm does not decrease the number of units sold.
We also need to show that the seller is guaranteed to sell all K units at the same or higher
prices than with the m-step markdown. Customers originally bidding at step m may bid
at higher price steps or they may not bid at all in the new markdown with fewer steps. If
they do not bid in the new mechanism, then the competition at the higher price levels is
unaffected. On the other hand, if they bid at higher price steps, then the competition can
only increase since there would be more customers bidding at a price step. As a result, at
any price step j < m, the competition either increases or remains the same, preventing the
seller’s revenue from decreasing. Hence, the revenue of the seller is not made any worse by
eliminating the lowest price step from the markdown. Using these arguments repeatedly,
any m-step markdown mechanism can be reduced to a two-step markdown mechanism with
prices pk−1, pk, yielding the seller equal or higher revenue. 2
Although based on a different market model, Theorem 1 parallels some of the earlier
results in the literature. [52] analyzes a static pricing mechanism that assigns prices for each
unit in the inventory. He shows that the seller never needs to charge more than two prices
to maximize revenues. [6] find that when customers demand at most one unit, a seller’s
expected profit increases as the number of price adjustments decreases. This is because as
the number of possible price adjustments increases, so does the customers’ price elasticity,
which dampens the seller’s ability to exercise her market power. We find a similar result for
the multi-unit demand case; fewer markdowns are preferred to multiple markdowns. [20]
study the problem where a set of allowable prices, as well as the initial price, is given and
the goal is to find the optimal timing of the price change. [22] study a similar but more
general problem than in [20] where the optimal initial price and the price path have to be
chosen from a discrete set of allowable prices. They find that under the assumption of a
deterministic demand function, the optimal solution has two price points: (1) some pk∗ for
a specified period of time and (2) a neighboring price pk∗+1 for the rest of the selling season.
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We find a similar result in the case of strategic customer behavior and multi-unit demands.
Remark: The results in Observation 2 and Theorem 1 require only that the customers
know the clearing price pc, i.e., the informational requirements are less restrictive than CI.
Theorem 1 allows us to narrow our search for the optimal markdown from a general
m-step mechanism to a specific two-step markdown mechanism under CI. Before we can
characterize the optimal two-step markdown, we need to analyze the customers’ bidding
behavior. For expositional ease, we state our main results in the main text and relegate
most of the proofs to the Appendix A.
Theorem 2. Under a two-step markdown mechanism, it is a dominant strategy for buyer
j, j = 1, . . . , N , to submit an all-or-nothing bid, i.e., to submit either all or none of his
demand at a price step.
The proof of Theorem 2 is comprised of solving for the buyers’ best response bidding
strategies. We show that the expected profit of a buyer as a function of his bid quantity
at any step is convex, and is maximized at one of the boundary points regardless of its
opponents’ bids. Therefore, submitting all-or-nothing bids is a dominant strategy. The
result also holds if the customer valuations decrease over time (i.e., due to a discount factor
0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 or customer j’s valuation drops to δvj in step 2, ∀j). Furthermore, we will show in
Theorem 7 that this result carries over to the setting when there is incomplete information
about customer valuations (Section 2.4).
Summarizing our results so far: (1) When pc is known, as is the case under CI, it is
sufficient for the seller to focus on two-step markdowns, since any additional price steps in
the markdown will not improve profits. (2) Under a two-step markdown (p1, p2), a buyer
will either submit all of his demand at p1 or at p2. Hence, we have already answered two out
of our initial three questions. The question that remains is: What are the optimal prices in
an effective markdown? (Recall that an effective markdown induces positive bids at each
price step. If a two-step markdown is ineffective at one of its prices, then it is equivalent to
and can be replaced by a single-price policy.)
Observation 3. In a two-step markdown mechanism, the optimal price for the second step,
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p∗2, is equal to the valuation of some customer, i.e., p∗2 = vj for some j.
Next, we characterize the optimal p1.
Observation 4. In an optimal effective two-step markdown mechanism, the prices satisfy
D[p1] < K and D[p2] > K.
Proof Consider a two-step markdown mechanism (p1, p2), where D[p1] ≥ K. Consider
an alternative mechanism (p¯1, p¯2) where p¯2 = p1 and p¯1 > p1 such that 0 < D[p¯1] < K.
The maximum profit the seller can obtain with prices p1 and p2 is Kp1. Conversely, with
prices p¯1 and p¯2, the minimum profit the seller can obtain is Kp1. The fact that D[p2] > K
follows directly from A3-CI. 2
Observation 4 implies that in an effective optimal markdown, there is no scarcity at the
high price but there is scarcity at the low price, motivating the high types to buy at p1.
To find the optimal value of p1, we must first identify the buyers’ subgame-perfect
Nash equilibrium (SPNE) bidding strategies. In Section 2.3.1, we focus on the case of
two customers, characterize the equilibria in a two-step optimal markdown, and compare
the markdown mechanism with the optimal single price in terms of seller’s profits. In
Section 2.3.2, we extend some of these results to multiple customers.
2.3.1 Two Customers
In this subsection, we consider a seller who faces two customers (N = 2) with valuations
v1 > v2 and demands of D1 and D2 units. Following A3-CI and observations 3 and 4 we
assume that D1 < K and D1 +D2 > K and that the seller employs a markdown satisfying
D[p1] < K and D[p2] > K. Without loss of generality, we also assume D2 ≤ K because
additional demand above K from Customer 2 does not further increase the competition at
step 2. Hence, we focus our attention on markdown mechanisms that satisfy the following
condition: v1 > p1 > v2 = p2.
Obviously, p1 should be within the range (v1, v2) if the markdown mechanism is to be
effective. If p1 > v1, neither buyer will submit a positive bid at p1; if p1 = v1, the high
valuation buyer is made strictly better off waiting and submitting all of his demand at p2,
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rendering the two-step markdown mechanism ineffective. Borrowing from the language in
[18], we label such an equilibrium to be a pooling outcome, since both customers bid their
entire demand in the second step and the markdown fails to separate the bids of the two
types.
We next characterize the set of prices that induce Customer 1 to bid at p1.
Proposition 3. Given a markdown mechanism with prices p1 and p2 = v2, Customer 1
bids his entire demand at step 1 if and only if p1 ≤ pˆCI(v1, v2), where
pˆCI(v1, v2) = p2 + (v1 − v2)D1 +D2 −K2D1 . (1)
Proof. Since we have p2 = v2, buyer 2 will bid all of his demand at step 2 (q21 = 0
and q22 = D2). From Theorem 2, buyers submit all-or-nothing bids; hence, buyer 1 has
two options: (a) Bid D1 at step 1 and get a guaranteed surplus of Π11 = D1(v1 − p1), or
(b) bid zero at step 1 and D1 in step 2. If the buyer chooses option (b), with probability
0.5, he has the priority in the random allocation and gets D1; similarly, with probability
0.5, buyer 2 has the priority and buyer 1 gets K −D2. This leads to an expected surplus
of Π12 = D1+K−D22 (v1 − v2) for Customer 1 under option (2). Customer 1 bids in step 1 if
and only if Π11 ≥ Π12 i.e., p1 ≤ pˆCI(v1, v2). 2
Customer 1’s expected unmet demand is D1+D2−K2 if he bids at step 2. The expression
D1+D2−K
2D1
in Equation (1) denotes the ratio of Customer 1’s expected unmet demand to D1,
if he chooses to bid at p2. Hence, (v1 − v2)D1+D2−K2D1 is premium charged by the seller,
which is the maximum additional amount (above p2 = v2) per unit Customer 1 is willing
to pay to secure his demand by bidding at p1. Table 3 summarizes all possible outcomes of
a markdown mechanism with prices p1 and p2 = v2.
Table 3: Optimal quantity bids of the customers under a two-step markdown mechanism
with p2 = v2.
Non-Pooling Pooling
p1 ≤ pˆCI(v1, v2) p1 > pˆCI(v1, v2)
Step 1 Bids (q11, q21) (D1,0) (0,0)
Step 2 Bids (q12, q22) (0,D2) (D1, D2)
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Proposition 4. Under an effective markdown, the optimal price at step 1 is p∗1 = pˆCI(v1, v2).
The proof of Proposition 4 follows by showing that the profit function of the seller
is strictly monotonically increasing (in p1) up to pˆCI(v1, v2), after which it sharply drops
to v2K and remains constant. Hence, this break point pˆCI(v1, v2) is the optimal price
p∗1 at which Customer 1 is indifferent between buying at step 1 or step 2. By our earlier
assumption (A2), Customer 1 bids his entire demand at step 1. The optimal first step price,
p∗1, increases with v1, v2, D1, and D2 and decreases with K. These dynamics indicate that
price increases as the customers’ demand or willingness to pay increases, and decreases if
the supply increases.
Note: Recall that multi-unit demand is an important generalization in our model com-
pared to the previous literature. One may question whether our results trivially follow if
we were to replace a single customer who demands D1 units with D1 customers who each
demand one unit. In the case of two customers, we showed that the optimal first step price
is p∗1 = v1−(v1−v2)D1+K−D22D1 (by rearranging the terms in Equation (1)). Consider instead
a setting where there are D1 customers with single-unit demand and a valuation of v1, and
D2 customers with single-unit demand and a valuation of v2. If the buyer uses a random
allocation rule at price p2, then the optimal first step price that induces all v1 customers to
purchase at that price is given by psingle1 = v1 − (v1 − v2)K−D1+1D2+1 . As is evident from the
optimal prices, setting prices for single unit demand is not identical to pricing for multi-unit
demand. Furthermore, we can establish the relationship between psingle1 and p
∗
1. We find
that psingle1 > p
∗
1 and hence the seller’s revenue is higher from single-unit demand customers
when K−D1+1D2+1 <
D1+K−D2
2D1
: From A3-CI, this condition reduces to D1 > D2+12 . Hence, our
results for the multi-unit demand case require a separate analysis and do not follow by a
transformation of the model to the case of multiple customers with single-unit demands.
Extensions: Our results easily extend to the case of decreasing valuations over time
(or discounting). Suppose customer j’s valuation drops to δvj in step 2, 0 < δ ≤ 1. In this
case, the threshold step 1 price becomes:
pˆCI(v1, v2, δ) = (1− δ)v1 + δv2 + δ(v1 − v2)D1 +D2 −K2D1 (2)
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If δ = 1, i.e., no discounting, then Equation (2) is equivalent to Equation (1). If δ = 0,
i.e., the customer receives no value from the good if he waits for the second step, then
pˆCI(v1, v2, δ) = v1. If δ ∈ (0, 1), we have ∂pˆCI(v1,v2,δ)∂δ = −(v1−v2)D1+K−D22D1 , which is always
negative (since D2 ≤ K without loss of generality). Hence, the threshold step 1 price is
decreasing in δ, implying that Customer 1 is willing to pay a higher premium in the first
step, if his value for the good is less in the second step. If the customers are risk-averse with
constant valuations over time, similar observations as in the case of discounting hold, since
the portion of the revenue generated in the second step of the markdown will be discounted
in a similar way due to risk aversion.
2.3.1.1 Comparing Markdown and Single Price Mechanisms
We compare the performance of our markdown mechanism to that of the commonly used
optimal single price mechanism. The structure of the optimal single (monopoly) price is
well-studied in the economics literature [29, 48]. For the sake of completeness, we restate
the following observations about the optimal single price p∗ when the seller faces discrete
demand.
Observation 5. In the CI setting, p∗ ∈ {v1, . . . , vN}.
Based on this observation, we can easily compute the optimal single price p∗ as follows:
Recall that D[vj ] denotes the market demand if the price is set equal to vj , and let Π0S [j] =
min{D[vj ],K}vj denote the corresponding total revenue (profit) of the seller. Then, p∗ =
arg maxvj Π
0
S [j]. Note that p
∗ can be higher than the clearing price pc.
Since the optimal single price is equal to one of the customer valuations, the seller has
two choices for the single-price p; v1 or v2.
If p = v1, only the high-valuation customer can afford to buy at v1, and the seller
effectively excludes the low-valuation customer from the market. We denote this alternative
with (SP1) and it corresponds to a revenue of v1D1. On the other hand, if p = v2, then
both customers can afford the product. We call this (SP2) and it yields a revenue of v2K
for the seller.
The seller chooses (SP1), if v1D1 > v2K, and chooses (SP2), otherwise.
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Observation 6. If (SP2) is the optimal single price mechanism, then the markdown mech-
anism with prices (p∗1, v2) dominates the optimal single price.
Observation 7. If (SP1) is the optimal single price mechanism, then the markdown mech-
anism with prices (p∗1, v2) dominates the optimal single price if and only if (v1 + v2)D1 <
(v1 − v2)D2 +K(3v2 − v1), i.e., v2v1 > K+D1−D23K−(D1+D2) .
Observation 6 is quite intuitive: The seller’s profits under the markdown mechanism will
be at least v2K if both customers were to buy in step 2. But since the optimal markdown
is effective, Customer 1 will buy in step 1 at price p∗1 > v2, increasing the seller’s profits
above v2K.
When (SP1) is the optimal single price (Observation 7), we find that a two-step mark-
down mechanism is more likely to dominate the optimal single price when the following are
true: (1) D2 is very large relative to D1, (2) the valuations of the two customers are close,
and/or (3) K is close to the total demand of both customers, D1 + D2. Conversely, SP1
will outperform the optimal markdown if these three conditions are not met. As Conditions
(1)-(3) become stronger, the optimal single price will switch to (SP2), and a markdown will
always be optimal. Figure 12 in Appendix A plots the seller’s revenues under the optimal
markdown, and illustrates when a markdown or a single price is optimal.
2.3.2 Multiple Customers
In this section, we generalize some of our earlier results and insights to multiple customers.
It is important to recall that Theorems 1 and 2 are general results for any N ≥ 2 customers,
i.e., the seller can restrict her search for the optimal markdown to a two-step markdown,
and customers submit all-or-nothing bids in equilibrium. A consequence of this is that, as
opposed to the case of two customers, we can no longer hope to design a markdown where
each customer bids at a different price step. The best that we can achieve under an effective
markdown is a partitioning of customers into three groups, with the first group purchasing
all of their demand at p1, the second group purchasing at p2, and the third group (possibly
an empty set) not making any purchases.
Following Observation 4, in this section, we consider markdown mechanisms (p1, p2) with
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D[p1] < K and D[p2] > K, i.e., customers are guaranteed to receive their bid quantities in
the first step and there is scarcity in the second step. Hence, let vn, n ≤ N , be the smallest
valuation greater than or equal to p2. Let S3 = {n+1, . . . , N} be the set of customers with
valuations less than p2. In equilibrium, the customers in S3 bid nothing at either price step.
Therefore, in the remainder of this section, we focus on customers 1, . . . , n.
Theorem 5. Consider a markdown mechanism (p1, p2) with D[p1] < K and D[p2] > K.
Given the conditions (C1) and (C2) below, if there exists a partition {S1, S2} of customers
{1, . . . , n} such that (C1) is satisfied for all t ∈ S1 and (C2) is satisfied for all s ∈ S2,
then the following bidding strategy is the (subgame-perfect) Nash equilibrium for customers
1, . . . , n.
Equilibrium Strategy (ES):
(1) If i ∈ S1, bid Di at step 1 and nothing at step 2.
(2) If i ∈ S2, bid nothing at step 1 and Di at step 2.
where
Dt(vt − p1) ≥ (vt − p2)E[At] ∀t ∈ S1 (C1)
Ds(vs − p1) < (vs − p2)E[As] ∀s ∈ S2 (C2)
and E[Aj ] is the expected allocation of customer j in step 2 if all customers (except j) bid
according to ES and j bids his entire demand at step 2. We have
E[Aj ] =
1
n!
∑
∀pi∈U
min
(K − ∑
i∈Bjpi
Di −
∑
i∈S1\{j}
Di)+, Dj
 ,
where U denotes the set of all permutations of {j} ∪ S2 and Bjpi ⊆ S2 denotes the set of
customers whose bid quantities are satisfied before customer j in step 2 in some permutation
pi ∈ U .
Theorem 5 formally states how customers would determine at which step to bid by
comparing their expected profits from bidding at step 1 versus step 2. Note that it is
possible to have a partition where S1 is empty, i.e., all customers bid at step 2.
In general, we would be interested in situations where “high” types bid at step 1 and
“low” types bid at step 2. Hence, we would like to determine conditions under which
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S1 = {0, 1, . . . , j} and S2 = {j + 1, . . . , n} for some j ≥ 0 (where 0 denotes a dummy
customer who always bids at step 1 and S1 = {0} indicates that all customers bid at
step 2). Proposition 6 provides a sufficient condition for such a high-low partitioning of
customers to exist.
Proposition 6. Consider a markdown mechanism (p1, p2) with D[p1] < K and D[p2] > K.
If D1 ≥ D2 ≥ . . . ≥ Dn, then there exists a partitioning of customers into {S1, S2} such
that S1 = {0, . . . , j} and S2 = {j + 1, . . . , n} for some 0 ≤ j < n and customers in Si bid
at step i, i = 1, 2, in equilibrium.
The search for the optimal prices is equivalent to searching for the optimal sets S1, S2,
and S3. If the seller wants to induce a particular partition {S1, S2, S3} in equilibrium,
using conditions (C1) and (C2), she first needs to characterize the range of prices where the
optimal p1 falls, for a given p2. Given its feasible range, the seller can then determine p1 as
a function of p2. From Observation 3, we know that p2 = vk for some k ≤ N . The seller
can find the optimal price pair {p1, p2} by searching over all valuations for p2 (in at most
N steps) and the corresponding optimal p1.
The proposed search method for finding the optimal price pair would work efficiently if
the seller only needs to consider a reasonable number of partitions and if p1 can be found
easily for a given p2. For example, when D1 = . . . = DN = D and K = rD (where
r is a positive integer), the seller only needs to consider partitions S1 = {0, . . . , j} and
S2 = {j + 1, . . . , k} for j ≤ r < k ≤ N (from Proposition 6); hence, the optimal p1 can
be found in at most r steps for each possible p2 = vk, k > r. As a result, the seller
can identify the optimal markdown efficiently in O(N2) time, which is polynomial in the
number of customer types. The price range for p1 that induces the partition {S1, S2} is
[vj+1 − (vj+1 − p2) r−jn−j , vj − (vj − p2) r−j+1n−j+1 ]. It is important to note that this range may
be empty, implying that partition {S1, S2} cannot be supported in equilibrium under any
price p1 for p2 = vk. For any partition supportable in equilibrium under equal demands,
the seller’s profits are maximized by setting p1 as follows:
p1 = p2 + (vj − p2) n− r
n− j + 1 (3)
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This has an interpretation similar to the optimal p1 for the two-customer setting given
in Equation (1). The expression n−rn−j+1 in Equation (3) denotes the ratio of customer j’s
expected unmet demand to his total demand, if he chooses to bid at p2. Hence, (vj −
p2) n−rn−j+1 is the maximum additional amount (above p2) per unit that customer j is willing
to pay to secure his entire demand by bidding at p1.
The choice of p2 determines which customers are excluded (S3) and included (S1 and
S2) in the market. There are two countervailing forces working in the selection of p2. A
lower p2 increases the seller’s market (total demand), and hence increases the scarcity at
p2, providing the incentive for a high-type customer to bid at p1. However a lower p2 also
implies reduced revenues for the seller from the units sold at that step and provides an
incentive for a high type to bid at p2.
2.3.3 Numerical Experiments
To gain insights on the structure and performance of the optimal markdown mechanism,
we conducted numerical experiments. We examined how the optimal markdown prices vary
according to the distribution of valuations and the supply level (Figure 1(a)-(c)) and the
conditions under which markdown revenues exceed single price revenues (Figure 1(d)). In
our experiments, we assumed that customers are drawn from two groups, high- and low-
valuation customers. Hence, we randomly selected customer valuations from a bimodal
distribution, where half of the customers have valuations drawn from a uniform distribution
over [100, 100+δ] and the remaining half have valuations drawn from a uniform distribution
over [200−δ, 200]. Such clustering of valuations allows us to model multiple customers while
keeping a link to the two-customer case for comparison purposes. Note that as δ increases,
the difference between the valuations of the two customer groups decreases. We ran the
experiments with 10 different values of δ = 5, 10, 15,..., 50. For each δ value, we tested fifty
instances with 20 customers, each with a demand of 10 units; hence, the total demand in
the market is 20 × 10 = 200. We examined six different supply scenarios where the seller
has enough supply to meet Q% of the total demand in the market (i.e., K = QD100 ), where
Q = {30, 40, 50, 60, 70 and 80}. Figure 1 presents the properties of the optimal markdown
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averaged over 50 randomly drawn instances.
From Figure 1(a), we observe that as δ increases, i.e., the expected customer valuations
get closer to each other, p1 decreases for all supply levels. The effect of δ on p2 and the
depth of the markdown critically depend on the supply level (Figures 1(b) and (c)). When
supply levels are low (Q < 50), we find that p2 is set very high for δ = 5 and then decreases
in δ; in addition, the depth of the markdown p1−p2p1 increases in δ. The opposite is true when
supply levels are moderate to high (Q ≥ 50) where p2 is set low for δ = 5, p2 increases
and the depth of markdown decreases in δ. It is interesting to note that the depth of the
markdown is the greatest for Q = 50. However, when δ = 50 the depth of the average
markdown is between 7-10% for all supply levels.
When δ = 50, the customers’ valuations are generally evenly distributed across the
entire range [100,200] - the distinction between a ‘high’ and ‘low’ types becomes weaker. As
a result, inducing a separation between these two groups requires a smaller price difference,
which implies that the optimal markdown is almost revenue equivalent to the optimal single
price (Figure 1(d)). It is worth pointing out that while the depth of the markdown if fairly
consistent across supply levels (when δ = 50), the actual price values do depend on K, as
is clearly illustrated in Figures 1(a) and (b).
The interplay between K and p2 is a very interesting one. Recall that as the seller
decreases p2, she increases the number of customers who are able to purchase at p2 and
hence increases the ‘scarcity’ at p2. All else being equal, an increase in scarcity at p2 creates
greater incentives for a high valuation customer to purchase at p1, whereas a reduction in p2
increases his incentive to purchase at p2. When supply levels are low (Q < 50), the seller’s
optimal balancing act between these two forces weighs in favor of a high p2; while the seller
includes only a few customers in the market to purchase at a high p2, this allows her to
keep p1 high as well and maintain an effective markdown. As K increases, the increase in
supply induces the seller to include more customers in the market by decreasing p2. If the
seller were to decrease p2 by a small amount, the scarcity level at p2 would not be enough
to support any purchases at p1, i.e., the markdown would not be effective. Hence, the seller
finds it optimal to decrease p2 substantially. While she receives a lower revenue (per unit)
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from sales at p2, the increased scarcity at p2 allows her to support an effective markdown
where p1 is still significantly greater than p2.
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Figure 1: Average optimal prices and revenues for each valuation distribution and supply
scenario. Each data point represents the average of fifty instances.
When we look at the difference between the revenues of markdown and single-price
mechanisms (Figure 1(d)), we see that whether or not a markdown dominates the optimal
single-price mechanism depends on supply levels as well as the dispersion of valuations in
the market. When supply levels are low (Q < 50), the markdown and single price are
almost equivalent for all δ. This is fairly intuitive, since the depth of the markdown is very
small, rendering it equivalent to a single price. When Q = 50 the single price outperforms
the markdown for all δ. When Q = 50, the optimal single price is most likely to be the
valuation of the 10th customer, v10 (lowest-valuation ‘high’ type). However, p2 must be less
than v10 under an effective markdown in order to guarantee scarcity at p2 and to induce
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some ‘high’-valuation customers to purchase at p1. As a result, the performance of the
markdown suffers. When supply levels are higher (Q > 50) a markdown yields higher
revenues over a wide range of settings. The difference in revenues is a unimodal function of
δ, and the markdown performs best when the depth of the markdown is between 20-25%
for all K. The maximum percentage difference occurs at δ = 25, 30, and 40 for Q = 80,
70, and 60, respectively. In summary, we observe that a markdown is almost equivalent to
a single price when supply levels are low, and that a markdown will dominate the optimal
single price when either (i) the supply is moderate and δ is high, or (ii) the supply is high
and δ is moderate. (Note that condition (i) is similar to the condition in Observation 7 for
the case of two customers.)
2.4 Equilibrium Bidding Behavior and Mechanism Design under In-
complete Information (IV)
In the previous section, we answered the following questions for a complete information
setting: (1) How will rational buyers bid when facing a markdown? (2) How many price
steps are there in an optimal markdown? (3) Under what conditions would the seller be
better off implementing a single price vs. markdown pricing? In this section we extend our
analysis to an incomplete valuation information (IV) setting. Under IV, we assume that the
valuation of customer j is drawn from [vj , v¯j ] with probability distribution function Fj(.),
∀j, where vj > v¯j+1, i.e., valuations are drawn from non-overlapping intervals (Figure 2).
Each customer knows his own valuation with certainty and both the seller and the customers
know the pdf and CDF of other customers’ valuations.
First, we show that the all-or-nothing bidding result we had for two-step markdowns
under CI (Theorem 2) carries over to the IV setting and m-step markdowns.
Theorem 7. Under IV, in an m-step markdown with prices p1 > . . . > pm customers
submit all-or-nothing bids in equilibrium.
In Section 2.3 we showed that under CI a two-step markdown was sufficient to maximize
the seller’s revenue (Theorem 1). This result relies on the fact that buyers know the clearing
price, pc, under CI. When the customer valuations are unknown, pc may not be known with
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certainty; hence, we cannot claim that a two-step markdown is always optimal. However, we
can easily determine in which customer’s valuation interval pc falls and use this information
to gain insights into the properties of the optimal markdown. Let k be such that
∑k−1
j=1 Dj <
K and
∑k
j=1Dj ≥ K. That is, pc ∈ [vk, v¯k].
Observation 8. In an effective optimal m-step markdown
(i) there is at most one price exceeding v¯k
(ii) there is at most one price less than vk and it is in the interval [vj , v¯j ] for some j ∈
{k, . . . , N}
(iii) all other intermediate prices occur in the range [vk, v¯k] .
Observation 8 states that in an effective optimal markdown, there exists at most one
price (p1) at which the buyers are guaranteed to receive their bid quantities. In addition,
the lowest price pm is in the valuation interval of some customer j ≥ k. Note that we cannot
simply replace the lowest price pm with vk (or any other higher price) without potentially
having an adverse effect on seller’s revenue (i.e., increasing the lowest price may reduce the
competition at the last step, which could prevent customers who were originally bidding at
higher prices from doing so). All other (intermediate) prices must occur within the interval
[vk, v¯k], which is the interval containing the clearing price (Figure 2). Note that p1 and pm
may themselves fall within [vk, v¯k].
1122.......... vvvvvvvvvv kkjjNN
1p12 ,..., −mppmp
Figure 2: Candidate structure for price steps in an effective optimal m-step markdown
under IV.
Since all intermediate prices must occur in the interval [vk, v¯k], we do not know if a
two, three, or m-step markdown is optimal. In B2C markets, we see that price reductions
are typically rather large, e.g., a retailer does not drop the price of a $44 item to $43, but
rather to $29. This suggests that the retailer is trying to access a new customer group
with each price reduction. Motivated by these practices, we next consider a narrower yet
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intuitive setting of markdown mechanisms, where there is at most one price step in each
customer valuation interval. More formally, we consider a family of interval markdowns,
INT markdowns, defined as follows:
INT Markdown There is at most one price drawn from each interval [v¯j , v¯j−1], ∀j =
2, . . . , N + 1, where v¯N+1 = vN .
Observation 9. In an effective INT markdown, there are at most three price steps. Fur-
thermore, if the markdown has three steps, then p1 > v¯k, p2 ∈ [vk, v¯k], and p3 ∈ [vj , v¯j ] for
some j ≥ k, where [vk, v¯k] is the interval containing the clearing price.
The proof follows directly from Observation 8.
Next, we would like to understand when an optimal INT markdown will have two steps
vs. three steps. Although we are not able to answer this question in general, we state a
sufficient condition for a two-step INT markdown to be optimal.
Observation 10. If pc ∈ [vN , v¯N ], then in an effective INT markdown, there are at most
two price steps, where p1 > v¯N and p2 ∈ [vN , v¯N ].
From Observation 10, when D1 + D2 + . . . + DN−1 ≤ K, in an m-step markdown
customers are partitioned into two or fewer groups, depending on whether or not they may
bid at a given price step. For example, if v¯j > p1 > v¯j+1, customers are partitioned into
{1, . . . , j} and {j, . . . , N} where the first group may bid at p1, whereas the second group
can only bid at p2.
Corollary 8. If D1 +D2 + . . .+DN−1 ≤ K, then a two-step INT markdown is equivalent
to or dominates any 3-step INT markdown.
It remains to characterize the optimal markdown. For the remainder of this section, we
characterize the optimal markdown and compare its performance against the optimal single
price when N = 2. As will quickly become clear, designing the optimal markdown under
IV is quite complicated even when N = 2.
2.4.1 Two Customers under IV
Given that a seller is facing two customers, an INT markdown has 2 steps. While we cannot
guarantee that a two-step markdown will be optimal, we believe this to be a reasonable
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framework for analysis given their common use in practice [20], and the theoretical [6, 22]
and empirical results [20, 42] supporting their near-optimal performance under various
market settings.
Following the conditions and the intuition laid out in A3-CI, we focus only on market
settings where D1 < K and D1 +D2 > K, and markdown mechanisms, where D¯[p1] < K
and D¯[p2] > K, i.e., Customer 1 is guaranteed to receive his entire quantity bid if he
should bid at the first price step, but may face scarcity if he bids at the second price step.
These conditions imply that we are searching for the optimal INT markdown that satisfies:
v¯1 ≥ p1 > v¯2 > p2 ≥ v2.
From Observation 1, we know that Customer 2 will bid his entire demand at step 2 with
probability 1− F2(p2), i.e., only if v2 ≥ p2; otherwise, he does not bid at all. Furthermore,
we know from Theorem 7 that Customer 1 with valuation v1 bids his entire demand at
either p1 or p2. Proposition 9 summarizes customer 1’s bidding behavior under IV.
Proposition 9. Given a markdown mechanism with prices p1 and p2, Customer 1 bids D1
at step 1 if and only if p1 ≤ pˆIV (v1, p2), or equivalently, v1 ≥ vˆ1(p1, p2); otherwise, he bids
D1 at step 2, where
pˆIV (v1, p2) = p2 + (v1 − p2)(1− F2(p2))D1 +D2 −K2D1 (4)
vˆ1(p1, p2) = p2 +
(p1 − p2)
1− F2(p2)
2D1
D1 +D2 −K (5)
A markdown mechanism (pˆIV (v1, p2), p2) makes customer 1 indifferent between bidding
at steps 1 and 2. That is, pˆIV (.) is the threshold step 1 price above which Customer 1 will not
bid at step 1. Note the similarity between the threshold step 1 price under IV (equation (4))
and CI (equations (1) and (3)) settings. In Equation (4), the term (1− F2(p2))D1+D2−K2D1
indicates the “scarcity” at step 2, i.e., it is the ratio of the expected unmet demand of
Customer 1 to his entire demand if he bids his entire demand at step 2. Since the scarcity
increases in D1 and D2 and decreases in K, the threshold step 1 price increases in D1 and
D2, and decreases in K. As in the CI setting, the second term of the threshold step 1 price
is the premium that the high-type customer is willing to pay to secure his entire demand
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at step 1. Similarly, vˆ1(p1, p2) is the threshold valuation below which Customer 1 would not
bid at step 1.
For a markdown not to be pooling, the threshold valuation should not exceed v¯1, or
equivalently, the step 1 price should be below the threshold step 1 price for the highest-
possible type.
Corollary 10. If vˆ1(p1, p2) > v¯1, equivalently, if p1 > pˆIV (v¯1, p2), then F1(vˆ1) = 1 and
Customer 1 never bids at p1; that is, the markdown is always pooling.
From Corollary 10, a markdown mechanism where p1 > pˆIV (v¯1, p2) is always pooling (for
all possible realizations of customer valuations), and hence, is equivalent to or dominated
by the optimal single price. Therefore, in our search for the optimal non-pooling INT
markdown, we focus our search on markdowns satisfying the following:
A4-IV pˆIV (v¯1, p2) ≥ p1 > v¯2 > p2 ≥ v2
It is also interesting to know when all Customer 1 types will bid at p1. This happens
when the threshold valuation is below the lowest Customer 1 type v1 (or equivalently, when
the step 1 price is below the threshold step 1 price for the lowest Customer 1 type).
Corollary 11. If vˆ1(p1, p2) ≤ v1, equivalently, if p1 ≤ pˆIV (v1, p2), then F1(vˆ1) = 0 and
every Customer 1 type will bid at p1.
When the threshold valuation for a given (p1, p2) falls in (v1, v¯1), then only a strict
subset of customer 1 types will bid at p1 (Figure 3).
Corollary 12. If v1 < vˆ1(p1, p2) ≤ v¯1, equivalently, if pˆIV (v1, p2) < p1 ≤ pˆIV (v¯1, p2) then
0 < F1(vˆ1) < 1 and customer 1 bids at p1 if and only if vˆ1(p1, p2) ≤ v1; that is, the resulting
markdown is potentially separating and only some subset of Customer 1 types will submit a
quantity bid at p1.
From Corollaries 11 and 12, the seller’s choice of p1, for a given p2, determines whether
a markdown mechanism will induce all or only some Customer 1 types to purchase at p1,
which we refer to as totally separating (TS) and potentially separating (PS) markdowns,
respectively (see Figure 3). In a TS markdown, all Customer 1 types bid at p1 whereas in
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Figure 3: Seller’s alternative choices for p1, given p2.
a PS markdown only Customer 1 types within [vˆ1, v¯1] bid at p1, with the remaining types
bidding at p2.
Given the customers’ equilibrium behavior, the seller wishes to design a markdown
that maximizes her expected profits. The seller’s problem is significantly more complicated
under an IV setting than a CI two-customer setting, for the seller must decide on both the
optimal p2 and the optimal p1. Under IV, it is no longer clear that a seller can or should
try to design a markdown that is TS (as was the case under CI). Interestingly, we find
conditions/examples that illustrate that a seller may be better off with a PS markdown,
whereby Customer 1 will purchase at p2 for some realizations of valuation. An additional
challenge facing the seller is the choice of p2. Under CI, p∗2 = v2 always, and hence Customer
2 always bids at the second price step. Under IV, to induce all Customer 2 types to bid
at p2 the seller must set p2 = v2. However, a higher p2 may allow the seller to charge
a higher p1 and increase his profits. Note that this is somewhat similar to the problem
faced by the seller under CI with N > 2 customers, i.e., the choice of p2 determines which
customers are excluded from and included in the market. Under IV, the effect of increasing
p2 on the surplus of Customer 1 is two-fold: the expected per unit surplus of Customer 1
from bidding at step 2 decreases, but his expected allocation increases since the probability
that Customer 2 can bid at step 2 decreases. Therefore pˆIV (v1, p2) might be decreasing or
increasing in p2. We provide examples below that illustrate that it may be optimal to set
p2 > v2.
In solving the seller’s problem, we must
• identify the p2 ranges for which TS and PS markdowns are feasible (i.e., exist satisfying
A4-IV),
• identify the optimal TS and PS markdowns, namely, (p∗TS1 , p∗TS2 ) and (p∗PS1 , p∗PS2 ),
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respectively, over their respective feasible regions, and
• determine whether a TS or PS markdown or single price leads to higher (expected)
revenues for the seller.
Figure 4 shows (for uniformly distributed valuations) how the existence of PS and TS
markdowns depends on the “scarcity” of supply measured by D1+D2−K2D1 (the ratio of cus-
tomer 1’s expected unmet demand to his entire demand, if both customers bid at step 2):
If scarcity is low, it is more likely to see a pooling outcome. (Figure 4 is based on Results
1 and 2 presented in Appendix A. Figure 4 assumes v¯1 − v1 < v¯2 − v2, which does not
necessarily need to hold. If v¯1− v1 ≥ v¯2− v2, then (c) would be replaced by (c’) where only
PS exists for all p2 over
v¯2−v2
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Figure 4: Existence of INT markdowns satisfying A4-IV as a function of market parame-
ters.
The analysis that goes into answering the three questions above is quite involved and
lengthy. So as not to encumber the reader with these derivations, we relegate most of this
analysis to Appendix A and provide our main results and insights below via numerical
instances that are representative of the general results found in Section 2.4.3. Given the
intractability of finding closed-form solutions for generic distribution functions in this set-
ting, the analysis that follows assumes that the customer valuations are drawn from uniform
distributions. Before we present our numerical examples, we characterize the optimal single
price under IV.
2.4.2 Comparison to the Optimal Single Price
As in Section 2.3, we compare the performance of an INT markdown to that of the optimal
single price. We first characterize the optimal single price as a function of the market setting
when there are N ≥ 2 customers.
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Observation 11. In the (IV) setting, p∗ ∈ [vj , v¯j ] for some customer j, j = 1, . . . , N .
Note that p∗ ≤ v¯1, otherwise, the seller would not be able to sell any units. Assume
vi > p∗ > v¯i+1 for some i < N . The seller could increase her profits by setting p′ = vi, and
sell the same number of units as she did at price p∗, thereby contradicting the optimality
of p∗.
Using this observation, the seller can easily compute the optimal single price p∗ as fol-
lows. Define the maximum potential market demand at price p as D¯[p] =
∑
i:v¯i≥pDi. Let
p∗i be the best single price that falls within the valuation interval of customer i, that is, p∗i =
arg maxvi≤p≤v¯iΠ
0
S [i], where Π
0
S [i] =
{
min{D¯[p],K}(1− Fi(p)) + min{(D¯[p]−Di),K}Fi(p)
}
p.
Then the optimal single price is p∗ = p∗k, where Π0S [k] ≥ Π0S [i] for all i 6= k.
With N = 2, the structure of the optimal single price implies that the seller has two
choices for the single-price p:
(SP1) : Set p ∈ [v1, v¯1]; excluding the low-valuation customer from the market to receive
a revenue of Π0S [1].
(SP2) : Set p ∈ [v2, v¯2] and possibly sell to both customers and receive revenue Π0S [2]. It is
important to point out the different interpretations of (SP1) and (SP2) under IV from CI
when N = 2. Under IV, the seller cannot guarantee that Customer 1 will purchase under
SP1, provided that p > v1. A similar statement is true for Customer 2 and (SP2).
Proposition 13. If (SP2) is the optimal single-price mechanism with p∗, then a TS or PS
markdown mechanism, should it exist for p2 = p∗, dominates the optimal single price.
Proof: The seller’s profits under a markdown mechanism would be the same as Π0S [2]
if all Customer 1 types purchased at p2. However, a PS or TS markdown, by design,
leaves some customer 1 types vˆ1(p1, p2) indifferent between buying in step 1 or step 2.
Consequently, a TS or PS markdown - with p2 = p∗ and Customer 1 types v1 ≥ vˆ1(p1, p∗)
purchasing in step 1 - yields the seller a higher expected revenue than Π0S [2]; ex post the
seller’s expected revenue is bounded below by Π0S [2]. 2
Proposition 13 is quite intuitive and extends Observation 6 to IV. Note that if a PS
or a TS markdown does not exist for p2 = p∗, the optimal markdown revenue may not
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exceed the (SP2) revenue. When (SP1) is the optimal single-price mechanism, we cannot
make a theoretical comparison of the markdown and single price revenues since we do not
have a closed-form solution for the optimal markdown revenue in general. For additional
insights on the comparison of markdown versus single-price revenues, we turn to numerical
examples.
2.4.3 Numerical Examples
In this section, we present representative numerical examples (see Table 4 for the param-
eters) to provide insights on the structure and performance of optimal markdown mecha-
nisms. We first present a base instance, solve for the optimal markdown, identify whether
it is totally or partially separating, and compare its performance against the optimal single
price.
(Base Instance) Example 1: TS optimal. In this setting, p2 = 2.41 > 2 = v2,
i.e, with positive probability, Customer 2 will not make a purchase. However, the optimal
first price is to induce all Customer 1 types to purchase at the first price step, i.e., p1 =
pˆIV (12, 2.41), and hence the optimal markdown in this instance is TS. Given the relatively
large demand from Customer 2 compared to Customer 1, the seller finds it optimal to set
the optimal single price to p∗ = 2.76. A TS markdown exists for all p2 ∈ [2, 3) and we have
p∗ = 2.76 ∈ [2, 3); hence, it follows from Proposition 13 that the optimal markdown yields
higher profits than SP2.
Table 4: Optimal markdown and single price for specific instances under IV
K, (D1, D2), (v2, v¯2), (v1, v¯1) Markdown (p1, p2) Π(p1,p2) Single p
∗ Πp∗
type price
Example 1: 20, (3,19), (2,5), (12,18) TS (5.17, 2.41) 50.88 SP2 2.76 43.31
Example 2: 20, (3,19), (2,4), (12,18) TS (5.33, 2.00) 50.00 SP2 2.18 40.27
Example 3: 20, (3,19), (2,7), (12,18) PS (7.01, 3.00) 49.80 SP2 3.94 52.81
Example 4: 20, (3,19), (2,5), (12,23) PS (5.37, 2.41) 50.92 SP2 2.76 43.31
Example 5: 20, (8,19), (2,5), (12,18) TS (6.38, 2.00) 75.00 SP1 12.00 96.00
In each of the subsequent four examples, we alter one parameter from this base instance
(highlighted in bold in Table 4). These examples are constructed to illustrate how the
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existence and the optimal structure of the PS and TS markdowns may change, as well
as the performance of a markdown when compared to the optimal single prices. These
examples were drawn from a larger numerical example set (see Appendix A), generated
by increasing/decreasing one parameter at a time from the base instance, until one of the
following assumptions of our model was violated.
• Customer valuations overlap (i.e., INT markdowns do not exist).
• D1 or D2 exceeds K (i.e., there are no leftover units after the first customer’s demand
is satisfied).
• K exceeds D1 +D2 (i.e., there is no scarcity in the market).
• The valuation interval of a customer reduces to a singleton (i.e., there is no uncertainty
in valuations).
Example 2: TS optimal. Example 2 complements the base case presented above. Here
the optimal markdown is also TS, and it performs better than the optimal single price.
However, unlike the base case, the shrinking support for Customer 2’s valuations (by a
decrease in v¯2) allows the optimal second price step under TS to decrease to p2 = v2 = 2,
i.e., all Customer 2 types are now guaranteed to bid at p2. Since the optimal markdown
remains a TS one, both customers’ bids are independent of their valuation realization and
the seller receives a guaranteed revenue. A decrease in v¯2 causes a decrease in the expected
valuation of Customer 2. As a result: (i) The seller finds it optimal to decrease p2 to
v2 to increase the competition at the second step by including all Customer 2 types. In
the meantime, given the increased competition at a lower p2, the seller finds it optimal to
increase p1 from 5.17 to 5.33. Hence, as the gap between the expected valuations increases,
so does the gap between the price steps. (ii) The optimal single price is of type SP2, but
the price decreases to 2.18. (iii) Both the expected optimal markdown and the single-price
revenues decrease. (iv) TS markdown now exists for all p2 ∈ [2, 4], and hence Proposition 13
implies that the optimal markdown should yield a higher profit than SP2.
As v¯2 → 2, a TS markdown with p2 = 2 continues to be optimal and dominates the
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optimal single price (which is of type SP2). Hence, as the uncertainty about the lower-
valuation customer’s valuation decreases, the seller is better able to design both an effective
as well as a separating markdown, similar to the CI setting.
Example 3: SP2 optimal. In contrast to Example 2, here we expand the support
of Customer 2’s valuations by increasing v¯2. Since Customer 2’s valuation range is now
wider, the seller is no longer able to design a TS markdown; this is because the first
price step necessary to induce all Customer 1 types to bid at p1 falls into (v2, v¯2), thereby
violating A4-IV. The seller’s ability to design a PS markdown is also constricted by this
increased uncertainty in Customer 2’s valuation since the set of feasible PS markdown
decreases. We find that a PS markdown exists only for very low values of p2, specifically,
p2 ∈ [2, 3]. However, the increase in customer 2’s expected valuation positively affects the
seller’s optimal single price. A SP2 single-price continues to be optimal, but it is now at
the increased price of p∗ = 3.94, and a single price mechanism outperforms the optimal
PS markdown. In summary, an increased range and expectation of Customer 2 valuations
implies that it is difficult for the seller to design an effective INT markdown. The only
effective INT markdowns require such substantially low p2 prices (relative to SP2), that the
seller is better off using SP2.
As v¯2 continues to grow, the seller is then incapable of designing an INT markdown,
i.e., the optimal markdown will be characterized by a p1 < v¯2. This implies that there is a
positive probability of competition at each price step, and hence the buyer is no longer able
to guarantee any high-valuation customer that his entire demand will be satisfied at p1.
Example 4: PS optimal. In this case v¯1 increases by five units compared to Example
1. Let us first remind the reader that the optimal prices in a TS markdown do not depend
on v¯1, but rather are driven by v1. Hence, as the range of Customer 1 valuation increases, as
well as its expected value, a PS markdown becomes more attractive since it offers the seller
the freedom to set a higher p1. Intuitively, given the increase in the expected valuation of
Customer 1, the seller finds it more profitable to increase p1 (i.e., increase the gap between
the price steps) and induce only a subset of Customer 1 types (12.97, 23) to bid at p1, and
increase her expected markdown revenue. Despite the increase in v¯1, the large value of D2
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implies that the optimal single price is still SP2 with p∗ = 2.76 and ΠoS [2] = 43.31, and
hence the PS markdown outperforms the single price.
As v¯1 continues to increase, a PS markdown continues to be optimal (for the reasons
articulated above) and dominate the optimal single price for a wide range of v¯1. We find
that v¯1 needs to be greater than 40 for the optimal single price to switch to SP1 and it
must be greater than 63 for SP1 to be optimal. In such a setting, the expected value of
Customer 1’s valuation is so high as to make targeting that customer alone optimal.
Example 5: SP1 optimal. Although the valuation ranges in this example are the
same as in the base case, the increase in D1 from three to eight results in an increase in
the optimal first price step under TS. Recall that we observed a similar effect of D1 under
CI (see Equation (1)). Furthermore, we find that the demand from the high-valuation
customers is now large enough to have SP1 become the optimal single price. Under this
particular market setting, we find that SP1 dominates the optimal (TS) markdown. From
our expanded example set, we find that SP1 outperforms the optimal TS markdown when
D1 ≥ 5 (given the other parameters in the base instance).
Although we do not have any theoretical results that rank the performance of SP1
with the optimal markdown, in general, this example clearly illustrates that an optimal
markdown may fail to perform better than SP1 when the demand from the high-valuation
customer is relatively large, the valuation ranges of the two customers are far apart, and
K is small relative to D1 + D2. Conversely, a markdown tends to dominate the optimal
single price if D1 is small relative to D2 and the space between the customers’ valuations,
(v1 − v¯2) is ‘moderately’ far apart. Note that these conditions are the same as those found
in Observation 7 for the optimal markdown to dominate the optimal single price under CI.
2.5 Conclusions and Future Research Directions
As businesses operating in both the B2C and B2B markets face increasingly sophisticated
buyers, there is a need for sellers to consider buyers’ strategic behavior in their pricing
strategies. In this chapter, we study the optimal design of markdowns with pre-announced
prices and their suitability in the presence of strategic buyers with multi-unit demands. We
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find that:
• The optimal markdown has 2 steps if buyers know the clearing price (the price at
which the demand exceeds the available supply, pc).
• If the buyers do not know pc, but know that at most one price will occur within any
one customer’s valuation range (INT markdown), then the optimal INT markdown
has no more than 3 steps.
• Under either of these settings, it is optimal for a buyer to submit all-or-nothing bids
at each price step.
There is a common intuition behind the first step prices under CI (equations (1) and
(3)) and IV (Equation (4)). “The ratio of a customer’s expected unmet demand to his total
demand if he chooses to bid at p2” can be perceived as a measure of scarcity, which the
seller can use to induce purchases at the first step. Hence, the seller can charge a premium
proportional to the scarcity that is equal to the maximum additional amount (above p2)
per unit the customer is willing to pay to secure his demand by bidding at p1. We would
also like to point out the similarity of trade-offs involved in the case of CI with multiple
customers and IV. In both cases, design of the optimal markdown involves deciding which
customers/types to exclude from the market and which to encourage to bid at higher price
steps.
Future Research Directions Future work in this area could consider the optimal
markdown design under IV when N > 2. From the results established in this chapter,
we know that the optimal INT markdown will have at most three steps (Observation 9)
and that customers will submit all-or-nothing bids (Theorem 7). We conjecture that the
performance of a markdown will improve (vis-a-vis a single price policy) as the number of
customer types increases; that is, the added pricing flexibility offered by markdowns will
outweigh the strategic opportunities it creates for the buyers.
We were able to prove that a seller would never need to use more than three-steps in
an optimal INT markdown (Observation 9) under IV, which brings up the question: How
well does a two-step markdown perform compared to a three-step markdown? Under which
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market settings is the difference in seller profits negligible: Conversely, when can they be
substantial?
One of the limitations of the model considered in this chapter is the assumption that
the seller and buyers have complete information on customer demand. When customer
valuations are also known by the seller, this assumption enables the seller to identify the
clearing price with certainty. However, if the customer demand information is incomplete,
both the seller and the buyers are unable to identify at which price the market would clear.
We believe an important extension of this work is to the setting where customer demands
are private information. Furthermore, we assume that all customers are present at the start
of the markdown and remain until either they meet all of their demands, or the markdown
is over. Our two- or three-step markdown result is partly due to this longevity of customers.
Future work could consider the random arrival of customers to the system and its effect on
the optimal number of markdown steps. (Note that in the Sam’s Club example in Appendix
A there are five price steps. This is possibly a result of the stochastic arrival of customers
with unknown valuations to their website.)
We focused on the design of INT markdowns under the IV setting; this implied that
the high-valuation customer was guaranteed to have his entire demand satisfied if he bid at
p1. For some market settings, in particular when the uncertainty surrounding low-valuation
customer valuations is high, INT markdowns fail to exist. Under these settings, we would
need to understand how customers will behave when they may face competition at each price
step, and compare the performance of a single-price mechanism to the optimal markdown.
Finally, we study the optimal design and use of markdown with pre-announced prices.
While this format has been adopted by some companies, there are many other applications
where price drops are not announced. Therefore, a natural extension of our work is to
study the design and performance of unannounced markdowns, and to contrast them with
preannounced price drops. This form of analysis would allow us to understand if and when
a seller is better off sharing the price path information with his strategic buyers.
Given the recent increase in the popularity and use of dynamic pricing, we believe that
exploration of these research directions will be crucial in designing and participating in such
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mechanisms.
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CHAPTER III
ALLOCATING CAPACITY TO STRATEGIC CUSTOMERS USING
PRIORITY PRICING UNDER INCOMPLETE DEMAND
INFORMATION
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we analyze the pricing decision of a seller who owns a certain type of capacity
for service or production. The seller announces a set of prices with varying availability
guarantees. Customers place quantity bids to purchase at these prices. Bids at the highest
price carry an allocation guarantee and the allocation at lower prices is done by rationing
the remaining capacity.
The priority pricing mechanism we study is equivalent to an intertemporal pricing mech-
anism, specifically a markdown with pre-announced prices. With pre-announced mark-
downs, the seller announces a declining schedule of prices and when each price in the list
becomes effective, customers place quantity bids to purchase at that price. Since the allo-
cation decisions are made sequentially as price decreases, fewer units are available at lower
prices. Despite the differences between our setting and common markdown pricing model
in the literature, we employ the markdown terminology while discussing the intertemporal
dynamics of our model.
Priority pricing is a potentially effective method to improve the profits above what
could be achieved with a single price when the seller cannot exercise first or third degree
price discrimination. The premise of priority pricing is to segment customers with varying
willingness-to-pay to create scarcity at lower prices and ultimately induce customers with
high valuations to buy at higher prices.
The idea of offering the same product or service at different prices, where the only
difference between these prices is availability/scarcity of supply is not new. Paris Metro,
the only subway in the world to have a first class, has had two classes since it opened in
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1900 [1]. 1st and 2nd class cars had identical number of seats, and the seats were of the same
quality, but 1st class ticket cost was twice the 2nd class. Each ticket holder was entitled to
an available seat in the corresponding class car. The end result justified the means, as the
1st class cars were less congested since people who cared about being able get a seat paid
the higher ticket price of the 1st class [36].
How sellers determine prices is not the only aspect of the business that has been changing
recently. Modern consumers are educated, sophisticated and trying very hard to get the best
“bang for their buck” [41]. There is more to choose from as the markets become globally
integrated, and the customers can get more information about each possible option. Rather
than merely trying to meet their demand, customers are making “strategic” purchasing
decisions, wielding various tools made available to them with more accessible computing
technology.
We assume that customers facing a mechanism with multiple price/availability options
make their purchases/bids with the objective of maximizing their individual surpluses, i.e.,
they act strategically. We consider a business-to-business market which consists of a small
number of customers hence, each customer’s demand, valuation and bidding strategy has
an impact on the decisions of the other customers.
In this context, we address the the following research questions:
- How do customers bid when facing priority pricing?
- What are the optimal prices? Under what conditions would the seller be better off
using a single price?
One motivating example for this setup originates from the pricing of after-sales services.
The service revenue contributes to a very significant portion of the operating income for
after-sales service providers. [8] reports: “Manufacturers of – products built to last – find
that revenue from after sales (maintenance, repairs etc.) are 30 % or more of their total
revenues, and the proportion is increasing . . . ” It is crucial for the service providers to be
able to provide the right mix of service contract options to cater to the needs of different
segments [8]. A 25-question survey was sent by an original equipment manufacturer (OEM)
to 500 users of varying size which helped identify two of the customer segments/needs
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as “basic needs customers” vs. “hand-holders”, where the “hand-holders” were offered
guaranteed response times, which outline the basic difference between the potential contract
types offered to the customers.
Consider an OEM servicing a range of customers, some with higher valuations for the
service than others. For example, these customers could be corporate and small busi-
ness/home owners of copy machines who demand after-sales service for the equipment they
purchased or leased. The service provider may offer different types of service contracts, the
most common two of which are:
- Guaranteed service (service capacity available with certainty)
- Best-effort contract (no guarantees, service provided if there is enough capacity)
With both type of contracts, the service provider charges a constant per unit price
for maintenance/repair service delivered. Effectively, this is identical to charging different
prices at different times for the same unit capacity, where the purchases at the higher price
carry an allocation guarantee and the allocation at the lower price is done by rationing the
remaining capacity.
In this setting, the service provider faces customers with different valuations for the
same basic service and demand from each customer is stochastic due to the nature of their
operations. Hence, the general pricing problem described above can be posed as follows:
Which contracts should the service provider offer and at what price? Should the seller
offer only guaranteed service or best-effort type contract or should she offer both types of
contracts and let the customers self-select? How do the valuations and demands of the
customers impact these decisions?
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the literature,
and Section 3.3 includes analysis of the bidding behavior of the customers, design of the
pricing mechanism that will maximize the expected revenue of the seller and comparison
the performance of this mechanism to optimal single price via numerical examples. Section
3.4 provides conclusions and managerial insights.
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3.2 Placement in Literature
Not charging the same price for all units of the same product or service capacity is a
recurring idea in multiple streams of literature. One stream of literature employing this
idea focuses on the problem of allocating a limited resource while enabling customers with
varying needs to experience different performance levels is known as congestion pricing
or priority pricing. A specific application is the pricing of bandwith capacity for data
transfer, where treating all service requests equally by charging the same price simply
results in a wide dissatisfaction with the perceived performance for customers with different
needs and expectations. Previous work in this area has devised mechanisms involving
complicated pricing structures (a general survey and references available in [21]). Many of
these mechanisms are not easy to implement as they consider queueing models, in which
pricing for each individual customer depends on the congestion in the queue at the time
of arrival or they involve additional control policies governing admission to the system or
resource allocation which may also be dynamically altered based on the system state. See
[34] and [23] for further discussion and related literature.
Analyses of intertemporal pricing mechanism considering rational/strategic customers,
which appear in the economics and operations management literature are also variations on
the same basic idea. Essentially, in these settings the seller offers the product or service at
a declining schedule of prices which are announced in advance, and the customers decide
when and at what price to make their purchase.
Technically, the time dimension does not alter the dynamics of the pricing mechanism
as the rational behavior of a customer facing a declining schedule of prices is identical to the
case where all prices are offered at once but the allocation of capacity is prioritized staring
from the requests at the highest price.
Earlier work which considers customers facing declining prices is in the economics liter-
ature. [43] studied a posted price mechanism where a seller with unlimited capacity faces
customers with single unit demands. An extension where the the seller is restricted to
making limited number of price adjustments was later studied by [6]. Both papers conclude
that a declining price schedule is optimal and the seller prefers to have as few number of
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price adjustments as possible.
[24] investigates the optimal pricing mechanism of a seller, who may have a capacity
constraint, facing a fixed number of buyers with single unit demands. Assuming that
customer valuations are private information, they find that if the capacity is exogenously
determined and exceeds the market demand, then a single price is optimal. If the capacity
is less than the market demand, a declining price schedule or a Vickrey auction is optimal.
[52] considers a monopolist facing a downward sloping demand curve which represents the
demand from a fixed and large number of randomly arriving customers. Before the customer
arrivals, the seller fixes the price of each unit by placing a tag that remains on the item until
it is sold. Note that with this mechanism, not only the prices but also how many units will
be available at each price is announced in advance. Customers may demand more than one
unit and purchase as much as their demand at the lowest price on the tags, upon arrival to
the store, as long as doing so has a positive marginal benefit. [52] finds that the seller can
maximize the revenue by charging no more than two different prices. Since each item has a
tag displaying the price in this setup, the derived result holds without explicitly modeling
the customers as myopic or strategic. This is not the case when prices of items change over
time.
The last group of relevant previous work is in the operations management literature, even
though the bulk of it was content with myopic customer behavior when studying the optimal
pricing policy of a seller with limited supply ([7], [19], [22]). In the past few years, several
papers focused on different aspects of declining price schedules with strategic consumers
and fixed seller inventory. [4] considers continuously declining customer valuations. Upon
arrival, customers decide whether to buy at the time of arrival, return later for a lower price
or not to buy at all. They investigate whether the seller benefits from not committing to
a discount path upfront, and find that alternative mechanisms where the seller decides on
the discounted price dynamically considering the inventory level after initial sales. Benefits
from this sophisticated strategy is minimal and it would not be a worthwhile alternative to
a pre-announced price path.
[44] focuses on a deterministic setting with a monopolist facing a continuous arrival of
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customers with single unit demands. Customers are heterogeneous in two dimensions; they
may have low or high valuations and either make a purchase and leave (myopic) or stay
in the system to maximize surplus with their purchase (strategic). The findings include
whether the optimal policy has decreasing or increasing prices depending on which type
customers are relatively more strategic when supply is exogenous. In case of endogenous
supply, the optimal policy is either a single price or multiple prices with a decrease at the
end of the horizon to capture the strategic low types.
[10] considers a two-step mechanism in a market consisting of myopic and strategic
customers. Existence of strategic customers in the market induces the seller to stock less,
give a smaller discount and make lower profits. The seller is better off by not committing
to a price path and deciding on the second step price after the demand in the first step is
observed. Furthermore, they find that the seller benefits from a mid-season replenishment
at a possibly higher cost than the initial order, when strategic customers are present in the
market. Conversely, [14] find that with fixed initial order quantities, posted pricing schemes
are nearly optimal and preferred over contingent pricing schemes since they are easier to
implement.
Our work departs from all of the mentioned work in operations management literature
by considering a multi-unit demand setting. Our model does not consider the individual cus-
tomers’ arrivals, and assumes that all customers are present in the system. Since customers
are in a typical B2B sales environment, we do not restrict ourselves to the assumption of
single unit demands.
Our approach is closely related to the markdown pricing model in Chapter 2, which
focused on the analysis of a declining price mechanism in a complete information (CI)
setting as well as under a special incomplete valuation information (IV) setting. However,
the fact that demand information is complete in both cases ensured that the seller can
always find a price at which the market demand exceeds the available supply. Without
complete information on demands, we cannot provide a theoretical limit on the number of
price changes in the optimal mechanism when there is an arbitrary number of customers in
the market.
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The incomplete demand information setting in this chapter allows us to explore issues
related to the effect of the relationship between the demand distributions of the customers to
the structure of the optimal pricing mechanism and its performance. The underlying prob-
lem of the customers is also quite different. Lacking the exact demand of other customers
in the market, they have to base their bidding behavior on the demand distributions.
Our work is different from but complementary to the previous priority/congestion pric-
ing research by considering the problem at a higher level, and eliminating the minute details
of a queueing model and the flexibility to adjust prices or alter admission or resource allo-
cation policies based on the state of the system. The pricing mechanism we consider and
the model assumptions are more along the lines of the economics and operations manage-
ment literature mentioned above, with the following important distinctions: We explicitly
model strategic behavior of the customers, and consider an incomplete demand informa-
tion setting where the customers are not restricted to single unit demands. By studying
an incomplete information setting and incorporating customers who demand multiple units
and act strategically, our model yields relevant insights for the real world problems that
motivate our research.
3.3 Model
We consider a seller facing two customers in a market. The seller implements a two-step
mechanism with price pk at step k, k = 1, 2, where p1 > p2. The seller’s starting inventory
is assumed to be exogenously given, which would be the case if the K units were comprised
of excess inventory for an end-of-season item or it is the service capacity which cannot be
adjusted easily in the short run. Later we discuss the choice of K, show that 2 steps are
sufficient for achieving optimal revenue with two customers and how this extends to the
case of N customers.
Exact demands of the customers are not known by the seller. She believes that each
customer’s private demand is drawn from a commonly known atomless continuous distri-
bution, with density function fi(D), with support over the interval [Li,Hi]. Each customer
shares this belief with the seller regarding the demand of the other but knows his own exact
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demand realization.
Customers have constant marginal valuations, v1 and v2, where v1 > v2, for up to a
certain number of units of the product. The valuations of the customers, the initial supply
level, and the unit product procurement or service cost of the seller are common knowledge.
We consider a mechanism where the seller announces the prices and the inventory on
hand before the sales begin1.
We assume that the valuations of the customers are constant over time and there is no
discounting. We do this to keep the exposition simple and we later show how our results
extend when a discount factor is present or customer valuations decline over time. In
addition, we assume that both customers are present at the start of the markdown and that
each one remains until the markdown is over or until his demand is satisfied. Hence, in our
model, the timing of price changes does not impact the seller’s profits, and the seller’s main
decision (given an initial inventory) is to choose the price at each of the two steps.
We assume that the customers and the seller are risk-neutral, so they maximize expected
surplus. At any (price) step, customers submit quantity bids, indicating the number of units
they would like to purchase at the current price. qjk denotes the bid of customer j at step k.
Πj stands for the total expected surplus (valuation – cost) over both steps, of the customers
(j = 1, 2) or the seller (j = S).
If the total demand exceeds the available supply at any step, the seller uses a random
allocation rule. She chooses one of the customers randomly and gives him the priority in
allocation. The possible scarcity in the second step is what induces the buyers to bid sooner
in the mechanism. As noted earlier by [35], this rationing rule is consistent with the case
where all items are sold at a first-come-first-serve basis when all customers arrive at the
store at the beginning of the second step.
To evaluate its suitability, we compare the performance of the optimal two-step mecha-
nism to the (simpler) optimal single price mechanism.
1Currently eCost.com has a “Bargain Countdown” feature where the available quantity is posted upfront
(http://www.ecost.com/ecost/shop/countdown/). Before it was acquired by eBay, FairMarket used to pro-
vide a “AutoMarkdown” solution (for big retail businesses such as Dell, J.C.Penney, and Sam’s Club) where
the future price schedule as well as the on hand inventory was posted in advance.
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A natural consequence of the model setting is that both the seller and the buyers have
to make their decisions under incomplete information. The distinction between the levels
of information available to the seller and the buyers is very crucial in investigating their
optimal decisions. The buyers have a slight advantage over the seller as they know their own
demand realization. As a result, while the buyers try to position themselves in response to
the uncertain demand of the other buyer, the seller has to deal with two different sources
of uncertainty: D1 and D2. In Section 3.3.1 we list preliminary results and eliminate the
trivial cases. Then, we analyze the bidding behavior of the customers in Section 3.3.2
and the seller’s pricing problem in Section 3.3.3. Performance comparison of the two-step
mechanism vs. single price via numerical examples in Section 3.4 is followed by managerial
insights.
3.3.1 Preliminaries
We consider the seller’s problem of maximizing revenue from the sale of K units in a market
consisting of two customers with random demands Di, which are known to be drawn from
distributions with support on [Li,Hi], i ∈ {1, 2}. The seller wants to determine the prices
for a two-step mechanism with the goal of inducing the high-valuation customer to buy at
the higher price.
The seller does not need to use a mechanism with more than 2 steps to maximize her
revenue. By contradiction, assume there is an m-step mechanism (m > 2) with prices
v1 ≥ p1 > . . . > pk > . . . > pm where pk ≥ v2 > pk+1. Some of these steps will have prices
in (v2, v1], and the rest will be less than or equal to v2. (Recall that neither customer can
afford prices higher than v1.) Since there is only one customer in the market that can afford
those prices, there will be a positive bid in at most one price step, p, such that v1 ≥ p > v2,
(The unit surplus is constant for each additional bid at any price step so customer 1 will
bid all his demand at one price step to maximize his surplus.) As a result, the seller can
keep just that price and eliminate all other prices higher than v2. On the other hand for the
remaining set of prices, the seller cannot do any worse by eliminating all but the highest one
of these steps. Her revenue will not decrease since both customers can afford the remaining
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step. As a result we can argue that the optimal revenue can be achieved with a two-step
mechanism where v1 ≥ p1 > v2 and v2 ≥ p2.
Observation 12. In the optimal two-step mechanism:
a. Second step price, p2 = v2.
b. Customer 2 bids his entire demand at the second step of the mechanism.
c. At any step, customers do not bid more than their demand realization.
If p2 > v2, then customer 2 cannot afford to buy at the second step and consequently
customer 1 has no incentive to bid at step 1. On the other hand, if p2 < v2, the seller can
increase p2 up to v2 and increase her revenue.
From Observation 12(a), the optimal step 2 price is v2. So, the only option of customer
2 is to bid his entire demand at step 2.
Under IV, the seller had the option of adjusting scarcity by picking a p2 in [v¯2, v2].
In certain settings, using this as a lever, she was able to charge a higher p1 while keeping
customer 1 bidding at step 1. However, in ID setting the seller has no control on the scarcity
at step 2 and has to cope with the built in uncertainty in the D2 distribution without any
ability to adjust or alter the scarcity.
Bidding higher than the realized demand does not increase the chances of acquiring the
product for the customers, but may result in higher payments. The random allocation rule,
which is used when the total bids exceed available supply, prevents customers from inflating
their bid quantities. As a result, customer bids are always bounded above by their demand
realization.
Observation 12 identifies the value of p2, and the seller’s decision reduces to p1.
We would like to compare the performance of the two-step mechanism to the optimal
single price. In a market with two customers where the valuations are common knowledge,
the optimal single price is equal to either v1 or v2, whichever yields the higher expected
revenue for the seller. We denote the former with SP1 and the latter with SP2.
Two pricing mechanisms are considered to be equivalent if the mechanisms yield the
same surplus (for the seller and the buyers). A mechanism is said to dominate another
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mechanism if it generates higher (expected) surplus for the seller compared to the other
mechanism.
Observation 13. Single price revenue with SP2 constitutes a lower bound on the two-step
revenue.
If p1 is so high that customer 1 always prefers to bid at p2 for every realization of D1,
then nothing is sold at step 1, and the two-step revenue is equivalent to the single price
revenue with SP2.
Observation 14. If K ≤ E[D1], then the optimal single price SP1 generates higher expected
revenue than a two-step mechanism.
Observation 15. If K ≥ H1+H2, then there is no possible scarcity of supply at any price
step. In this case nothing is sold at step 1, and the two-step revenue is equivalent to the
single price revenue with SP2.
Proposition 14. If SP2 is the optimal single price mechanism, then a two-step mechanism
dominates the optimal single price if it induces some customer 1 type to bid at step 1,
otherwise SP2 and the two-step mechanism are equivalent.
This result is quite intuitive: If both customers prefer to bid at step 2, From Observa-
tion 13, we know that the two-step revenue is equal to the single price revenue with SP2.
The amount sold is equal to the maximum of the total demand realization and the available
supply. On the other hand if some type of customer 1 prefers to bid at p1 > v2, there is a
positive probability that there will be sales at step 1, and hence, the expected revenue from
the two-step mechanism exceeds the SP2 revenue.
In Observations 14 and 15 we have identified the trivial settings in which a two-step
mechanism fails to dominate the optimal single price. Hence, we focus our attention to
settings which satisfy the following non-triviality condition:
A-NT. E[D1] < K < H1 +H2.
Note that this range neither implies nor eliminates the possibility that K > D1 +D2.
Recall that under CI and IV settings in chapter 2 we were able to restrict our attention
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to D1 < K < D1 + D2. Essentially, lacking the exact demand information, the seller can
potentially benefit from a markdown mechanism for a wider range of K values. If we can
show that the optimal markdown mechanism can perform better than the optimal single
price for any K value in A-NT, we can argue that the incomplete demand information
creates an advantage for the markdown pricing mechanism over the optimal single price.
A-NT excludes the supply ranges for which the seller does not have any hope of increasing
her revenue above what she can achieve with a single price mechanism. However, under
incomplete demand information, even under A-NT, there is no guarantee that the seller
will be able to set two prices p1 and p2 and sell some of the supply at the higher price.
Without having complete demand information, sometimes the best she can hope to achieve
is to induce the high valuation customer to buy at the high price for some realizations of
D1 and get a higher expected revenue than a single price mechanism. Hence, to be able to
solve the seller’s pricing problem, first we need to identify how customer 1 will bid given p1
and p2.
If the two-step mechanism, (which we interchangeably refer to as “markdown”) induces
customer 1 to bid D1 at step 1 for some D1 ∈ [L1,H1], we call it separating. Essentially,
there is a positive probability that under this markdown, customer 1 bids at step 1 while
customer 2 bids at step 2. If this probability is zero, i.e., the markdown cannot induce
customer 1 to bid at step 1 for any D1, then we call it pooling. As a further refinement,
if a markdown induces customer 1 to bid D1 at step 1 for any D1 ∈ [L1,H1], we call it a
totally separating (TS) markdown, and refer to the remaining cases as partially separating
(PS). In the next section, we examine how each of these markdown types lead to a different
bidding behavior.
3.3.2 Bidding Behavior of Customer 1
Observation 12(b) stated that the only possible action for customer 2 is to bid his entire
demand at step 2 in an optimal two-step mechanism. However, it is not obvious how
customer 1 will bid. The key factor that impacts the decision of customer 1 is how many
units will be allocated to him as a result of his bid.
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Figure 5: Relation of K to demand ranges of the customers in low, moderate and high
supply scenarios.
In Theorem 15, we show that all-or-nothing bidding is optimal under incomplete demand
information.
Theorem 15. Under a two-step markdown mechanism, it is a dominant strategy for cus-
tomer 1 to submit an all-or-nothing bid, i.e., to submit either all or none of his demand at
a price step.
The proof, which is presented in the Appendix B, is by showing that the expected
surplus of customer 1 as a function of his bid at the first price step, q11, is a (piecewise
linear) convex function. Hence the expected surplus is maximized at one of the extreme
points, namely at q11 = 0 or q11 = D1. This sort of customer behavior is identical to the
one we observe in case of incomplete information on valuations.
Table 5: Allocation to customer 1 if he bids D1 at step 2.
Region Customer 1 is selected first Customer 2 is selected first
I D1 < K, D1 +D2 < K D1 D1
II max{D1, D2} < K, D1 +D2 ≥ K D1 K −D2
III D1 ≥ K, D2 < K K K −D2
IV D1 < K, D2 ≥ K D1 0
V D1 ≥ K, D2 ≥ K K 0
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In order to prove Theorem 15 and understand the bidding behavior we need to under-
stand how many units will be allocated to customer 1 if he bids at step 2.
Recall that the seller and the customers are working with different information settings.
Customer 1 knows the realization of D1, but the seller only knows that D1 ∈ [L1,H1].
Hence the analysis involves finding answers to the following two questions:
1. How do D1 and D2 relate to K? This determines the actual allocation.
If customer 1 bids 0 < q11 ≤ D1 at p1, then he is allocated min{q11,K}. On the other
hand, the expected number of units allocated to customer 1 at step 2 varies depending on
the realization of D1 and D2 relative to K. Depending on which customer has the allocation
priority at step 2, different allocations for customer 1 are given in Table 5.
2. How do L1, H1, L2 and H2 compare to K? This determines which allocations will
have a positive probability of occurrence.
For example, if H2 < K then IV and V, which require D2 > K, will be irrelevant for
that instance. Similarly, if L1 < K−H2, then for some realizations of D1, specifically when
L1 ≤ D1 < K −H2, customer 1 can always get a guaranteed allocation of D1 regardless of
which price step he bids (See Figure 5).
If customer 1 bids at step 2, how many units are allocated to him depends on how K
relates to the demand parameters (and the demand realization) of both customers. Regard-
less of the demand realization of customer 1, the relationship of K to H2 and L1 + H2 is
important since this determines if customer 1 might get none, some or all of his demand
if he bids at step 2 and is not selected first. We define the following three supply levels
accordingly.
Low supply (L): E[D1] < K < H2,
Moderate supply (M): H2 ≤ K < L1 +H2 and
High supply (H): L1 +H2 ≤ K.
These supply levels are valid for any customer 1 demand realization in [L1,H1]. For
example, if D1 > K, then the allocation to customer 1 at step 2 is bounded by K when
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Table 6: For each supply level, relevant allocation settings for customer 1 if he bids D1 at
step 2.
Allocations
Low Supply (L) I, II, III, IV and V
Moderate Supply (M) I, II and III
High Supply (H) I, II and III
he bids at step 2 and is selected first. Similarly if D1 > K − L2, then the allocation to
customer 1 at step 2 is bounded by the leftover from customer 2 when he bids at step 2 and
is not selected first.
Table 5 and Figure 5 present the different allocations when customer 1 bids at step 2. In
Table 6, we present a complete list of allocations that are relevant in each supply level. Note
that although the relevant allocations are identical in Moderate and High supply levels, the
expected allocations are quite different since the expectation incorporates the probabilities
associated with each allocation setting. While setting I is the only possibility for some
D1 realizations under High supply (specifically for D1 < K − H2, Figure 5(c)), settings I
and II are both possible for any D1 under Moderate supply (Figure 5(b)). Later, we show
that this subtle difference plays a significant role in how the bidding behavior of customer
1 is differs under Moderate and High supply scenarios: The seller cannot achieve a TS
markdown under High supply.
Next, we present a theorem that summarizes the bidding behavior of customer 1 for any
relation of K to Li and Hi.
Theorem 16. Customer 1 with demand D1 bids at step 1 if and only if p1 is less than
or equal to the threshold price, wxj where x ∈ {i, ii} and j ∈ {L,H,M}. The closed form
expression for wxj ’s corresponding to D1 ranges are presented in Figure 6.
We provide a detailed discussion of the results on the bidding behavior of customer 1
under Low (L) supply scenario and present the results for Moderate (M) and High (H)
supply in Appendix B.
We made the assumption that K < H1 holds when presenting the results in Figure 6.
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Figure 6: Customer 1 with demand D1 bids at step 1 unless p1 exceeds the corresponding
threshold price.
This enables us to present the most general version that icludes all possible threshold
function variations. Note that if H1 ≤ K < H1 + L2, then the case with K < D1 ≤ H1 is
impossible, hence wiij (K), j ∈ {L,M,H} will not be applicable. Similarly, if H1 + L2 ≤ K
then K − L2 < D1 < K is impossible and we need to consider wij(D1), j ∈ {L,M,H} as
the only threshold function over the entire D1 range. In the rest of the chapter, we keep
the assumption that K < H1 holds in order to present the most general case.
3.3.2.1 Bidding Behavior of Customer 1 in Low Supply (E[D1] < K < H2)
With Theorem 15, we established that customer 1 submits all-or-nothing bids. Next, we
identify the conditions under which customer 1 bids D1 at step 1, depending on the real-
ization of D1. Table 5 summarizes the step 2 allocations for customer 1 if he bids his entire
demand at p2. In Figure 5, we also indicate how these different allocations relate to the
supply levels L, M and H.
We identify the equilibrium bidding strategy of customer 1 for each possible demand
realization D1 subject to A-NT.
Proposition 17. In a two-step markdown mechanism with prices p1 > p2 = v2 and K ≤
min{H2,H1}, customer 1 bids D1 at step 1 (and 0 at step 2) if
PSi. p1 ≤ wiL(D1) = v1 − (v1 − v2)
[
1
2 +
1
2D1
∫K
K−D1 F2(x2)dx2
]
and L1 ≤ D1 ≤ K −L2, or
PSii. p1 ≤ wiiL(D1) = v1 − (v1 − v2)
[
1
2 +
1
2D1
∫K
L2
F2(x2)dx2
]
and K − L2 < D1 ≤ K, or
TS. p1 ≤ wiiL(K) = v1 − (v1 − v2)
[
1
2 +
1
2K
∫K
L2
F2(x2)dx2
]
and K < D1 ≤ H1,
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and bids 0 at step 1 (and D1 at step 2) otherwise.
Here, wiL(D1) and w
ii
L(D1) correspond to the maximum (threshold) step 1 price that
would induce customer 1 of type D1 to bid his entire demand at step 1 (separating). We
use labels TS, PSi and PSii to indicate the form of markdown corresponding to each price
range. The only difference between PSi and PSii is in the sensitivity of the threshold price
to the changes in the value of D1 in the corresponding demand ranges. The terms that
follow (v1 − v2) in each equation correspond to the ratio of the expected unmet demand of
customer 1 to his demand, if he bids his entire demand at step 2.
In the proof, which is presented in Appendix B, we compare the expected surplus of
customer 1 from bidding his entire demand at step 2 to his surplus from bidding at step 1,
and derive the threshold price as a function of D1. As long as D1 < K, the threshold price is
a function of D1. If K ≤ D1, then the threshold price is constant due to Observation 12(c).
Note that K ≤ H1 is not a requirement for Proposition 17 to hold. When Figure 6
was presented we noted that it was for the most general case where all variations of the
threshold price expressions are valid. Only a subset of the threshold functions will be valid
for different D1 ranges when H1 < K. The practical implication of all this is that if the
initial supply is relatively high, it is less likely for the seller to set up a mechanism where a
possible demand realization of the customers would lead to a totally separating outcome.
Proposition 18. The threshold step 1 prices, wxj (D1) where x ∈ {i, ii} and j ∈ {L,H,M}
are non-decreasing functions of D1.
As D1 increases, the expected allocation for customer 1 at step 2 also increases, but
the expected allocation is less than D1. Hence, the ratio of allocation at step 2 to step 1
decreases with D1. Thus, for higher values of p1, customer 1 still prefers to bid his entire
demand at step 1. When D1 ≤ K −L2, the demand by customer 2 is so low that customer
1 can get his entire demand at step 2 with positive probability. On the other hand, for
K − L2 < D1 ≤ K, if customer 1 does not get the allocation priority, he always gets the
remaining units from customer 2 at the second step, which is less than his bid quantity.
When D1 goes above K, step 1 and step 2 allocations do not increase with D1 anymore and
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the threshold price level remains constant. Notice that this threshold is independent of D1,
i.e., there is a constant threshold step 1 price below which customer 1 prefers to bid D1 at
step 1 when D1 ≥ K. In all three scenarios, for K ≤ D1 ≤ H1, the threshold step 1 price
is a function of K and does not depend on D1.
A common result of these propositions is the following bidding behavior: A given p1
makes a customer type ∆ ∈ [L1,H1] indifferent between bidding in step 1 or step 2. If
customer 1 of type ∆ prefers to bid at step 1 then any higher type also prefers to bid at
step 1. In other words, any given step 1 price separates the set of customer types into two
disjoint and continuous subsets, [L1,∆) and [∆,H1], where ∆ is the lowest customer 1 type
that prefers to bid at step 1. Note that either one of these subsets might be empty, i.e., all
customer 1 types may prefer to bid at step 1 or step 2. However, if all types prefer to bid
at step 2 for a given step 1 price, then the markdown is pooling and it is equivalent to a
single price mechanism with p = v2.
3.3.3 Seller’s Revenue
Now that we have identified the customers’ bidding behavior for any given value of D1 and
p1, we can investigate the seller’s pricing problem. The seller will set the step 1 price at a
level which maximizes her surplus in expectation of the customer demands.
In our analysis of the customers’ bidding behavior, we referred to a customer with
demand realization of D1. However, when we analyze the seller’s decision, we need to
explicitly consider that customer 1 could be one of many alternative types, where type
is defined by the realization of D1. Since the seller has incomplete information on D1,
she assumes a customer 1 with demand that can be anywhere in [L1,H1], with a known
probability distribution. Any choice of p1 corresponds to a threshold demand realization
of ∆, where any demand realization at or above the level of ∆ would lead to customer 1
bidding at step 1.
Before proceeding with the detailed analysis, we revisit the pooling/separating mark-
downs distinction, and provide results on under what conditions each type would exits. This
helps us later on when we analyze whether the seller can achieve the same revenue with a
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single price: A pooling markdown can never outperform a single price, since everything is
sold at a single price level in the markdown, the seller can fix the price and still sell the
same amount with a single price. Hence, a markdown may yield higher revenue than a
single price only if it is separating.
First, we show that a separating markdown always exists and identify a special setting
where all separating markdowns are TS. Then we identify conditions under which a TS
markdown exists.
Proposition 19. For any given instance that satisfies A-NT, a PS markown exists.
The proof is by comparing the expected revenues of customer 1 from bidding D1 in step
1 vs. step 2. If customer 1 bids D1 in step 2, the expected allocation to him in step 2 takes
a value between 0 and D1. Hence, the proportion of his demand satisfied by the allocation
is in [0,1]. Recall from Observation 12(a) that step 2 price is v2. So, customer 1’s expected
surplus from bidding D1 at step 2 takes a value between 0 and D1(v1 − v2). It is always
possible to find a step 1 price, p1 in (v2, v1] such that, for some D1 ∈ [L1,H1], the surplus
to customer 1 from bidding D1 at step 1, D1(v1 − p1), is at least as good as the expected
surplus from bidding D1 at step 2.
If A-NT is satisfied, we can always determine a customer 1 type D1 , for which the
optimal mechanism would be separating. Thus, in her search for the optimal mechanism,
the seller cannot eliminate the two-step mechanism without thoroughly analyzing the prob-
ability of occurrence for the separating outcome and comparing the expected revenue to the
optimal single price.
Under CI, with D1 and D2 being common knowledge, the seller can determine exact
bidding behavior and tell for sure whether the mechanism would be separating or pooling
for any p1 value. However, without the complete demand information, the best she can do
is to consider the expected values and try to increase the possibility of getting a separating
outcome.
Under IV, existence of TS and PS mechanisms depended on a measure of scarcity. A
markdown could only lead to a pooling outcome if v¯2−v2v¯1−v2 >
D1+D2−K
2D1
, and the seller did
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not have any hope of achieving a revenue higher than the optimal single price revenue
in this case. With proposition 19, such a result becomes impossible under ID, increasing
the chances that incomplete information on demands provides an advantage for markdown
pricing over the optimal single price.
Corollary 20. Given an instance that satisfies A-NT; if L2 ≥ K, then all separating
markdowns are TS.
This follows immediately from Proposition 19 since the expected allocation to customer
1 from bidding D1 at step 2 is D1/2 when L2 ≥ K. Hence for any D1 ∈ [L1,H1], customer 1
gets half of his maximum possible surplus, D1/2(v1−v2), if he bids at step 2. Since bidding
D1 at step 1 yields D1(v1 − p1), the actual decision of the seller is independent of D1 and
all prices that induce customer 1 to bid at step 1 for some D1, induce him to bid at step 1
for all D1.
If supply is scarce enough (to be exact, if the minimum possible demand of customer
2 would deplete the entire supply) then the outcome would be separating regardless of the
demand realization of customer 1.
Proposition 19 and Corollary 20 together suggest that if A-NT and L2 ≥ K both hold,
then there is always a step 1 price, p1, for which customer 1 bids at step 1. The analysis is
much simpler in this case since the seller can assume that an amount equal to the expected
demand of customer 1 would always sell at step 1.
Proposition 21. For any given instance that satisfies A-NT, a TS markown exists if and
only if K ≤ L1 +H2.
If L1 + H2 < K, a TS markdown fails to exist since for D1 < K − H2, the expected
allocation to customer 1 from bidding D1 at step 2 is equal to D1. In other words, for some
D1 realizations, customer 1 gets his entire demand at step 2 and no p1 > v2 can induce him
to bid at step 1.
Proposition 21 directly implies that the seller cannot get a TS markdown in the High
supply scenario. This result is similar to results 1 and 2 (in Appendix A) in the IV setting,
suggesting that if scarcity is low, it is more likely to see a pooling outcome.
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Customer 1 decides whether to bid D1 at step 1 or step 2 based on p1. Hence, the seller’s
pricing decision is closely related to the bidding behavior of customer 1. Any particular
selection of p1 will lead to a continuous subset of customer 1 types, [∆,H1], bidding at step
1 while the rest [L1,∆] prefer to bid at step 2. Given the one-to-one relationship with p1
and the minimum D1 that would be induced to bid at step 1 given p1, the seller is essentially
deciding on which customer 1 type to make indifferent between bidding in step 1 versus
bidding in step 2.
Looking at the threshold price for customer 1 provided in Theorem 16, we can examine
the seller’s choice of step 1 price in four distinct intervals, which are presented in the
Theorem 22 for each possible scenario.
Theorem 22. Given a supply scenario j ∈ {L,M,H} and corresponding p1 ranges as
defined in Table 7; if one of the following holds, then customer 1 prefers to bid D1 at step
1.
i. p1 ∈ jTS
ii. p1 ∈ jPS(ii) and p1 ≤ wiij (D1)
iii. p1 ∈ jPS(i) and p1 ≤ wij(D1)
Otherwise; i.e, if if one of the following holds
i. p1 ∈ jPS(ii) and wiij (D1) < p1
ii. p1 ∈ jPS(i) and wij(D1) < p1
iii. p1 ∈ jP ,
then customer 1 prefers to bid D1 at step 2.
This result follows from Theorem 16 by substituting the end points of the ranges in the
corresponding threshold price expression for each case. In order to find p∗1, we need to solve
for the best price over each range and compare the corresponding optimal seller profits in
these four price ranges and determine which one of these prices maximizes her profit.
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Table 7: p1 ranges corresponding PS, TS, and Pooling results in Low, Moderate and High
Supply
Low Supply Moderate Supply High Supply
LP : (wiiL(K), v1] MP : (w
ii
M (K), v1] HP : (w
ii
H(K), v1]
LPS(ii): (wiiL(K − L2), wiiL(K)] MPS(ii): (wiiM (K − L2), wiiM (K)] HPS(ii): (wiiH(K − L2), wiiH(K)]
LPS(i): (wiL(L1), w
ii
L(K − L2)] MPS(i): (wiM (L1), wiiM (K − L2)] HPS(i): (v2, wiiH(K − L2)]
LTS: (v2, wiL(L1)] MTS: (v2, w
i
M (L1)] HTS: ∅
We provide the detailed result for the seller’s expected revenue in the low supply scenario
and identify the optimal step 1 price for each interval.
The practical interpretation of Theorem 22 is as follows: For a given instance, the seller
needs to consider at most four possible ranges for p1 separately. Of these four, the lowest
three ranges differ by the rate of change in the premium seller can charge to customer 1 in
step 1 per unit change in his demand realization, D1. For the highest range of p1 values,
the seller cannot induce customer 1 to bid at step 1, so there is no premium to speak of.
Specifically, these correspond to the p1 ranges for which the resulting mechanism becomes
pooling, partially separating or totally separating. Recall that for the partially separating
p1 values, the increase in expected allocation to customer 1 for a unit increase in D1 is
governed by two different expressions, depending on whether D1 exceeds K − L2 or not.
Hence, we have to analyze the two p1 ranges separately for partially separating mechanism,
in order to account for the different rates at which the expected allocation to customer 1
at step 2 changes with D1.
Another takeaway from Theorem 22 is; as supply increases, it gets harder for the seller
to keep customer 1 bidding at step 1 and extract more of his surplus.
3.3.3.1 Seller’s Revenue in the Low Supply Scenario
Figure 7 summarizes the result of Proposition 17 and displays how customer 1 bids for
different values of D1 and p1 when K is low relative to H2. In Figure 7, we partition the
original p1 range into four: LP corresponds to the p1 range for which customer 1 always
bids at step 2. LPS(ii) and LPS(i) are the ranges in which customer 1 bids at step 1 if and
only if p1 < wiiL(D1) and p1 < w
i
L(D1), respectively. Finally, LTS is the p1 range which
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Figure 7: Customer 1’s optimal bid in relation to D1 and p1 in low supply scenario when
D2 is uniformly distributed.
induces customer 1 to always bid at step 1. By substituting the endpoints in the bidding
thresholds, we formally define the four price ranges described above.
LP. v1 ≥ p1 > wiiL(K) = v1 − (v1 − v2)
[
1
2 +
1
2K
∫K
L2
F2(x2)dx2
]
LPS(ii). wiiL(K) ≥ p1 > wiiL(K − L2) = v1 − (v1 − v2)
[
1
2 +
1
2(K−L2)
∫K
L2
F2(x2)dx2
]
LPS(i). wiiL(K − L2) ≥ p1 > wiL(L1) = v1 − (v1 − v2)
[
1
2 +
1
2L1
∫K
K−L1 F2(x2)dx2
]
LTS. wiL(L1) ≥ p1 > v2
We need to solve for the optimal step 1 price p∗1 over each range and compare the
corresponding optimal seller profits and determine which one of these prices maximizes her
profit.
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Case (A): D2≥K-L1 Case (B): D2<K-L1
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Figure 8: Seller’s revenue function in relation to D1 and p1 for a fixed D2 in the low supply
scenario.
Figure 8 displays two representative cases of how the seller’s revenue function changes
with respect to the random variables D1 and D2, and the decision variable p1. In Case
(A) D2 is “high”, so the total demand exceeds the available supply even when D1 = L1.
Alternatively, Case (B) corresponds to “low” D2, and it is possible that the total demand
may not exceed the supply for some realizations of D1.
If D2 is “low”, the seller faces the risk of not sellingK units for a range of D1 realizations
(specifically [L1,K − D2]). However the additional revenue from a separating outcome
constitutes a higher expected revenue increase. (D1 constitutes a larger portion of total
sales D1 +D2 compared to K, when D1 +D2 < K)
How these two opposing effects compare determines whether the expected revenue would
increase or decrease for an increase in the step 1 price p1.
If p1 is within the range LP, both customers prefer to bid at step 2. From Observation 13,
we know that the markdown revenue is equal to the single price revenue with SP2. The
amount sold is equal to the maximum of the total demand realization and the available
supply. Since nothing is sold at step 1, the step 1 price does not affect the seller’s surplus,
so she is indifferent between all the prices in the range (LP) v1 ≥ p1 > wiiL(K).
Proposition 23. In the low supply scenario
i. the seller is indifferent between the p1 values in range LP since customer 1 prefers to
bid at step 2.
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ii. the value of p1 in range LTS that maximizes the expected surplus of the seller is
p
∗(LTS)
1 = w
i
L(L1).
The practical meaning of Proposition 23 is that the seller need not consider p1 values
outside [wiL(L1), w
ii
L(K)] when searching for the optimal p1.
Recall that wiL(D1) and w
ii
L(D1) are the bidding threshold functions that relate D1 to
the maximum step 1 price that would induce customer 1 with demand realization D1 to bid
his entire demand at step 1. Conversely, let us define ∆iL(p1) and ∆
ii
L(p1) as the demand
realization thresholds, which relate the step 1 price p1 to the minimum demand realization
that would induce customer 1 to bid his entire demand at step 1 when p1 is picked from
the corresponding range. Given a specific distribution function for D1 and D2, the seller
can determine the corresponding threshold demand realization for any p1, and identify a
closed form expression for her expected revenue. However, unless we assume a specific
distribution, it is impossible to find closed form expressions for the optimal step 1 price and
the optimal revenue. In Proposition 14, we stated that the markdown revenue is always
higher than single price if the optimal single price mechanism is SP2. However since we do
not have closed form solutions for the markdown prices and revenue, it is not possible derive
any conclusions as to whether a markdown mechanism can outperform the single price of
type SP1. Numerical examples will be used to understand how the parameter changes and
combinations impact the performance of the optimal markdown mechanism compared to
SP1.
We provide the derivations for the bidding behavior of the customers in moderate and
high supply scenarios in Appendix B. The following propositions summarize the analogous
analytical results for the seller’s decision on step 1 price:
Proposition 24. In the moderate supply scenario
i. the seller is indifferent between the p1 values in range MP since customer 1 prefers to
bid at step 2.
ii. the value of p1 in range MTS that maximizes the expected surplus of the seller is
p
∗(MTS)
1 = w
i
M (L1).
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Proposition 25. In the high supply scenario, the seller is indifferent between the p1 values
in range HP since customer 1 prefers to bid at step 2.
Extensions: The theoretical results we presented so far were derived assuming there
are two customers in the market. We argued that a two-step mechanism would be optimal
when the seller faces two customers. We can generalize the same idea to characterize the
properties of the optimal mechanism when the seller faces N > 2 customers.
With N customers in the market, the optimal mechanism need not have more than one
price ph , where ph > vt such that
∑t−1
j=1Hj ≤ K and
∑t
j=1Hj > K. Notice that there is
no scarcity risk for all other higher prices, hence the customers do not have any incentive
to submit positive bids at any price higher than ph.
Similarly, the seller would need at most one price pl, where pl ≤ vu such that
∑u−1
j=1 Lj ≤
K and
∑u
j=1 Lj > K. The reasoning behind this observation is that the seller can eliminate
all but one of such prices without risking reduction of units sold.
As a generalization of the two-customer case, we state the following observation in case
of N customers:
Observation 16. Under ID with N > 2 customers, the optimal markdown mechanism has
at most one price ph such that ph > vt and at most one price pl such that pl ≤ vu. There
can be an arbitrary number of steps with prices between vt and vu.
The optimal mechanism would one price at which there is no risk of scarcity (ph > vt)
and one price at which there is a positive probability of having leftover supply (pl ≤ vu).
However, unlike the two-customer setting, where these two were the only necessary prices,
there can be an arbitrary number of steps with prices between vt and vu, each of which
have different availability/scarcity levels. Furthermore, we cannot say anything about the
bidding behavior of customers at any of these price steps.
Under CI and IV settings with N > 2 customers, we were able to identify theoretical
limits on the number with theorem 1 and observation 9. The fact that there can be an
arbitrary number of price steps under ID is in stark contrast with these results. This
observation suggests that incomplete demand information may be one of the reasons why
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we observe multiple price steps in online applications of markdown pricing mechanisms.
While we do not provide a result for optimality of a two-step mechanism under ID, we
believe this would be a reasonable framework for analysis given the common use in practice
([20]), and the theoretical ([6], [22]) and empirical results ([20], [42]).
Our main results hold when a discount factor is present (or customer valuations decline
over time). Assume that customer j’s valuation drops to δvj in step 2, 0 < δ ≤ 1. We can
still show that customer 1 makes all-or-nothing bids. With discounting, customer 1 bids D1
at step 1 (and 0 at step 2) if
PSi. p1 ≤ wiL(D1) = v1− δ(v1− v2)
[
1
2 +
1
2D1
∫K
K−D1 F2(x2)dx2
]
and L1 ≤ D1 ≤ K−L2, or
PSii. p1 ≤ wiiL(D1) = v1 − δ(v1 − v2)
[
1
2 +
1
2D1
∫K
L2
F2(x2)dx2
]
and K − L2 < D1 ≤ K, or
TS. p1 ≤ wiiL(K) = v1 − δ(v1 − v2)
[
1
2 +
1
2K
∫K
L2
F2(x2)dx2
]
and K < D1 ≤ H1,
and bids 0 at step 1 (and D1 at step 2) otherwise.
If there is no discounting, δ = 1, and the conditions above are identical to the conditions
in Theorem 17. At the other extreme, δ = 0, the customers valuations at the second step
reduce to zero and the threshold prices all converge to v1. Note that the threshold price is
decreasing in δ, implying that if the valuation of customer 1 is less in the second step, he
agrees to pay a higher price in the first step. If customers have constant valuations but they
are risk-averse such that they undervalue surplus from probabilistic outcomes by a factor
of δ, the surplus generated in the second step will have lower value due to the random
allocation and the impact on the threshold price will be similar to the case of discounting.
So far, we assumed that the seller has fixed capacity K. Next, we briefly comment on
how the seller’s revenue is affected by an increase in the available supply. As K gets higher
we assume that the seller appropriately adjusts the prices of the optimal single price and
two-step mechanisms.
Note that the range of interesting K values are such that L1 < K < H1 + H2. SP1
revenue increases at a decreasing rate up to K = H1 and remains constant beyond this
threshold since SP1 only sells to customer 1. SP2 revenue increases v2 per unit until
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K = L1+L2, and continues to increase at a decreasing rate up to K = H1+H2. Similarly,
the revenue from the two-step mechanism has a diminishing rate of increase over K values
satisfying A-NT. Looking at each of these mechanisms separately and assuming that c (the
unit cost if increasing K) is positive and non-decreasing, it is obvious that the seller would
prefer not to increase K beyond a specific threshold where the marginal revenue increase
matches the marginal cost of increasing K. However, if we look at the best revenue for
the seller among all three possible mechanisms at any supply level, the conclusion is not
straightforward.
For instances where SP1 revenue stays higher than SP2 revenue as K increases, we
still observe that the increase in K benefits the seller up to a threshold. Nonetheless, in
the next section we present an instance, for which the overall best revenue of the seller
initially increases with K, stays constant up to certain threshold and increases further with
K beyond that. This example shows that the seller’s decision of K is not an easy one, and
requires an involved analysis.
3.4 Results and Observations
So far, we have identified A-NT as the range of K values for which the seller can possibly
exceed optimal single price revenues using a markdown mechanism. With proposition 19 we
have shown that the seller can come up with at least a partially separating mechanism for
all K values satisfying A-NT. We also noted that, in expectation, A-NT is covers a a wider
range of values compared to the IV and CI settings. We are one step away from claiming
that a markdown mechanism benefits the seller for a richer set of parameter values under
ID setting. We will complete the last step if we can show that the seller can achieve higher
revenues compared to optimal single price in all supply scenarios.
In order to accomplish this and answer other research questions, we resort to numerical
examples since we do not have a closed form solution to the optimal prices and seller’s
revenue with an optimal two-step mechanism:
- What is the optimal step 1 price and the corresponding expected revenue of the seller
in an optimal two-step mechanism?
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- How do the changes in supply level (K), minimum and maximum demand parameters
of the customers (L1, H1, L2 and H2), and customer valuations (v1 vs. v2) impact the
optimal prices and/or revenues of the optimal single price and two-step mechanisms?
- How does the optimal markdown revenue compare to the optimal single price?
- What is the effect of reducing the variability of the demand distributions on the seller’s
revenue?
We also demonstrate through a numerical example that the seller’s highest overall rev-
enue from single price and two-step mechanisms is non-monotonous in K.
First we present theoretical results on how the single price revenue changes with K, Li,
Hi and vi, i ∈ {1, 2}. Note that SP1 revenue is independent of the demand and valuation
of customer 2. In Appendix B, we provide the proofs for both results, for which we assume
that the customer demand is uniformly distributed over the support intervals.
Proposition 26. Seller’s revenue from SP1 increases with L1, H1, v1, and also increases
with K up to K = H1 and remains constant as K exceeds H1.
Proposition 27. Seller’s revenue from SP2 is non-decreasing in L1, H1, L2, H2; increasing
in v2. It also increases with K at the rate of v2 per unit up to K = L1 + L2 and continues
to increase at a decreasing rate up to K = H1 +H2.
Next, we present the numerical examples focusing on the structure of the optimal mark-
down mechanism and its performance compared to the optimal single price . We vary
the supply, K, and the demand parameters of the customers and observe how the seller’s
revenue from the optimal markdown and the optimal single price changes.
We generate instances in six groups depending on how D1 and D2 ranges may compare.
We introduce the first five next (see Figure 9 for a visualization) and save the last one for
later:
- G1. D1  D2: (H1 > L1 ≥ H2 > L2) The minimum possible demand of customer 1
is greater than the maximum demand of customer 2.
- G2. E[D1] > E[D2]: (H1 > H2, L1 > L2) Even though D1 > D2 or D2 > D1 are both
possible, in expectation demand of customer 1 exceeds that of customer 2.
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G3: E[D1]=E[D2]
Figure 9: Instance groups for numerical examples.
- G3. D1 = D2: (H1 = H2 > L1 = L2) Customer demands are identically and
independently distributed.
- G4. E[D2] > E[D1]: (H2 > H1, L2 > L1) This is in contrast with the second setting
above. The expected demand by customer 2 exceeds expected demand by customer
1, but D1 > D2 is possible.
- G5. D2  D1: (H2 > L2 ≥ H1 > L1) This is the opposite of setting 1 above. The
minimum demand of customer 2 exceeds maximum demand of customer 1.
We create instances by changing H1 from 20 to 60 in increments of 10, and for each value
of H1, we set L1 to take values from 10 to H2 − 10, again in increments of 10. This yields
15 different D1 distributions from [10, 20] to [10, 60] and [50, 60]. For each D1 distribution,
we generate D2 distributions corresponding to six instance groups.
Figures 13, 14, 15 in Appendix B tabulate the results all instance groups. In each
instance group, for all 15 D1 ranges, we provide the optimal revenue from SP1, SP2, and
two-step mechanism (denoted with M) as well as the optimal step 1 price for low, moderate
and high supply scenarios. We further distinguish K values less than L1+L2. If no feasible
K value exists in a given scenario, we leave the cells blank. The demand and supply
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combinations for which the optimal two-step revenue is higher than the optimal single price
revenue are identified by a shaded background color. Next we present a summary of our
observations from these set of instances.
We observe that SP1, SP2 and markdown revenues increase (or stay the same) with K,
keeping all else constant. However, SP1 benefits the from the increase as long as K < H1,
SP2 and optimal markdown revenues increase until K exceeds H1+H2. The optimal step 1
price, p∗1 decreases with K, since the decrease in relative scarcity at step 2 forces the seller
to charge a lower step 1 price that would induce customer 1 to still bid at step 1. We see
that the optimal markdown becomes more likely to perform better than the optimal single
price as K increases. We observe the same behavior in all instance groups regarding the
impact of varying K.
An increase in L1 leads to an increase in p∗1, SP1, SP2 and the optimal markdown
revenue. Similarly, as H1 increases SP1, SP2 and the optimal markdown revenues increase.
On the other hand p∗1 may increase or stay the same. If the change in H1 affects the price
ranges PS(i) and PS(ii) such that the previous p∗1 is no longer feasible, then the new p∗1
takes a higher value, otherwise the previous value is still optimal.
If L1 or H1 increases together with K by the same percentage, then we see an increase
in the optimal single price and the optimal markdown revenues but a decrease in p∗1. The
intuition behind this is the fact that E[D2] stays at the same level so the customers perceive
a decrease in relative scarcity at step 2. This forces the seller to decrease the step 1 price
to make sure that the required customer 1 types prefer to bid at step 1 at optimality.
When L2 or H2 increases we see that SP1 revenues stay at the same level as expected,
while SP2 revenues increase. The optimal markdown revenue and p∗1 increase as the relative
scarcity at step 2 increases.
Regarding the differences among the instance groups, we observe that markdown revenue
exceeds the optimal single price revenue for most of the instances in G5, some in G4 and only
1 in G3. The higher the demand of the low valuation customer compared to the demand
of the high valuation customer, the more likely is the optimal markdown mechanism to
dominate the optimal single price. Basically, it is much harder for the seller to ignore the
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low valuation customer and just sell to the high type in such a case. Hence, a higher D2 is
more likely to lead to SP2 being the optimal single price, in which case we know that the
optimal markdown revenue is higher.
Note that, we have been able to identify an instance under all supply scenarios for
which the markdown revenue exceeds the optimal single price revenue except for the case
when K < L1 + L2 under Low supply. However, this is possibly due to the relatively large
valuation difference.
To investigate whether this can be overcome by reducing valuation difference between
the customer, we present an additional set of examples. With these examples, we also
investigate the impact of the changes in the valuations of the customers, v1 and v2. For
six of the original fifteen D1 ranges considered, we reduced v2 from 20 to 12 and calculated
the optimal revenues from the single price and the two step mechanisms. See Figure 16 in
Appendix B for tabulated results. We observe that the optimal markdown is more likely to
dominate the optimal single price when the customer valuations are close. As the valuations
of the customers gets closer we observe that SP1 revenues decrease relative to SP2.
We can also see that for all supply scenarios, even when supply is less than the minimum
total demand in the market, (K < L1 + L2), the seller can achieve higher revenues using
a markdown mechanism compared to the optimal single price. This completes the final
step, and we can claim that the ID setting indeed provides an advantage for the markdown
mechanism to perform better than the optimal single price for , in expectation, a wider
range of supply values.
Under complete information we had identified that the optimal markdown is more likely
to dominate when D2 is high relative to D1, and/or when the customer valuations are close.
Our observations form the numerical examples are in line with our theoretical findings in
chapter 2.
In addition to these observations regarding the performance of the optimal markdown,
we also look at how the variability of the demand distribution affects the seller’s revenue.
We introduce an additional group of instances for this purpose:
- G6. D1 ⊂ D2: (H2 > H1 > L1 > L2) where E[D1] = E[D2]. Even though the
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expected demand is the same for both customers, the variance is larger for customer
2.
We address the following questions:
1. What is the impact of the the variability of D2 on the seller’s revenue?
2. Does the seller benefit more from an equivalent reduction in D1 or D2?
A reduction in the variability of D2 also helps customer 1, since he can make a more
informed bid. So, it is not clear whether a decrease in the spread of D2 distribution would
improve the seller’s revenue. Taking the identically and independently distributed demand
setting as the base case, we increase L2 and decreaseH2 simultaneously by the same amount.
We observe that the decrease in variability helps the seller in this setting.
To answer the second question, we create a base set of examples and we first increase
the variability of D1, then D2 and look at how the seller’s revenue changes as a result.
(See Figure 17 in Appendix B for tabulated results. Note that the last column corresponds
to instances 1, 4, 6, 11, 13 and 15 for G6 in Figure 15) We observe that reducing the
variability of D1 increases the seller’s revenue more compared to an equivalent reduction in
the variability of D2. The intuition behind this observation is the fact that a reduction in
the variability of D2 helps and the both customer 1 and the seller. Since customer 1 can
also improve his bidding strategy thanks to more precise information, the seller’s benefit
from the additional information is set back by customer 1. On the other hand, the decrease
in variability of D1 solely benefits the seller.
The results we observe from these examples about the impact of reducing variability of
D2 do not necessarily indicate general trend for all demand and supply parameters. In fact,
in chapter 4 we provide an example for which reducing D2 variability by a certain amount
hurts the seller’s revenue.
While discussing the impact of increasing K on the seller’s overall revenue, we hinted
to an interesting instance. Specifically for one of the instances in G4, with D1 ∈ [30, 40],
D2 ∈ [35, 45], when K = 38 the best revenue for the seller is 696 from SP1. As K increases
to 45, SP1 still generates the highest revenue of all mechanisms with 700, a 4 unit increase
over K = 38. With K = 65, SP1 with 700 still remains the best revenue but as K becomes
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75, the seller’s best overall revenue increase further up to 737.2, generated by a two-step
mechanism with p1∗ = 10.29, p2 = 10. The overall best revenue the seller can get for K
units is not monotonous in K, initially increases, remains constant for a while and then
increases further with K. We conclude that determining the optimal value of K for the
seller requires detailed examination of possible values.
3.5 Summary of Results and Managerial Insights
We have analyzed a priority pricing mechanism, which can also be considered as a two-
step markdown mechanism under incomplete demand information with two customers and
identified the bidding behavior of the customers and how the seller should set prices to
achieve the best revenue from this mechanism.
We showed that optimal step 2 price is the valuation of the low-type customer. Given
any markdown with prices p1 and p2 = v2, customer 2 can only buy at step 2. The bidding
behavior of customer 1 can be identified by an indifferent type ∆, which corresponds to a
D1 realization in [L1,H1]. If Customer 1 of type ∆ is is indifferent between buying at steps
1 and 2, all higher types in [∆,H1] prefers to buy at step 1 while the rest prefers step 2.
The seller’s action space for p1, [v1, v2) is partitioned into three regions based on the
purchasing decision of customer 1: The highest region corresponds to pooling, the middle
range corresponds to partially separating while the lowest corresponds to totally separating
outcomes. The seller sets the price in the PS and TS ranges to maximize her revenue.
One of the interesting results from our analysis is that an optimal mechanism for N > 2
customers may have an arbitrary number of price steps. We cannot identify a theoretical
limit on the number of prices under ID.
When the seller does not have complete information on customer demands, she can
benefit from a markdown mechanism compared to a single price for, in expectation, a
larger set of supply ranges, and depending on the values of the other parameters, can hope
to achieve revenues higher than that can be achieved with a single price mechanism. This is
in spite of the fact that she does not have any controls to manipulate scarcity at the second
step.
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The theoretical model in this paper is motivated by the after-sales service contracts of
OEMs. We rephrase the theoretical and numerical results from our model in this context
and link some of them to real-world examples from pricing of service contracts.
Our model setting corresponds to a service provider facing two customers in a market
with known heterogeneous valuations vi and randomly distributed demands Di, drawn
from commonly known distributions. The seller has the option of offering one or both of
the following contracts:
- Priority contract (service capacity allocated before non-priority buyers)
- Non-priority contract (remaining capacity is rationed among buyers)
Offering both contracts is analogous to the two-step markdown, while each contract by
itself corresponds to SP1 and SP2.
If the expected demand from the high valuation customer exceeds the available supply,
then offering the non-priority contract at a unit price of p1 maximizes the service revenue.
If the market demand for service is too high (K < E[D1]) or too low (H1 + H2 < K)
compared to the service capacity, then the service provider cannot increase revenues by
offering both type of contracts. Essentially, she would choose to just serve the high types
and intentionally leave low type customers out of the market.
Offering both type of contracts with prices such that all customer types prefer the non-
priority contract does not bring any higher revenue than just offering only that contract
type. The larger the portion of the demand comes from the low type, the more likely it is
that offering both contracts will improve the service revenue. This is also the case when
the valuations of the customer types are close. Both of these cases constitute a setting
where the OEM cannot ignore the low types since the potential revenue coming from them
is significant.
[31] classifies service strategies for different product segments based on the fixed and
variable costs incurred by the customers due to product failure. When discussing significant
shifts in cost structures, PCs and printers identified as prominent examples. These costs
are significant determinants for the valuations customers have for the after-sales service.
When PCs were first introduced to the market they were scarcely available, purchasing
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and ownership costs were high, and they were hard to replace if any failure occurred. High
percentage of the customers had high valuations for the service and they usually bought
expensive on-site maintenance contracts with service guarantees. As microprocessor tech-
nology advanced, prices declined drastically. As PCs became abundant, failure of a single
PC started not to matter significantly in the continuity of operations for the businesses.
Consequently a very large percentage of the customers ended up having low valuations for
the service that comes with computers. Now, the manufacturers offer mostly extended
warranties to the PC owners as opposed to an on-site maintenance contract. This exam-
ple shows how the change in the valuation difference for the two types of service leads
to industry-wide shift to discontinue with the availability of a certain type of after-sales
contract in the market.
The following example, also from [31], is similar in that sense, except that the forces in
play include a change in the high and low valuation demand proportions in the market in
addition to the changes in valuation difference between the two types.
In the printer industry, not only did the valuations of the high segment for printer
service decline but the demand from the low valuation segment also shrunk as low-end
and small-office printers have become reliable and cheap enough to make service contracts
unnecessary. Small office copiers became almost disposable as the lower prices no longer
justify major repair costs.
We have mentioned Paris Metro as an example where the same service is offered at two
different prices and the customers are allowed to self-select whether they would like to pay
the premium for higher probability of available seats. From our model, we have found out
that if the availability difference between the two offers is not significant, the seller would
not be much worse off if she offered only one price. [36] mentions that one nice feature
of the Paris Metro class pricing is the self regulating nature of the system. If the overall
ridership was too low, then the 2nd class carts had ample room and there was no incentive
to pay the premium to ride the 1st class. Conversely, if the 1st class cars were too full
such that seat availability was not any different from the second class, then there was no
incentive for the new passengers to pay the 1st class fare. This confirms our observation
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that there needs to be a significant availability difference between the two price offerings
for the multi-price mechanism to bring higher revenues. [1] mentions that Paris Regional
Transport Authority has recommended that subway system switch from two to only one
class of car by the end of 1991. The reason for the recommendation is cited as the decline
in the ticket checks and abundance of turnstile-jumpers and second-class passengers riding
in the first class cars. Out of 120 million tickets sold in 1990, only 21000 for were for first
class, but each train had a first class car. This is another example confirming that, if the
scarcity difference between the two price offers cannot be maintained, then the seller can
do just as good with offering only one price. The other alternative is to create some other
type of difference in the service or products offered at different prices. In the case of French
railroads, they are known to have tried various methods ranging from offering champagne
and delicacies to first class passengers to ripping off the roof of a rail car and billing it as
“third class” and offer it at a discount to the second class [2].
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CHAPTER IV
ON THE VALUE OF INFORMATION AND INFORMATION
SHARING WHEN SELLING TO STRATEGIC CUSTOMERS
4.1 Introduction
The plethora of information businesses have been accumulating in the recent years makes
understanding the potential value of information and strategically exploiting it more crucial
than ever. The challenge is not only in storing, categorizing and interpreting the transaction
data but also doing it strategically by tackling the portions with higher potential benefits
with higher priority.
The value of information has been of special interest in the field of operations manage-
ment. The real world phenomena are usually stochastic in nature, while the models used to
study them are either deterministic, or incorporate a simplified version of the variability in
stochastic models and assume complete information. Hence, exploring the value of having
complete information in various contexts has been a popular research topic.
There are quite a few examples in inventory theory where researchers tried to analyze
the robustness of models under incomplete information settings. In inventory management
context, value of information was studied using a newsvendor model in [39]. Value of
information has also been a popular in the context of supply contracts (recently [12]).
The attention on analysis of customer behavior in revenue management and pricing
research has been increasing in the past decade. However, the value of information and
information sharing in the context of pricing with strategic customers is mostly unexplored
territory. See [40] for a recent review of the literature on customer behavior modeling in
revenue management and auctions.
We focus on a specific pricing problem where a seller is using a priority pricing mech-
anism to sell a limited amount of a product or service to two strategic customers with
multi-unit demands. The seller has complete information on customer valuations, but only
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knows the distribution of their demand. The seller cannot tell which customer the demand
is coming from so she cannot exercise first or third degree price discrimination. Instead, she
uses a priority pricing mechanism with two prices promising different availability/scarcity
levels. Purchase requests at the higher price are satisfied before the requests at the lower
price. If the total requests exceed the available supply, the seller picks a customer at random
and satisfies his request, and allocates the remainder to the other customer.
The customers know how many units the seller has, the prices associated with both
priority levels and the valuation and demand distribution of the other customer. Each
customer also knows his exact demand realization and tries to maximize the surplus ((val-
uation - price paid) * expected number of units allocated). By employing a priority pricing
mechanism, the seller is trying to get the high-valuation customer to buy at the higher
price. This is not a very easy task, as the seller has incomplete demand information and
she has hardly any tools to establish a scarcity threat at the lower price.
In this setting, we investigate the benefit to the seller from improving the quality of
demand information about the customers’ demands.
Specifically, we answer the following questions:
- Does the seller always benefit from reduced demand variability of the customers?
-If she can get access to the private valuation information of the customers, would she
benefit from sharing this information with the customers?
In [45], a newsvendor model is used as a basis for exploring the value of inventory
information when selling to strategic customers. The seller, facing a random market demand
from customers with search costs, sets an observable price and an unobservable stocking
quantity. Consumers anticipate the likelihood of stockout and determine whether to visit
the seller. They show that the seller can improve profits by sharing the stocking quantity
information with the market or by promising to compensate consumers in the event of
stockout.
Our approach is different since the initial inventory of the seller is public information in
our model. We complement the previous work by analyzing the value of demand information
and the seller’s option of sharing this information with the market.
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The rest of this section is organized as follows: We summarize the model and the
properties of the optimal pricing mechanisms. We present the numerical examples, analyze
the impact of reducing variance of demand and list our observations. Directions for future
research conclude the chapter.
4.2 Model
A seller operates in a market consisting of two customers with a fixed starting inventory, K,
and does not know the customers’ exact demands. The customers have constant marginal
valuations, v1 and v2, for up to a certain number of units of the product. The valuations
of the customers, the initial supply level are common knowledge. Each customer’s private
demand is drawn from a commonly known atomless continuous distribution with support
over the interval [Li,Hi]. Each customer shares this belief with the seller regarding the
demand of the other customer but knows his own exact demand realization.
The customers and the seller are assumed to be risk-neutral, so they maximize their
expected surplus. The seller employs a two-step mechanism, which has an initial higher
price only the high type can afford, and a lower price both customers can afford. While
the low-valuation customer can only buy at the lower price, the high-valuation customer
chooses between the two prices, based on his expected surplus.
The high-type customer faces a tradeoff, and buys at the high price if and only if
(v1 − p1)D1 ≥ (v1 − p2)(expected allocation at p2). The expectation is due to two factors;
incomplete information about the demand of customer 2 and the use a random allocation
rule by the seller. If the total bids exceed the available supply at the lower price, the seller
randomly chooses one of the customers and satisfies his request completely and allocates
the remaining units to the other customer.
Lacking the exact demand information, the seller cannot guarantee that customer 1 will
buy at step 1. Using the distribution information on both demands, she can identify what
exact D1 realization would make customer 1 better off by buying for a particular step 1
price, p1. Accordingly, the optimal step 1 price is the one that maximizes the expected
revenue calculated over all possible demand distributions of the customers.
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We categorize a two-step mechanism that induces customer 1 to bid D1 at step 1 for
some D1 ∈ [L1,H1] as separating. If customer 1 bids at step 1 for all D1 ∈ [L1,H1] then
we use the term totally separating. Conversely, if the mechanism cannot induce customer 1
to bid at step 1 for any D1, then we call it pooling.
With access to complete demand information, the seller can identify a clearing price
and come up with the optimal set of prices that guarantee high-valuation customer bids at
the higher price. However, under incomplete demand information there is no closed form
solution to the pricing problem of the seller. Hence we resort to numerical examples for our
analysis.
Specifically, restricting our attention to mean-preserving variance reductions of the de-
mand distributions, we seek to answer the following questions: Does the seller benefit from
reducing variability of D1 or D2? If the seller could achieve equivalent reduction in the
variance of D1 or D2, which one provides more benefit to the seller?
The purchasing decision of the high-valuation customer depends on the perceived scarcity
at step 2, which is a function of the demand distribution of the low valuation customer.
This interaction motivates a follow-up question: Would the seller benefit from sharing the
improved demand information about customer 2 with customer 1?
Intuitively, reducing D1 variability can never hurt the seller since this information only
factors into the seller’s decision. However it is hard to predict the effect of reducing D2
variability. Our main finding is that the answer is not always straightforward and simple;
it depends on the instance. We introduce two examples, present the optimal mechanisms
before and after the variance reduction and arrive at opposite conclusions about the impact
of reducing variance of D2. We also show that sometimes reducing neither D1 nor D2
variability benefits the seller.
As for the follow-up question, we demonstrate via numerical examples that the seller
can be made better or worse off by sharing the D2 information with customer 1.
In the next section, we introduce two numerical examples, and investigate the impact of
reducing the variation of D1 or D2 on the buying decision of the high-valuation customer
and the expected revenue of the seller.
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Figure 10: Relation of K to the demand ranges of customers in the numerical examples.
4.3 Numerical Examples
We present two numerical examples, modify both examples by reducing the variance of D1
and D2 distributions and examine how the seller’s revenue is impacted by either change in
both examples (Figure 10). Then we investigate if the seller would be better off if she does
not share the improved information on D2 distribution with customer 2.
To simplify the analysis in both examples, we assume that the customer demands are
uniformly distributed over their respective support intervals, [Li,Hi]. As we investigate
the impact of reduced variance, we consider equal and opposite changes in the bounds of
the support interval, hence the changes are mean-preserving. Commonly known customer
valuations are v1 = 20, v2 = 10 and the optimal step 2 price, p∗2 = v2 = 10 in both examples.
Example 1: L1 = 10, H1 = 40, L2 = 40, H2 = 65 and K = 50.
In the two-step mechanism that maximizes the revenue of the seller, p∗1 = 14.169 and
p2 = 10. Faced with these prices, the high-type customer prefers to buy at step 1 as long
as his exact demand is at least 11.69. Hence, the seller cannot guarantee a separating
mechanism and ends up taking the risk of selling all existing supply at the lower price for
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the opportunity of selling D1 at p1 in the cases when D1 exceeds 11.69, with an expected
revenue of 601.11. Note that, if the seller were to set p1 = 14, customer 1 would prefer to
bid at step 1 for all demand realizations in [10, 40]. However, the expected revenue is less
in this case.
First, we consider the case where D1 range shrinks by 40% to [16, 34]. With this change,
if the seller sets step 1 price as high as p1 = 14.375, customer 1 chooses to buy at step 1
for any D1 realization in [16, 34]. Note that this p1 value is higher than the optimal step 1
price prior to the variance reduction. The mechanism is guaranteed to be separating and
leads to a higher expected revenue level at 609.75.
Next, we analyze the impact of reducing D2 variance by shrinking its support interval
by 40% to [45, 60]. With this change the probability that D2 ≥ K, which was originally 0.6,
increases to 0.67. With a higher probability, demand of customer 2 depletes the existing
supply, effectively increasing the scarcity risk perceived by customer 1. Hence, the seller
can charge a higher step 1 price, p1∗ = 14.583, and still manage to induce customer 1 for all
D1 realizations in [10, 40]. Benefiting from the increased scarcity risk at step 2, the seller
increases her expected revenue to 614.583.
In this example, we observe that the seller benefits more from an equivalent reduction
in variance of D2, since it boosts the scarcity risk.
Example 2: L1 = 50, H1 = 60, L2 = 5, H2 = 55 and K = 65.
The optimal step 1 price is p∗1 = 11.531. The high-valuation customer buys at step
1 for all D1 realizations in [50, 60]. The expected revenue of the seller from the two-step
mechanism for this example is 734.607.
WhenD1 support range is reduced by 20% to [51, 59], with the optimal 2-step mechanism
the seller can charge a higher step 1 price at p1 = 11.648. The motivation behind this change
is that she does not need to worry about keeping a potential customer 1 with D1 = 50 from
bidding at step 2, while setting a step 1 price based on the tradeoff of customer 1. With
the higher step 1 price, the seller’s expected revenue increases to 737.609.
On the other hand, when the coefficient of variation for D2 is reduced by 20% by
shrinking the support interval to [10, 50], the outcome is detrimental to the seller’s revenue.
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K − L2 was greater than H1 prior to the reduction, suggesting that if customer 2 had
the allocation priority at step 2, the allocation to customer 1 would always depend on
the demand realization of customer 2. However, after the variance reduction we have
K − L2 = 55, and for 50% of his demand realizations (D1 ∈ [50, 55]), he gets a positive
remainder from customer 2, no matter what the realization of D2 is. Hence the sensitivity
of the perceived scarcity risk for customer 1 to his demand realization is diminished. As a
result, the seller cannot charge as high a step 1 price while keeping customer 1 buying at
step 1 for all D1 ∈ [50, 60]. With p1 = 11.531, the two-step mechanism is totally separating
and the seller ends up with an expected revenue of 733.698, which is slightly less than the
original value.
As predicted, a reduction in D1 variance does not lead to a decrease in the revenue of
the seller. However, we have shown two examples where the impact of reducing D2 variance
can be negative or positive on the seller’s expected revenue. Our examples demonstrate
that this is due to the indirect effect a variance reduction on D2 has on the seller’s revenue
through the risk of scarcity perceived by the high-valuation customer.
Even though this has not been exhibited by the two examples we presented, we can
argue that it is possible for the seller to not benefit from a variance reduction of D1: When
L1 > K, allocation to customer 1 at step 2 is independent from the variance of D1. Since
the allocation to customer 1 is K if he is picked first and 0 otherwise, it does not decrease
the seller’s revenue either in such instances.
Recall our follow-up question regarding the decision of the seller to share the improved
information on D2 with customer 1. The observations so far suggest that if the seller has
the option to share information with customer 1, he may indeed choose not to.
Note that in the case of example 1, the seller benefits from the impact of reduced variance
on the buying decision of customer 1. Hence, having acquired this information, the seller
does not benefit from withholding it from the high-valuation customer. On the other hand,
looking closely at example 2, we can see that if the seller keeps the updated D2 distribution
to herself, the high-valuation customer’s behavior is not altered, and the seller is isolated
from the negative impact on the expected revenue.
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4.4 Research Directions
The decisions of the seller regarding the pricing mechanism if she chooses to keep D2
information private is beyond the scope of our analysis. The notion that the customers are
rational and would be able to deduce from any non-optimal action that the seller might
have additional or incorrect information, brings about questions about commitment and
gaming the market and opens doors for using other methods for analysis. It exceeds the
purpose we set out with; answering questions about the value of information in the context
of pricing under incomplete demand information when selling to strategic customers.
We believe that the ability to identify instances in which improved information accuracy
benefits the agent who is allocating limited resources to analysis of virtually unlimited data
is crucial to the decision of choosing which data to analyze and how to perform the analysis.
Although we focused on numerical examples based on a stylized model, we were able to
demonstrate that the answer is not straightforward.
We believe that our model captures the essence of the dilemma in the motivating real-
world settings as it incorporates the incomplete demand information the seller has to work
with when pricing goods or services in a market with strategic customers: The changes
in information about a customer’s parameters may benefit the seller directly but hurt her
cause indirectly through the response of other customers in the market.
Nevertheless, we think future research incorporating heterogeneity in the strategic na-
ture the customers, wherein some subset of the demand may be coming from myopic or
non-rational customers may yield to interesting insights.
Another interesting direction for extension is incorporating repeated interaction of the
seller and the buyers in the market whereby the buying decisions are not only a result of
the current prices but also depend on the pricing policy decisions of the seller in previous
iterations.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
Motivated by the recent popularity of non-static pricing mechanisms and increased sophis-
tication of the customers due to advances in computing and information technologies, we
studied the design of pricing mechanisms in the presence of rational customers with multi-
unit demands.
In chapter 2, we focused on the optimal design of pre-announced markdown mechanisms.
Under complete information, we showed that the optimal mechanism need not have more
than 2 steps and identified the optimal bidding behavior of the customers and the pricing
decision of the seller in a 2-customer setting. For a more general, N -customer setting we
devised an algorithm to find the optimal prices, and showed via numerical examples how the
seller’s revenue changes as the valuation distribution of the customers and ratio of available
to the total market demand changes.
Then, we modified the problem setting to an incomplete valuation information setting,
characterized the bidding behavior of the customers and provided guidelines as to how the
seller can identify the optimal prices when facing two customers.
Common results from these settings include, all-or-nothing bidding behavior of cus-
tomers and the form of the first step price, which charges a premium over the second step
price proportional to the scarcity perceived by the customer if he bids at the second step.
In chapter 3, we investigated the design of a priority pricing mechanism for a seller
operating with incomplete demand information in a setting similar to the one in the previous
chapter. In contrast with the results in the previous chapter, we showed that the number
of prices in the optimal mechanism can not be limited to a small number when there are
multiple customers in the market. For the two-customer setting, we identified the bidding
behavior of the customers is still all-or-nothing and narrowed the K range for which the
seller can hope to achieve higher revenue than the optimal single price as A-NT E[D1] <
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K < H1 + H2. In expectation, this supply range is larger than the D1 < K < D1 + D2
range, which was identified under complete demand information settings considered in the
previous chapter. Via numerical examples, we showed that the seller can indeed achieve a
higher revenue using a two-step mechanism for all supply scenarios within A-NT.
In chapter 4, we focused on the benefit to the seller from improved demand information
about the customers building on the incomplete demand information model in chapter 3.
We showed that the seller may or may not benefit from reduced variability of demand
distribution of the low-valuation customer, since this may also signal a reduced scarcity
to the high-valuation customer altering his purchasing decision at step 1. Hence, we also
identified an instance for which the seller would be better off by not sharing information
with the market.
Our results and insights shed light to interesting dynamics involved in designing pricing
policies in a market with rational customers. Some of our results can be used to explain
the interactions in real-world settings motivating the model settings we study
One of the limitations of our analysis is assuming that all customers in the market are
rational and all of them are present in the market throughout the sale period. The result
that limits the number of price steps are likely to not hold if customers arrive in time or if
they do not stay until the end.
Another area for future work is the analysis of pricing mechanisms where the number
of units available for sale, K, is not public information. This is usually the case with retails
stores, and some online merchants, as the customers have no visibility to the entire inventory
of the seller.
We believe the exploring these directions will improve understanding of the potential
buyers and seller who are likely to be faced with or employ such mechanisms.
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Appendix A
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Examples of Markdowns with Pre-Announced Prices from Sam’s Club (Fig-
ure 11) and Filene’s Basement
“Filene developed a revolutionary way to price merchandise called the ‘Automatic Mark
Down System.’ The price tag on each item was marked with the date it hit the selling floor.
The longer an item remained unsold, the more the price would automatically be reduced,
first 25%, then 50% and finally 75%.” http://www.filenesbasement.com/master.html
Figure 11: An example of a markdown mechanism with pre-announced prices from the
website of Sam’s Club, under the name of Plunging Prices. Sam’s Club logo reproduced
with permission. Microsoft product screen shot reprinted with permission from Microsoft
Corporation
Example for the Two-Customer Case (Section 2.3.1)
To illustrate the results of Section 2.3.1, we present a numerical example with two
customers. We consider an instance where the customers are willing to buy up to 10 and
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18 units (D1=10, D2=18) and are willing to pay v1=20 and v2=10 per unit, respectively.
We assume that the seller has an exogenously determined initial inventory of 20 units for
sale (K=20).
For this instance, the optimal single price is not unique. The seller can either set the
price equal to 20 and only sell to Customer 1, or set the price equal to 10 and sell the entire
supply. With either one of these prices, the optimal single-price revenue of the seller is 200.
In the optimal two-step markdown, the optimal step 2 price is p2 = v2 = 10 (Observa-
tion 3). Optimal step 1 price, p∗1 = 20− 10+20−1820 (20− 10) = 14 (Proposition 4). Customer
1 buys 10 units at step 1, and the remaining 10 are sold to Customer 2 at step 2. The
revenue of the seller is 240. The markdown mechanism with prices (p∗1, p2) dominates the
single price as stated in Observation 6.
Figures 12(a) and 12(b) illustrate how the seller’s revenue under the markdown and the
optimal single-price mechanisms changes as a function of (D1) and (v1), respectively. In
Figure 12(a), for D1 ≤ v2K/v1 = 10, markdown pricing dominates the optimal single price,
as stated in Observation 6. For D1 > v2K/v1 = 10, markdown pricing dominates the opti-
mal single price only if (v1+v2)D1 < (v1−v2)D2+K(3v2−v1) (as stated in Observation 7),
that is, if D1 < 12.7. In Figure 12(b), we observe a similar dominance between the two
pricing mechanisms as we keep v2 fixed at 10, but vary v1. From Figures 12(a) and 12(b)
we also make the following observation: The revenues under the optimal single price re-
main constant and then start increasing after either D1 or v1 reach a threshold where it
becomes more profitable to sell only to high-valuation customers. However, revenues under
markdown pricing monotonically increase with D1 and v1.
Figures 12(c) and 12(d) reaffirm the conditions stated in Observation 7, under which
the optimal markdown mechanism dominates the optimal single price: Markdown pricing
dominates the optimal single price when (i) D2 is large relative to D1 (Figure 12(c)), (ii)
K is close to the total quantity demanded by both customers (D1+D2) (Figure 12(c)) and
(iii) the valuations of the two customers are close to each other (Figure 12(d)).
Proof of Theorem 2 Given the bid quantities (qi1, qi2) of all customers i 6= j, we want
to find the best response (optimal bid quantities) of customer j. If vj < p2, customer j bids
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Figure 12: Seller’s revenue under the optimal markdown mechanism and comparison of
the markdown mechanism with the optimal single price.
zero at both price steps. If p1 > vj ≥ p2, then from Observation 1 customer j bids his entire
demand at step 2. If vj ≥ p1, customer j’s expected profit from bidding (qj1, qj2 = Dj−q1j)
can be expressed as follows
Πj = (vj − p1)qj1 + (vj − p2)E[Aj ]
where E[Aj ] denotes the expected quantity allocated to customer j in step 2. Note that since
we consider effective markdowns, customer j is guaranteed to receive all his bid quantity at
step 1, i.e., his profit at step 1 is (vj − p1)qj1. Customer j’s expected profit from bidding at
step 2 depends on the (expected) quantity that will be allocated to that customer at step
2. Recall that when the total bid quantity exceeds supply at a given step, the seller uses
the random allocation rule. This is equivalent to choosing a permutation of N customers
randomly and satisfying the customers’ demand in sequence based on their position in
this permutation. There are N ! distinct permutations of N customers and the seller will
choose any of these permutations with equal probability 1/N !. Let us denote the set of all
permutations by U and let Bjpi denote the set of customers whose bid quantities are satisfied
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before customer j in some permutation pi ∈ U . Bjpi = ∅ indicates that customer j’s demand
is satisfied first.
E[Aj ] =
1
N !
∑
∀pi∈U
min{(K −
∑
i∈Bjpi
Di −
∑
i/∈Bjpi
qi1 − qj1)+, (Dj − qj1)},
We will show that the profit function Πj is convex in qj1 by analyzing its slope Π′j =
∂Πj
∂qj1
=
(vj − p1) + (vj − p2)(E[Aj ])′, where (E[Aj ])′ = ∂E[Aj ]∂qj1 evaluates to − xN ! for some positive
real x. The higher the value of qj1, the higher is the number of permutations for which
(K −∑
i∈Bjpi Di −
∑
i/∈Bjpi qi1 − qj1)+ is equal to zero, i.e., the lower is the value x. Hence
we observe that as qj1 increases, the slope of the profit function either increases (possibly
changing from negative to positive) or remains the same.
Based on these observations, we conclude that the profit function is convex, and will be
maximized at one of the extreme points {0, Dj}, implying an all-or-nothing bidding strategy
at each step. 2
Proof of Proposition 4 Since p2 = v2, using the equilibrium bidding strategies from
Table 3 we can write the total profit of the seller as follows:
ΠS(p1) =
 p1D1 + v2(K −D1) if p1 ≤ pˆCI(v1, v2)v2K if p1 > pˆCI(v1, v2)
ΠS is strictly monotonically increasing in p1 up to pˆCI(v1, p2), after which it sharply drops
to v2K. Hence, this break-point pˆCI(v1, p2)=p∗1 is the optimal price. At p∗1, customer 1 is
indifferent between buying at step 1 or 2. By assumption (A2) customer 1 bids his entire
demand at step 1. 2
Proof of Theorem 5 Suppose there exists some partition {S1, S2}, which satisfies
conditions (C1) and (C2) simultaneously. We will demonstrate that the proposed bidding
strategies constitute an equilibrium by considering any profitable deviations. Suppose that
all buyers, except buyer k, bid according to ES. From Theorem 2, we know that it is always
optimal for customer k to bid all of his potential demand in one step.
For k ∈ S1, if buyer k bids according to ES, his profit is given by Πk1 = Dk(vk−p1). On
the other hand, if customer k deviates from ES and bids Dk at step 2, he will compete with
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the other customers in S2 for the allocation of the remaining units; in this case customer
k’s expected profit is Πk2 = (vk−p2)E[Ak] where E[Ak] is customer k’s expected allocation
at step 2.
We know that Πk1 = Dk(vk − p1) > (vk − p2)E[Ak] = Πk2 (by the definition of the
partition {S1, S2} and condition (C1)). Therefore, given all other buyers bid according to
ES, it is an optimal response for buyer k ∈ S1 to do the same.
Similarly, for k ∈ S2, if buyer k bids according to ES, his profit is given by Πk2 = (vk −
p2)E[Ak]. If buyer k deviates and bids Dk in step 1, his profit is given by Πk1 = Dk(vk−p1).
From the definition of {S1, S2} and condition (C2), we know that Πk1 = Dk(vk − p1) <
(vk−p2)E[Ak] = Πk2. Therefore, given all other buyers bid according to ES, it is an optimal
response for buyer k ∈ S2 to do the same. 2
Proof of Proposition 6 We can rewrite condition (C1) as follows:
vk − p1
vk − p2 ≥
E[Ak]
Dk
(C1)
As we increase Dk by one unit, the denominator of
E[Ak]
Dk
increases by one unit, but the
numerator increases by at most one unit, i.e., as Dk increases,
E[Ak]
Dk
decreases (or remains
the same). On the other hand, vk−p1vk−p2 is increasing in vk. Then we have
vj − p1
vj − p2 >
vk − p1
vk − p2 >
E[Ak]
Dk
≥ E[Aj ]
Dj
for any j < k since vj > vk and Dj ≥ Dk. This implies that if condition (C1) holds for
customer k for a given partition {S1, S2}, then it should hold for all customers j < k. 2
Proof of Theorem 7 Let qjt denote customer j’s bid quantity at step t, t ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Note that for any customer j who can afford to bid at pm, we have qjm = Dj −
∑
t<m qjt.
The expected profit of customer j can be expressed as:
Πj(qj1, . . . , qjm) =
m∑
t=1
(vj − pt)E[Ajt]
where E[Ajt] is the expected allocation to customer j at step t. Recall that when the total
bid quantity exceeds supply at a given step, the seller uses a random allocation rule and
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this is equivalent to choosing a permutation of N customers randomly and satisfying the
demands based on their sequence in this permutation. The seller will choose each of N !
permutations with equal probability 1N ! . We denote the set of all permutations with U
and define Bjpi as the set of customers whose bids are satisfied before customer j in some
permutation pi ∈ U . Using this notation, we can define the expected allocation of customer
j at step t as follows:
E[Ajt] =
1
N !
∑
∀pi∈U
min{K+t , qjt}
where
K1 = K −
∑
∀i∈Bjpi
qi1, Km = K −
∑
∀i∈Bjpi
Di −
∑
∀i/∈Bjpi
∑
k<m
qik −
∑
k<m
qjk
Kt = K −
∑
∀i∈Bjpi
∑
k≤t
qik −
∑
∀i/∈Bjpi
∑
k<t
qik −
∑
k<t
qjk, m > t > 1
We look at the derivative of Πj with respect to qjk and show that the profit is maximized
at the end-points of the range for qjk.
∂Πj(qj1, . . . , qjm)
∂qjk
=
m∑
t=1
(vj − pt)∂E[Ajt]
∂qjk
∂E[Ajt]
∂qjk
evaluates to zero for k > t. For k < t, ∂E[Ajt]∂qjk evaluates to −
xk
Nt!
for some xk. The
higher the value of qjk, the higher is the number of permutations for which K+t is equal to
zero, i.e., the lower is the value of xt. For k = t,
∂E[Ajt]
∂qjt
evaluates to wtNt! for some wt. Note
that K+t is constant with respect to qjt, hence, as qjt increases, the number of permutations
for which min{K+t , qjt} = qjt decreases (or remains the same), implying that ∂E[Ajt]∂qjt is
non-decreasing in qjt. In summary, as qjk increases,
∂E[Ajt]
∂qjk
increases or remains the same.
From this observation, it follows that the slope of the profit function in the direction of
qjk in non-decreasing in qjk implying that customer j’s profit is maximized at one of the
end-points 0 or Dj −
∑
l<t qjl.
Since the optimal bid quantity at step t is 0 or Dj −
∑
l<t qjl, customer j submits 0
or Dj at step 1. By induction, if the customer submits 0 or Dj at steps 1, . . . , t, t < m,
then he will submit 0 or Dj at step t + 1. Hence, it is optimal for customer j to submit
all-or-nothing bids at any step. 2
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Proof of Observation 8: Consider a markdown where p1 > p2 > ... > pj > v¯k >
pj+1 > ... where pc ∈ [vk, v¯k].
(i) Since the total demand is less than K for any price higher than v¯k, customers will not
purchase but simply wait until the markdown reaches pj , which is the lowest price above v¯k.
Hence, one can eliminate p1, p2, . . . , pj−1 from the markdown without affecting the expected
profit of the seller.
(ii) Suppose p1 > . . . > vk > pl > . . . > pm, i.e, pl is the highest price which is smaller
than vk. We claim that the seller would be better off by eliminating the last price step pm.
Since D[pi] > K ∀pi ≤ pl, eliminating pm does not decrease the number of units sold. We
also need to show that the seller is guaranteed to sell all K units at the same or higher
prices than with the m-step markdown. Customers originally bidding at step m may bid
at higher price steps or they may not bid at all in the new markdown with fewer steps. If
they do not bid in the new mechanism, then the competition at the higher price levels is
unaffected. On the other hand, if they bid at higher price steps, then the competition can
only increase since there would be more customers bidding at a price step. As a result, at
any price step j < m, the competition either increases or remains the same, preventing the
seller’s revenue from decreasing. Hence, the revenue of the seller is not made any worse by
eliminating the lowest price step from the markdown. Using these arguments repeatedly,
we can eliminate all price steps (strictly) smaller than pl.
(iii) By contradiction, suppose pm ∈ [v¯j+1, vj ] for some j < N . By setting p = vj ,
the seller does not decrease the demand at any price step, hence, the competition at each
price step remains the same. However, due to the increase in pm, some customers who were
previously bidding at pm may now choose to bid at higher price steps, potentially increasing
the seller’s revenues. 2
Proof of Observation 10: Since pc ∈ [vN , v¯N ], from Observation 8, there is at most
one price, p1, exceeding v¯N . By the definition of an INT markdown, only one price can be
chosen from [vN , v¯N ]. 2
Proof of Proposition 9: If customer 1 bids D1 at p1, his surplus is Π11 = (v1−p1)D1.
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Alternatively, if he bids D1 at p2 his expected surplus is
Pi12 = (v1 − p2)
{
F2(p2)D1 + [1− F2(p2)]D1 +K −D22
}
.
Hence, customer 1 bids at p1 if and only if Π11 ≥ Π12. Rearranging terms, we get
Equations (4) and (5). 2
To identify the range of p2 values for which TS or PS markdowns are feasible, first we
find the p2 values which satisfy pˆIV (v1, p2) = v¯2 (the lower bound on allowable prices for p1
under an INT markdown), and find two solutions, namely, v¯2 and p2(v1) where
p2(v1) = v1 − 2D1
D1 +D2 −K (v¯2 − v2) (6)
(Note that when customer valuations are uniformly distributed, the threshold step 1 price,
pˆIV (v1, p2), is a quadratic convex function of p2.) To induce some customer 1 types to
bid at p1, we need p2 ≤ p2(v¯1). In addition, p2 < v¯2 from A4-IV, hence, we need
p2 ≤ min{v¯2, p2(v¯1)}. Combining this with the result of Corollary 12, we get the following
condition for a feasible PS markdown.
Observation 17. A feasible PS markdown satisfies the following:
v2 ≤ p2 < min{v¯2, p2(v¯1)} and max{pˆIV (v1, p2), v¯2} < p1 ≤ pˆIV (v¯1, p2) (7)
Similarly, we can identify conditions for the existence of a TS markdown.
Observation 18. A feasible TS markdown satisfies the following:
v2 ≤ p2 < min{v¯2, p2(v1)} and v¯2 < p1 ≤ pˆIV (v1, p2) (8)
Note that since pˆIV (v¯1, p2) > pˆIV (v1, p2), a PS markdown exists whenever a TS mark-
down exists.
Results 1 and 2 spell out conditions (7) and (8) (presented in Observations 17 and 18)
for uniformly distributed valuations, and are used in the proofs of some of the theorems
that follow.
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Result 1. When the valuations are uniformly distributed, there exists a PS markdown with
price p2 if and only if one of the following conditions holds:
i. for p2 ∈ [v2, p2(v¯1)] if v¯2−v2v¯1−v2 ≤
D1+D2−K
2D1
<
v¯2−v2
v¯1−v¯2 or equivalently if v2 ≤ p2(v¯1) < v¯2
ii. for all p2 ∈ [v2, v¯2) if v¯2−v2v¯1−v¯2 ≤ D1+D2−K2D1 or equivalently if v¯2 ≤ p2(v¯1)
The proof of Result 1 follows immediately by inserting the appropriate values for the
uniform distribution into the conditions (7) of Observation 17. We have a similar result for
the TS markdown.
Result 2. When the valuations are uniformly distributed, there exists a TS markdown with
price p2 if and only if one of the following conditions holds:
i. for p2 ∈ [v2, p2(v1)] if v¯2−v2v1−v2 ≤
D1+D2−K
2D1
<
v¯2−v2
v1−v¯2 or equivalently if v2 ≤ p2(v1) < v¯2
ii. for all p2 ∈ [v2, v¯2) if v¯2−v2v1−v¯2 ≤
D1+D2−K
2D1
or equivalently if v¯2 ≤ p2(v1)
In the following, whenever there is a strict inequality a < b as a constraint, this should
be perceived as a ≤ b − , where  ≈ 0. To simplify the notation, we use a < b.  can be
thought of as the minimum possible price increment.
Figure 4 shows how the existence of PS and TS markdowns depends on the scarcity of
supply measured by D1+D2−K2D1 (the ratio of customer 1’s expected unmet demand to his
entire demand, if both customers bid at step 2): if scarcity is low, it is more likely to see a
pooling rather than a separating outcome. (Figure 4 is based on Results 1 and 2 presented
above.)
The seller can determine the optimal PS markdown by maximizing ΠPSS subject to (7),
where:
ΠPSS = [1− F1(vˆ1(p1, p2))]p1D1 + F1(vˆ1(p1, p2))p2D1 + (K −D1)[1− F2(p2)]p2 (9)
Similarly, the seller can determine the optimal TS markdown by maximizing ΠTSS subject
to (8), where:
ΠTSS = p1D1 + (K −D1)[1− F2(p2)]p2 (10)
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Define PPS and PTS to be the set of p2 values for which a PS and a TS markdown
exists, respectively. Note that since PTS ⊆ PPS , we have PTS ∩ PPS = PTS . In what
follows, we characterize the optimal PS and TS markdowns. Based on those results, we
are able to derive sufficient conditions for a PS or a TS markdown to be optimal. Define
p∗M1 (p2) to be the optimal first step price given a second price step of p2 under markdown
type M = TS, PS.
Characterization of the Optimal TS Markdown
To characterize the optimal TS markdown, we find p∗TS1 (p2) and then demonstrate some
properties of the seller’s revenue function.
Theorem 28. The optimal TS markdown has the following properties:
(i) For a given second step price p2, the optimal first price step is pˆIV (v1, p2).
(ii) ΠTSS (pˆIV (v1, p2), p2) is convex in p2 if K < D1 + D2/3, and it is concave in p2 if
K ≥ D1 +D2/3.
(iii) If ΠTSS (pˆIV (v1, p2), p2) is concave in p2, then the optimal step 2 price is:
p∗TS2 =

v2 if pTS2 ≤ v2
pTS2 if v2 < p
TS
2 ≤ min{p2(v1), v¯2}
p2(v1) if p2(v1) < min{pTS2 , v¯2}
v¯2 −  if v¯2 ≤ min{pTS2 , p2(v1)}
(iv) If ΠTSS (pˆIV (v1, p2), p2) is convex in p2, then the optimal step 2 price is:
p∗TS2 =
 v2 if
D1+D2−K
2D1
≥ D1v¯2−Kv2D1(v1−v2) +
(K−D1)
D1
(v¯2−p2(v1))
(v¯2−v2)
p2(v1)
(v1−v2)
p2(v1) otherwise
where pTS2 =
v¯2(3K−D1−D2)−2D1v2−(D1+D2−K)v1
2(3K−3D1−D2) .
Proof of Theorem 28:
(i) The seller’s profit is increasing in p1 (since
∂ΠTSS
∂p1
= D1 > 0). Therefore, for a given
p2, the seller would prefer to set p1 to its upper bound, which is pˆIV (v1, p2).
(ii) The first derivative of seller’s revenue with respect to p2 after substituting p1 =
pˆIV (v1, p2) and uniform CDF and pdf for Fi(pi) and fi(pi) is as follows:
∂ΠTSS (pˆIV (v1, p2), p2)
∂p2
= D1 − v1(v¯2 − v2)
(D1 +D2 −K)
2
+
(v¯2 − 2p2)
(v¯2 − v2)
(3K − 3D1 −D2)
2
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Taking the second derivative with respect to p2 yields:
∂2ΠTSS (pˆIV (v1, p2), p2)
∂p22
= (3D1 +D2 − 3K) 1
v¯2 − v2
Since v¯2 > v2 we obtain a sufficient and necessary condition for the function to be concave
(convex) in p2 as K ≥ D1 +D2/3 (K < D1 +D2/3).
(iii) When the revenue function is concave in p2, its maximizer is pTS2 . If p
TS
2 ∈
[v2,min{p2(v1), v¯2}], then it is the optimal step 2 price. Otherwise, the optimal p2 is one of
the boundary values of the feasible p2 range.
(iv) When the revenue is a convex function of p2, one of the boundary points will be the
optimal step 2 price. First we show that if a TS markdown exists for all p2 ∈ [v2, v¯2), then
p∗TS2 = v2. For v2 to be the optimal step 2 price, revenue at this price should be higher
than the revenue at p2 = v¯2, i.e.,
ΠTSS (pˆIV (v1, v2), v2) ≥ ΠTSS (pˆIV (v1, v¯2), v¯2)
→ Kv2 + (v1 − v2)
D1 +D2 −K
2
≥ D1v¯2 → D1 +D2 −K2 ≥
D1v¯2 −Kv2
v1 − v2
From Result 2(ii), we have v¯2−v2v1−v¯2 ≤
D1+D2−K
2D1
as the condition for a TS markdown to
exist for all p2, hence we conclude that v2 is always optimal provided that a TS markdown
exists for all p2 as a result of the following series of inequalities,
D1 +D2 −K
2D1
≥ v¯2 − v2
v1 − v¯2
>
v¯2 − v2
v1 − v2
>
v¯2 − v2
v1 − v2
− K −D1
D1
v2
(v1 − v2)
=
D1v¯2 −Kv2
D1(v1 − v2)
If a TS markdown exists for only p2 ∈ [v2, p2(v1)], where p2(v1) < v¯2, then either
p∗TS2 = p2(v1) or p∗TS2 = v2. We compare the corresponding revenues to find condi-
tions under which either one is optimal. For p∗TS2 = v2, we need ΠTSS (pˆIV (v1, v2), v2) ≥
ΠTSS (pˆIV (v1, p2(v1)), p2(v1)) = Π
TS
S (v¯2, p2(v1)), i.e.,
D1 +D2 −K
2D1
≥ D1v¯2 −Kv2
D1(v1 − v2)
+
(K −D1)
D1
(v¯2 − p2(v1))
(v¯2 − v2)
p2(v1)
(v1 − v2)
From Result 2 we know that a TS markdown exists for p2 ∈ [v2, p2(v1)] when v¯2−v2v1−v2 <
D1+D2−K
2D1
<
v¯2−v2
v1−v¯2 . Hence p
∗TS
2 = v2 if
v¯2−v2
v1−v¯2 >
D1+D2−K
2D1
>
v¯2−v2
v1−v¯2 ≥
D1v¯2−Kv2
D1(v1−v2) +
(K−D1)
D1
(v¯2−p2(v1))
(v¯2−v2)
p2(v1)
(v1−v2) . Combining the ranges that yield the same p
∗TS
2 we get the desired
conditions. 2
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Characterization of the Optimal PS Markdown
To characterize the optimal PS markdown, we first show some properties of the seller’s
revenue function in and then derive p∗PS1 (p2) for a given p2.
Theorem 29. The optimal PS markdown has the following properties
(i) ΠPSS is concave in p1 and p
PS
1 (p2) = p2 + (v¯1 − p2)[1 − F2(p2)]D1+D2−K4D1 maximizes
the unconstrained ΠPSS .
(ii) The optimal step 1 price is the following:
p∗PS1 (p2) =
 p
PS
1 (p2) if v1 <
v¯1+p2
2 and p2 < p˜2 = v¯1 − 4D1D1+D2−K (v¯2 − v2)
max{pˆIV (v1, p2), v¯2}+  otherwise
Proof of Theorem 29:
(i) First we show that the revenue function is concave in p1 from the second order
condition, and find the maximizer from the first order condition. The first and second order
partial derivatives of ΠPSS (p1, p2) in Equation (9) with respect to p1 are:
∂ΠPSS
∂p1
= [1− F1(vˆ1(p1, p2))]D1 − ∂vˆ1(p1, p2)
∂p1
f1(vˆ1(p1, p2))(p1 − p2)D1
∂2ΠPSS
∂p21
= −2f1(vˆ1(p1, p2))∂(vˆ1(p1, p2))
∂p1
D1
Since ∂(vˆ1(p1,p2))∂p1 =
1
[1−F2(p2)]
2D1
D1+D2−K , and f1(.) are both positive and independent of
p1 under uniform distribution, the revenue function is concave in p1 for all p2.
Substituting vˆ1(p1, p2) from Equation (5),
∂(vˆ1(p1,p2))
∂p1
= 1[1−F2(p2)]
2D1
D1+D2−K , and uniform
CDF and pdf for F1(.) and f1(.) in the first derivative and setting equal to zero, we get the
first order condition:
v¯1 − p2
v¯1 − v1
D1 − 1
v¯1 − v1
(p1 − p2)
[1− F2(p2)]
4D21
D1 +D2 −K = 0
We solve for the p1 value that satisfies the first order condition and get pPS1 (p2) = p2 +
(v¯1 − p2)[1− F2(p2)]D1+D2−K4D1 .
(ii) To find out the optimal p1 for a given p2, we need to understand the conditions
under which pPS1 (p2) ∈ (max{pˆIV (v1, p2), v¯2}, pˆIV (v¯1, p2)] as stated in constraint (7). It
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is easy to see that pPS1 (p2) < pˆIV (v¯1, p2) always, hence, we only need to check the lower
bounds. Next, we show that pPS1 (p2) ∈ (max{pˆIV (v1, p2), v¯2}, pˆIV (v¯1, p2)] if and only if
v1 <
v¯1+p2
2 and p2 < p˜2
(ii.a) pPS1 (p2) > pˆIV (v1, p2) if and only if v1 <
v¯1+p2
2 .
We substitute v1 = v1 in Equation (4), and compare with pPS1 (p2).
pPS1 (p2) = p2+(v¯1−p2)[1−F2(p2)]
D1 +D2 −K
4D1
> p2+(v1−p2)[1−F2(p2)]
D1 +D2 −K
2D1
Simplifying the expression, we get v1 <
v¯1+p2
2 as the equivalent condition.
(ii.b) pPS1 (p2) > v¯2 if and only if p2 < p˜2 = v¯1 − 4D1D1+D2−K (v¯2 − v2).
In order for pPS1 (p2) to exceed v¯2, we get:
p2 + (v¯1 − p2)[1− F2(p2)]D1 +D2 −K4D1 > v¯2
Substituting uniform CDF for F2 and rearranging we get p2 < p˜2 as the equivalent condition.
2
Plugging p1 = p∗PS1 (p2) in Equation (9), now we can determine the optimal step 2 price,
p∗PS2 , corresponding to each case.
Result 3. When p∗PS1 (p2) = pPS1 (p2), the optimal step 2 price for a PS markdown is:
p∗PS2 =

v2 if pPS2 ≤ v2
pPS2 if v2 < p
PS
2 < min{v¯2, p2(v¯1)}
p2(v¯1) if p2(v¯1) ≤ pPS2 and p2(v¯1) < v¯2
v¯2 −  otherwise
Proof of Result 3: Substituting p1 = pPS1 (p2) into Equation (9), we get:
ΠPSS (p
PS
1 (p2), p2) = p2D1 + [1− F2(p2)]
(
(v¯1 − p2)2(D1 +D2 −K)
8(v¯1 − v1)
+ (K −D1)p2
)
The first derivative with respect to p2 yields:
∂ΠPSS
∂p2
= D1 − [1− F2(p2)]
(
(v¯1 − p2)(D1 +D2 −K)
4(v¯1 − v1)
+ (K −D1)
)
−f2(p2)
(
(v¯1 − p2)2(D1 +D2 −K)
8(v¯1 − v1)
+ (K −D1)p2
)
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The second derivative with respect to p2 after substituting uniform distribution for F2
yields:
∂2ΠPSS
∂p22
=
(v¯1 − p2)(D1 +D2 −K)
2(v¯1 − v1)(v¯2 − v2)
− 2(K −D1)
(v¯2 − v2)
+
(v¯2 − p2)(D1 +D2 −K)
4(v¯1 − v1)(v¯2 − v2)
Solving for p2 from the first order condition
∂ΠPSS
∂p2
= 0, we get p2 = A±
√
A2−B.C
C , where
A = (v¯2+2v¯1)(D1+D2−K)− 8(K −D1)(v¯1− v1), B = 8(v2D1− v¯2K)(v¯1− v1) + v¯1(v¯1+
2v¯2)(D1 +D2 −K) and C = 3(D1 +D2 −K).
The second order condition required for p2 to be a maximizer yields p2 > AC , hence
we get pPS2 =
A+
√
A2−B.C
C as the unique maximizer of the unconstrained revenue function.
By comparing pPS2 with boundary points of the feasible p2 range,[v2,min{p2(v¯1), v¯2}) ,we
determine the optimal step 2 price. 2
In order not to clutter the presentation in the proofs in this document, we will drop 
when substituting arguments with  in other expressions and use lim→0 in expressions that
involve =.
Result 4. When p∗PS1 (p2) = v¯2 + , then in a PS markdown we have:
(i) ΠPSS (v¯2 + , p2) is convex in p2 if and only if
(K−D1)
v¯2−v2 <
D1
v¯1−v1 , and it is concave in
p2 otherwise.
(ii) If ΠPSS (v¯2 + , p2) is concave in p2, then the optimal step 2 price is:
p∗PS2 (v¯2) =

v2 if pPS2 (v¯2) ≤ v2
pPS2 (v¯2) if v2 < p
PS
2 (v¯2) ≤ p2(v¯1)
p2(v¯1) if p2(v¯1) < pPS2 (v¯2)
where pPS2 (v¯2) be the value of p2 that solves
∂ΠPSS (v¯2+,p2)
∂p2
= 0.
(iii) If ΠPSS (v¯2 + , p2) is convex in p2, then the optimal step 2 price is:
p∗PS2 (v¯2) =

v¯2 −  if p2(v1) ≥
(
1− (K−D1)(v¯1−v1)D1(v¯2−v2)
)
v2 and p2(v¯1) > v¯2
p2(v¯1) if p2(v¯1)
(
D1 + (K −D1) v¯1−v1v¯2−v2
)
≥ ΠPSS (v¯2 + , v2) and p2(v¯1) ≤ v¯2
v2 otherwise
where lim→0ΠPSS (v¯2 + , v2) = Kv2 +D1(v¯2 − v2)
(
v¯1−v2
v¯1−v1 −
v¯2−v2
v¯1−v1
2D1
D1+D2−K
)
.
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Proof of Result 4: (i) We substitute p1 = v¯2 +  in the seller’s revenue given in (9)
and uniform CDF for Fi(.)
lim
→0
ΠPSS (v¯2 + , p2) =
(
v¯1 − p2
v¯1 − v1
− v¯2 − v2
(v¯1 − v1)
2D1
(D1 +D2 −K)
)
v¯2D1+(
− v¯1 − p2
v¯1 − v1
+
v¯2 − v2
(v¯1 − v1)
2D1
(D1 +D2 −K)
)
p2D1 + (K −D1)p2 v¯2 − p2
v¯2 − v2
The first derivative with respect to p2 is:
∂ΠPSS (v¯2 + , p2)
∂p2
=
− v¯2D1
v¯1 − v1
+
p2D1
v¯1 − v1
+
(
− v¯1 − p2
v¯1 − v1
+
v¯2 − v2
(v¯1 − v1)
2D1
(D1 +D2 −K)
)
D1 + (K −D1) v¯2 − 2p2
v¯2 − v2
Taking the second derivative with respect to p2, we get:
∂2ΠPSS (v¯2 + , p2)
∂p22
=
2D1
v¯1 − v1
− 2(K −D1)
v¯2 − v2
Hence the function is concave if (K−D1)v¯2−v2 ≥
D1
v¯1−v1 and concave otherwise.
(ii) Given that ΠPSS (v¯2 + , p1) is concave in p2, the optimal step 2 price is p
PS
2 (v¯2) =
v¯2
2 +
p2(v¯1)D1
v¯1−v1
2
[
D1
v¯1−v1−
K−D1
v¯2−v2
] , provided that pPS2 (v¯2) is in the p2 range for which a PS markdown
exists.
We first show that pPS2 (v¯2) is less than v¯2. Since Π
PS
S (v¯2+ , p2) is concave, the denomi-
nator of the second term in pPS2 (v¯2) expression above is negative, hence p
PS
2 (v¯2) <
v¯2
2 < v¯2.
If pPS2 (v¯2) < v2, we conclude that the revenue function is decreasing in p2 over the entire
range and v2 is optimal. If pPS2 (v¯2) > v2, then the revenue function is increasing in p2 at
p2 = v2, and we have to compare pPS2 (v¯2) with the maximum p2 for which a PS markdown
exists in order to find the optimal step 2 price. From Observation 17 we know that a PS
markdown exists for all p2 < min{p2(v¯1), v¯2}. If pPS2 (v¯2) < p2(v¯1), then the markdown with
prices (v¯2, pPS2 (v¯2)) is optimal. If p
PS
2 (v¯2) ≥ p2(v¯1), then p2(v¯1) is optimal.
(iii) When ΠPSS (v¯2+ , p2) is convex in p2, one of the endpoints of the p2 range will be
the optimal step 2 price. If p2(v¯1) < v¯2, then the p2 range for which a PS markdown exists
is [v2, v¯2). Otherwise, the p2 range is [v2, p2(v¯1)].
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In each case, we identify which endpoint maximizes the seller’s revenue by evaluating
ΠPSS (v¯2 + , p2) at each endpoint and comparing the resulting revenues.
For p2 ∈ [v2, v¯2), we show that p∗PS2 (v¯2) = v¯2−  if ΠPSS (v¯2+ , v2) ≤ ΠPSS (v¯2+ , v¯2− ).
By substituting the p1 and p2 values in (9), we get the condition for p∗PS2 (v¯2) = v¯2 − :
lim→0ΠPSS (v¯2 + , v¯2 − ) = v¯2D1, hence we require p2(v¯1)
(
D1 + (K −D1) v¯1−v1v¯2−v2
)
≥
v¯2D1. Rearranging terms and simplifying we get, p2(v1) ≥
(
1− (K−D1)(v¯1−v1)D1(v¯2−v2)
)
v2.
Similarly, for p2 ∈ [v2, p2(v¯1)], we show that p∗PS2 (v¯2) = p2(v¯1) if ΠPSS (v¯2 + , v2) ≤
ΠPSS (v¯2 + , p2(v¯1)).
lim→0ΠPSS (v¯2 + , p2(v¯1)) = p2(v¯1)
(
D1 + (K −D1) v¯1−v1v¯2−v2
)
, and
lim→0ΠPSS (v¯2+ , v2) = Kv2+D1(v¯2− v2)
(
v¯1−v2
v¯1−v1 −
v¯2−v2
v¯1−v1
2D1
D1+D2−K
)
. Hence, we have the
following as the condition for p∗PS2 (v¯2) = p2(v¯1).
p2(v¯1)
(
D1 + (K −D1) v¯1−v1v¯2−v2
)
≥ Kv2 +D1(v¯2 − v2)
(
v¯1−v2
v¯1−v1 −
v¯2−v2
v¯1−v1
2D1
D1+D2−K
)
.
For both p2 ranges, the other alternative optimal is to have p2 at the lower bound, which
is v2, hence we get the conditions given in the result. 2
Comparing PS and TS Markdowns
Proposition 30. When PTS 6= ∅,
(i) the optimal markdown is PS if v1 <
v¯1+v2
2 .
(ii) the optimal markdown is TS if v1 ≥ v¯1+v¯22 .
Proposition 30(i) implies that it is optimal for the seller to only partially separate the
high types when the range of the high types is large relative to the low valuation range.
Proposition 30(ii) implies that the seller is best served by inducing all of the high types to
purchase at the first price step when the ‘high’ and ‘low’ types are fairly far apart.
Proof of Proposition 30: (i) From Theorem 29 we know that for a given p2, the
PS revenue function is maximized at p∗PS1 (p2) = pPS1 (p2) if v1 <
v¯1+p2
2 (i.e., p
PS
1 (p2) >
pˆIV (v1, p2)) and p2 < p˜2 (i.e., pPS1 (p2) > v¯2). Since Proposition 30 is stated only for the
case when TS is feasible, from Equation 8, we have v¯2 < pˆIV (v1, p2). Hence, the condition
v1 <
v¯1+p2
2 combined with Equation 8 automatically implies that p
PS
1 (p2) > v¯2 and therefore
pPS1 (p2) is optimal, i.e., the PS markdown’s optimal step 1 price is not at the boundaries.
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Table 8: Optimal markdown and single price performance for different values of D1.
D1 = 3 Single Price TS Markdown PS Markdown
p∗ Revenue Type p∗TS1 p∗TS2 Revenue p∗PS1 p∗PS2 Revenue
2 2.67 42.67 SP2 none exists 5.00 2.5 45.42
3 2.76 43.31 SP2 5.17 2.41 50.88 5.17+ 2.41
4 2.88 44.08 SP2 5.58 2.29 55.42 5.58+ 2.29
5 12.00 60.00 SP1 5.89 2.15 60.10 5.89+ 2.15
6 12.00 72.00 SP1 6.17 2.00 65.00 6.17+ 2.00
7 12.00 84.00 SP1 6.29 2.00 70.00 6.29+ 2.00
8 12.00 96.00 SP1 6.38 2.00 75.00 6.38+ 2.00
9 12.00 108.00 SP1 6.44 2.00 80.00 6.44+ 2.00
10 12.00 120.00 SP1 6.50 2.00 85.00 6.50+ 2.00
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
20 12.00 240.00 SP1 6.75 2.00 135.00 6.75+ 2.00
Since the PS revenue is concave (and the boundaries approach the TS revenue), the PS
markdown dominates the TS markdown.
(ii) From Theorem 29, we know that for a given p2, the PS revenue function is maximized
at p∗PS1 (p2) = max{pˆIV (v1, p2), v¯2}+  if v1 ≥ v¯1+p22 . As → 0, the markdown converges to
a TS markdown, and hence the TS markdown revenue exceeds the optimal PS markdown
revenue in this case. If v1 ≥ v¯1+v¯22 , then v1 ≥ v¯1+p22 for all p2 ∈ [v2, v¯2) since the right-
hand-side is maximized at p2 = v¯2. 2
Tabulated Results for Numerical Examples Section (Section 2.4.3)
Each table corresponds to one parameter being changed while keeping everything else
the same. First column of the header identifies the parameter that is altered and the original
value. Each row corresponds to a different instance and the new value of the parameter
is given in the first column in that row. Whenever the PS markdown converges to a TS
markdown,  is used to differentiate step 1 prices of PS and TS markdowns. In this case,
the corresponding PS markdown revenue is slightly less than the TS markdown revenue,
hence the corresponding cell has been left blank.
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Table 9: Optimal markdown and single price performance for different values of D2.
D2 = 19 Single Price TS Markdown PS Markdown
p∗ Revenue Type p∗TS1 p∗TS2 Revenue p∗PS1 p∗PS2 Revenue
18 2.76 43.31 SP2 none exists none exists
19 2.76 43.31 SP2 5.17 2.41 50.88 5.17+ 2.41
20 2.76 43.31 SP2 6.76 2.21 55.23 6.76+ 2.21
Table 10: Optimal markdown and single price performance for different values of K.
K = 20 Single Price TS Markdown PS Markdown
p∗ Revenue Type p∗TS1 p∗TS2 Revenue p∗PS1 p∗PS2 Revenue
19 2.78 41.26 SP2 6.19 2.78 53.17 6.19+ 2.78
20 2.76 43.31 SP2 5.17 2.41 50.88 5.17+ 2.41
21 2.75 45.38 SP2 none exists none exists
Table 11: Optimal markdown and single price performance for different values of v2.
v2 = 2 Single Price TS Markdown PS Markdown
p∗ Revenue Type p∗TS1 p∗TS2 Revenue p∗PS1 p∗PS2 Revenue
1 12.00 36.00 SP1 none exists 5.00 2.50 38.44
2 2.76 43.31 SP2 5.17 2.41 50.88 5.17+ 2.41
3 3.00 60.00 SP2 6.00 3.00 69.00 6.00+ 3.00
4 4.00 80.00 SP2 6.67 3.00 88.00 6.67+ 3.00
Table 12: Optimal markdown and single price performance for different values of v¯2.
v¯2 = 5 Single Price TS Markdown PS Markdown
p∗ Revenue Type p∗TS1 p∗TS2 Revenue p∗PS1 p∗PS2 Revenue
3 2.00 40.00 SP2 5.33 2.00 50.00 5.33+ 2.00
4 2.18 40.27 SP2 5.33 2.00 50.00 5.33+ 2.00
5 2.76 43.31 SP2 5.17 2.41 50.88 5.17+ 2.41
6 3.35 47.78 SP2 none exists 6.00 3.00 51.75
7 3.94 52.81 SP2 none exists 7.00 3.00 49.80
8 4.53 58.13 SP2 none exists none exists
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Table 13: Optimal markdown and single price performance for different values of v1.
v1 = 12 Single Price TS Markdown PS Markdown
p∗ Revenue Type p∗TS1 p∗TS2 Revenue p∗PS1 p∗PS2 Revenue
6 2.76 43.31 SP2 none exists 5.00 2.57 47.01
7 2.76 43.31 SP2 none exists 5.00 2.55 47.36
8 2.76 43.31 SP2 none exists 5.00 2.53 47.80
9 2.76 43.31 SP2 none exists 5.00 2.50 48.33
10 2.76 43.31 SP2 none exists 5.00 2.47 49.02
11 2.76 43.31 SP2 5.00 2.00 49.00 5.00 2.42 49.92
12 2.76 43.31 SP2 5.17 2.41 50.88 5.17+ 2.41
13 2.76 43.31 SP2 5.47 2.38 51.75 5.47+ 2.38
14 2.76 43.31 SP2 5.78 2.34 52.63 5.78+ 2.34
15 15.00 45.00 SP1 6.10 2.31 53.52 6.10+ 2.31
16 16.00 48.00 SP1 6.43 2.28 54.42 6.43+ 2.28
17 17.00 51.00 SP1 6.76 2.25 55.33 6.76+ 2.25
Table 14: Optimal markdown and single price performance for different values of v¯1.
v¯1 = 18 Single Price TS Markdown PS Markdown
p∗ Revenue Type p∗TS1 p∗TS2 Revenue p∗PS1 p∗PS2 Revenue
13 2.76 43.31 SP2 5.17 2.41 50.88 5.17+ 2.41
14 2.76 43.31 SP2 5.17 2.41 50.88 5.17+ 2.41
15 2.76 43.31 SP2 5.17 2.41 50.88 5.17+ 2.41
16 2.76 43.31 SP2 5.17 2.41 50.88 5.17+ 2.41
17 2.76 43.31 SP2 5.17 2.41 50.88 5.17+ 2.41
18 2.76 43.31 SP2 5.17 2.41 50.88 5.17+ 2.41
19 2.76 43.31 SP2 5.17 2.41 50.88 5.17+ 2.41
20 2.76 43.31 SP2 5.17 2.41 50.88 5.17+ 2.41
21 2.76 43.31 SP2 5.17 2.41 50.88 5.17+ 2.41
22 2.76 43.31 SP2 5.17 2.41 50.88 5.23 2.41 50.89
23 2.76 43.31 SP2 5.17 2.41 50.88 5.37 2.41 50.92
24 2.76 43.31 SP2 5.17 2.41 50.88 5.52 2.41 50.98
25 2.76 43.31 SP2 5.17 2.41 50.88 5.66 2.41 51.07
41 20.5 43.37 SP1 5.17 2.41 50.88 8.07 2.33 53.72
64 32.0 59.08 SP1 5.17 2.41 50.88 11.89 2.17 58.65
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Proof of Theorem 15: We show that the expected surplus of customer 1 as a function
of his bid at the first price step, q11, is a (piecewise linear) convex function.
Customer 1 has to trade-off between bidding at steps 1 and 2. Regardless of his bid at
step 1, it is optimal for customer 1 to bid all his remaining demand, D1− q11, at step 2. He
does not benefit from withholding any of his demand at the last price step.
In order to identify the bidding behavior of customer 1, we consider three alternative
scenarios regarding how K compares to the customer demand parameters. Specifically we
consider three distinct scenarios: low (E[D1] < K < H2), moderate (H2 ≤ K < L1 +H2)
and high supply (L1 +H2 ≤ K < H1 +H2). For each scenario, given D1, we identify his
expected surplus and show that the second derivative with respect to q11 is positive, hence
the function is convex.
Low Supply (E[D1] < K < H2)
We examine three cases depending on howD1 compares to the supply of the seller. While
presenting the expected surplus of customer 1, we will refer to the regions in Figure 5(a)(b)
and (c).
Case (i): K ≤ D1 ≤ H1 (Regions III and V)
If the bid of customer 1 at p1 is greater than the available supply, then there is nothing
left for the second step; otherwise, the total bids exceed the amount available at step 2. Due
to the random allocation rule, with probability 12 , customer 1 has the allocation priority
and gets K − q11, and with the remaining probability, he gets any leftover from the other
customer (if the demand realization is in region III). In region V, there is no leftover from
customer 2 since his demand exceeds the available supply.
Π1(q11) =

q11(v1 − p1) +
[
K−q11
2
+12
∫K−q11
L2
f2(x2)(K − q11 − x2)dx2
]
(v1 − v2) if 0 ≤ q11 < K
K(v1 − p1) if K ≤ q11 ≤ D1
dΠ1(q11)
dq11
=
 (v1 − p1)− (v1 − v2)
1
2
[
1 +
∫K−q11
L2
f2(x2)dx2
]
if 0 ≤ q11 < K
0 if K ≤ q11 ≤ D1
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L1 H1 L2 H2 SP1 SP2 2-step p1* SP1 SP2 2-step p1* SP1 SP2 2-step p1*
1 10 20 5 10 296.0 179.1 192.0 11.5 300.0 220.8 221.8 10.3
2 10 30 5 10 375.5 221.9 235.5 11.4
3 20 30 5 10 496.0 279.1 291.3 10.9 500.0 320.8 321.8 10.2
4 10 40 5 10 466.7 273.6 286.1 11.3
5 20 40 5 10 575.5 321.9 335.3 11.0
6 30 40 5 10 696.0 379.1 391.0 10.7 700.0 420.8 421.8 10.1
7 10 50 5 10 600.0 374.0 374.2 10.1
8 20 50 5 10 691.7 398.6 405.3 10.7
9 30 50 5 10 787.5 435.4 445.5 10.7
10 40 50 5 10 896.0 479.1 490.9 10.5 900.0 520.8 521.8 10.1
11 10 60 5 10 620.0 349.2 364.2 10.9
12 20 60 5 10 727.8 399.7 415.6 10.9
13 30 60 5 10 866.7 473.6 486.1 10.8
14 40 60 5 10 987.5 535.4 545.4 10.6
15 50 60 5 10 1096.0 579.1 590.8 10.4 1100.0 620.8 621.8 10.1
L1 H1 L2 H2 SP1 SP2 2-step p1* SP1 SP2 2-step p1* SP1 SP2 2-step p1*
1 10 20 5 15 296.0 179.6 201.4 12.0 300.0 233.3 234.3 10.3
2 10 30 5 15 375.5 225.7 245.5 11.8 400.0 291.7 293.6 10.4
3 20 30 5 25 496.0 279.8 324.6 11.8 500.0 391.7 393.6 10.2
4 10 40 5 15 466.7 281.9 299.0 11.5
5 20 40 5 25 575.5 327.9 362.2 11.7 600.0 449.5 449.6 10.0
6 30 40 5 35 696.0 379.9 450.3 12.0 700.0 544.4 545.7 10.1
7 10 50 5 15 600.0 395.8 396.8 10.2
8 20 50 5 25 691.7 427.8 446.2 11.1
9 30 50 5 35 787.5 447.2 493.8 11.4 800.0 590.6 592.8 10.2
10 40 50 5 45 896.0 479.9 515.7 12.1 900.0 695.8 696.8 10.1
11 10 60 5 15 620.0 359.2 379.2 11.3
12 20 60 5 25 727.8 417.9 450.2 11.6 800.0 543.0 544.6 10.2
13 30 60 5 35 866.7 493.8 535.6 11.5 900.0 599.8 599.9 10.0
14 40 60 5 45 987.5 547.9 617.4 11.4 1000.0 616.7 650.8 10.9
15 50 60 5 55 1100.0 646.7 734.7 11.6 1100.0 846.7 847.4 10.0
M (H2<K<L1+H2) H  (L1+H2<K<H1+H2)G1 L (E[D1]<K<H2)
G2 L (E[D1]<K<H2) M (H2<K<L1+H2) H  (L1+H2<K<H1+H2)
Figure 13: Numerical results for groups 1 and 2.
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L1 H1 L2 H2 SP1 SP2 2-step p1* SP1 SP2 2-step p1* SP1 SP2 2-step p1* SP1 SP2 2-step p1* SP1 SP2 2-step p1*
G1
1 10 60 5 10 177.6 179.1 181.7 10.3 180.0 220.8 221.0 10.1
4 10 40 5 10 280.0 273.6 276.1 10.3
6 30 40 5 10 417.6 379.1 381.5 10.1 420.0 420.8 421.0 10.0
11 10 60 5 10 372.0 349.2 352.2 10.2
13 30 60 5 10 520.0 473.6 476.1 10.2
15 50 60 5 10 657.6 579.1 581.4 10.1 660.0 620.8 621.0 10.0
G2
1 10 60 5 15 177.6 179.6 183.9 10.4 180.0 233.3 234.2 10.1
4 10 40 5 15 280.0 281.9 285.4 10.3
6 30 40 5 35 417.6 379.9 393.9 10.4 420.0 544.4 544.7 10.0
11 10 60 5 15 372.0 359.2 363.2 10.3
13 30 60 5 35 520.0 493.8 502.1 10.3 540.0 599.8 599.8 10.0
15 50 60 5 55 660.0 646.7 664.3 11.6 660.0 846.7 846.8 10.0
G3
1 10 60 10 60 177.6 180.0 190.1 10.7 180.0 200.0 207.6 10.5 180.0 247.9 250.9 10.3 180.0 297.9 298.0 10.0
4 10 40 10 40 280.0 298.1 310.6 10.6 300.0 421.1 425.4 10.3 300.0 498.2 498.2 10.0
6 30 40 30 40 417.6 380.0 411.1 14.5 420.0 450.0 473.3 10.7 420.0 647.9 650.6 10.1 420.0 697.9 698.0 10.0
11 10 60 10 60 372.0 394.7 411.5 10.6 420.0 589.3 595.4 10.3 420.0 657.3 659.5 10.1
13 30 60 30 60 520.0 500.0 533.7 10.8 540.0 600.0 714.2 12.7 540.0 850.0 852.5 10.1 540.0 885.2 885.9 10.1
15 50 60 50 60 657.6 580.0 631.3 10.9 660.0 650.0 694.0 10.8 660.0 1047.9 1050.5 10.1 660.0 1097.9 1098.0 10.0
G4
1 10 60 15 65 177.6 180.0 194.1 11.0 180.0 250.0 257.6 10.5 180.0 297.9 300.9 10.3 180.0 333.3 334.2 10.1
4 10 40 15 45 280.0 299.8 315.7 10.7 300.0 471.1 475.4 10.3 300.0 543.8 544.0 10.0
6 30 40 35 45 417.6 380.0 414.3 11.0 420.0 450.0 479.2 10.8 420.0 650.0 656.3 10.2 420.0 733.3 734.1 10.1
11 10 60 15 65 372.0 397.8 417.4 10.7 420.0 639.3 645.4 10.3 420.0 689.3 692.4 10.2
13 30 60 35 65 520.0 500.0 537.9 10.9 540.0 650.0 672.8 10.5 540.0 871.1 875.0 10.2 540.0 921.1 922.5 10.1
15 50 60 55 65 657.6 580.0 634.3 11.0 660.0 650.0 699.5 10.9 660.0 1050.0 1056.0 10.1 660.0 1133.3 1334.1 10.0
G5
1 10 60 60 65 177.6 180.0 195.0 11.0 180.0 349.5 361.2 10.8 180.0 563.0 563.6 10.1 180.0 574.5 574.6 10.1
4 10 40 40 65 280.0 300.0 325.0 11.0 300.0 500.0 520.2 10.8 300.0 682.2 687.4 10.3 300.0 767.5 767.9 10.1
6 30 40 40 65 417.6 380.0 415.0 11.0 420.0 650.0 670.4 10.6 420.0 749.2 758.5 10.3 420.0 874.2 874.2 10.0
11 10 60 60 65 372.0 400.0 435.0 11.0 420.0 650.0 678.2 10.9 420.0 700.0 720.8 10.7 420.0 794.2 806.0 10.5
13 30 60 60 65 520.0 500.0 545.0 11.0 540.0 650.0 691.2 10.9 540.0 900.0 910.6 10.3 540.0 990.3 995.0 10.2
15 50 60 60 65 657.6 580.0 635.0 11.0 660.0 650.0 702.3 11.0 660.0 1100.0 1104.1 10.1 660.0 1145.8 1147.3 10.3
G6
1 10 60 5 65 177.6 179.8 188.7 10.6 180.0 241.7 245.5 10.3 180.0 291.7 292.1 10.1
4 10 40 5 45 280.0 295.3 307.3 10.6 300.0 440.6 457.0 10.2 300.0 495.3 496.5 10.1
6 30 40 25 45 417.6 380.0 409.9 10.9 420.0 450.0 473.3 10.7 420.0 641.7 644.9 10.1 420.0 691.7 692.1 10.1
11 10 60 5 65 372.0 391.3 407.7 10.6 420.0 607.6 612.8 10.2 420.0 649.4 652.0 10.2
13 30 60 25 65 520.0 500.0 532.0 10.7 540.0 599.8 622.4 10.5 540.0 840.6 843.6 10.1 540.0 878.3 879.3 10.1
15 50 60 45 65 657.6 580.0 630.2 10.9 660.0 650.0 694.0 10.8 660.0 1041.7 1044.8 10.1 660.0 1091.7 1092.0 10.0
K<L1+L2
L' (E[D1]<K<H2) M' (H2<K<L1+H2) L (E[D1]<K<H2) M (H2<K<L1+H2) H  (L1+H2<K<H1+H2)
Figure 16: Numerical results with reduced customer 1 valuation.
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L1 H1 L2 H2 K SP1 SP2 Markdown SP1 SP2 Markdown SP1 SP2 Markdown 
1 5 25 10 20 18 275.5 177.9 213.6 275.5 179.8 220.3 296.0 179.8 224.2
1 5 25 10 20 25 300.0 235.9 254.7 300.0 241.7 259.0 300.0 241.7 260.9
1 5 25 10 20 30 300.0 266.7 275.6 300.0 272.9 280.0 300.0 291.7 293.7
4 5 45 10 40 30 443.8 291.7 347.2 443.8 295.3 353.8 466.7 295.3 355.1
4 5 45 10 40 50 500.0 433.3 451.7 500.0 440.6 456.4 500.0 440.6 457.0
4 5 45 10 40 70 500.0 491.7 493.7 500.0 495.3 496.4 500.0 495.3 499.8
6 25 45 30 40 38 675.5 380.0 520.3 675.5 380.0 527.3 696.0 380.0 529.5
6 25 45 30 40 45 700.0 450.0 555.0 700.0 450.0 555.0 700.0 450.0 566.7
6 25 45 30 40 65 700.0 635.9 652.1 700.0 641.7 657.2 700.0 641.7 658.0
6 25 45 30 40 75 700.0 685.9 689.3 700.0 691.7 693.6 700.0 691.7 693.6
11 5 65 10 60 40 595.8 387.5 465.4 595.8 391.3 472.0 620.0 391.3 473.0
11 5 65 10 60 70 700.0 600.0 627.9 700.0 607.6 632.7 700.0 607.6 633.4
11 5 65 10 60 80 700.0 642.1 657.4 700.0 649.4 662.4 700.0 649.4 662.7
13 25 65 30 60 50 843.8 500.0 645.3 843.8 500.0 654.7 866.7 500.0 660.2
13 25 65 30 60 60 893.8 599.0 703.6 893.8 599.8 706.2 900.0 599.8 712.6
13 25 65 30 60 90 900.0 833.3 850.2 900.0 840.6 855.4 900.0 840.6 855.5
13 25 65 30 60 100 900.0 871.9 878.7 900.0 878.3 883.5 900.0 878.3 883.5
15 45 65 50 60 58 1075.5 580.0 823.6 1075.5 580.0 829.8 1096.0 580.0 830.8
15 45 65 50 60 65 1100.0 650.0 863.9 1100.0 650.0 863.9 1100.0 650.0 870.0
15 45 65 50 60 105 1100.0 1035.9 1051.5 1100.0 1041.7 1056.7 1100.0 1041.7 1057.4
15 45 65 50 60 115 1100.0 1085.9 1089.2 1100.0 1091.7 1093.6 1100.0 1091.7 1093.6
BASE Decrease D2 [L2+5, H2-5]  Decrease D1 [L1+5, H1-5]
Figure 17: Numerical results with reduced demand distribution.
d2Π1(q11)
dq211
=

1
2f2(K − q11)(v1 − v2) > 0 if 0 ≤ q11 < K
0 if K ≤ q11 ≤ D1
Case (ii): K − L2 ≤ D1 < K (Regions II and IV)
In step 2, with probability 12 , customer 1 has the allocation priority and getsD1−q11, and
with probability 12 , he gets the leftover from the other customer (if any). SinceK−L2 ≤ D1,
leftover form the other customer will always be less than his own remaining demand.
Π1(q11) = q11(v1 − p1) +
[
D1 − q11
2
+
1
2
(∫ K−q11
L2
f2(x2)(D1 − q11)dx2
)]
(v1 − v2)
dΠ1(q11)
dq11
= (v1 − p1)− (v1 − v2)
[
1
2
+
1
2
∫ K−q11
L2
f2(x2)dx2
]
d2Π1(q11)
dq211
=
1
2
f2(K − q11)(v1 − v2) > 0
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Case (iii): L1 ≤ D1 < K − L2 (Region I)
In step 2, with probability 12 , customer 1 has the allocation priority and gets D1 − q11,
and with probability 12 , he gets the maximum of the leftover from the other customer (if
any) and his own remaining demand.
Π1(q11) = q11(v1 − p1) +
[
D1 − q11
2
+
1
2
(∫ K−D1
L−2
f2(x2)(D1 − q11)dx2
+
∫ K−q11
K−D1
f2(x2)(K − q11 − x2)dx2
)]
(v1 − v2)
dΠ1(q11)
dq11
= (v1 − p1)− (v1 − v2)
[
1
2
+
1
2
∫ K−D1
L2
f2(x2)dx2 +
1
2
∫ K−q11
K−D1
f2(x2)dx2
]
d2Π1(q11)
dq211
=
1
2
f2(K − q11)(v1 − v2) > 0
Next we consider the moderate supply scenario.
Moderate Supply (H2 ≤ K < L1 +H2)
The only difference from low supply is due to H2 ≤ K. Since K − q11 > H2 is possible
in this scenario, when K − H2 > q11, there will always be some leftover from customer 2
if customer does not get the allocation priority at the second price step. We calculate the
expectation on demand realization of customer 2 incorporating this observation. Accord-
ingly, in each case we have an additional expression which is valid for 0 ≤ q11 < K −H2,
while the expression for K −H2 ≤ q11 < K remains as in the low supply scenario.
Case (i): K ≤ D1 ≤ H1 (Region III)
Π1(q11) =

q11(v1 − p1) + [K−q112 + 12
∫ H2
L2
f2(x2)(K − q11 − x2)dx2](v1 − v2)
if 0 ≤ q11 < K −H2
q11(v1 − p1) + [K−q112 + 12
∫K−q11
L2
f2(x2)(K − q11 − x2)dx2](v1 − v2)
if K −H2 ≤ q11 < K
K(v1 − p1)
if K ≤ q11 ≤ D1
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dΠ1(q11)
dq11
=

(v1 − p1)− (v1 − v2)12
[
1 +
∫ H2
L2
f2(x2)dx2
]
if 0 ≤ q11 < K −H2
(v1 − p1)− (v1 − v2)12
[
1 +
∫K−q11
L2
f2(x2)dx2
]
if K −H2 ≤ q11 < K
0 if K ≤ q11 ≤ D1
d2Π1(q11)
dq211
=

1
2(v1 − v2) > 0 if 0 ≤ q11 < K −H2
1
2f2(K − q11)(v1 − v2) > 0 if K −H2 ≤ q11 < K
0 if K ≤ q11 ≤ D1
Case (ii): K − L2 ≤ D1 < K (Region II)
Π1(q11) =

q11(v1 − p1) +
[
K−q11
2
+ 12
∫ H2
L2
f2(x2)(K − q11 − x2)dx2
]
(v1 − v2) if 0 ≤ q11 < K −H2
q11(v1 − p1) +
[
K−q11
2
+ 12
∫K−q11
L2
f2(x2)(K − q11 − x2)dx2
]
(v1 − v2) if K −H2 ≤ q11 < D1
dΠ1(q11)
dq11
=
 (v1 − p1)− (v1 − v2)
1
2
[
1 +
∫ H2
L2
f2(x2)dx2
]
if 0 ≤ q11 < K −H2
(v1 − p1)− (v1 − v2)12
[
1 +
∫K−q11
L2
f2(x2)dx2
]
if K −H2 ≤ q11 < D1
d2Π1(q11)
dq211
=

1
2(v1 − v2) > 0 if 0 ≤ q11 < K −H2
1
2f2(K − q11)(v1 − v2) > 0 if K −H2 ≤ q11 < D1
Case (iii): L1 ≤ D1 < K − L2 (Region I)
Π1(q11) =

q11(v1 − p1) +
[
D1−q11
2 +
1
2
(∫K−D1
L2
f2(x2)(D1 − q11)dx2
+
∫ H2
K−D1 f2(x2)(K − q11 − x2)dx2
)]
(v1 − v2) if 0 ≤ q11 < K −H2
q11(v1 − p1) +
[
D1−q11
2 +
1
2
(∫K−D1
L2
f2(x2)(D1 − q11)dx2
+
∫K−q11
K−D1 f2(x2)(K − q11 − x2)dx2
)]
(v1 − v2) if K −H2 ≤ q11 < D1
dΠ1(q11)
dq11
=
 (v1 − p1)− (v1 − v2)
1
2
[
1 +
∫ H2
L2
f2(x2)dx2
]
if 0 ≤ q11 < K −H2
(v1 − p1)− (v1 − v2)12
[
1 +
∫K−q11
L2
f2(x2)dx2
]
if K −H2 ≤ q11 < D1
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d2Π1(q11)
dq211
=

1
2(v1 − v2) > 0 if 0 ≤ q11 < K −H2
1
2f2(K − q11)(v1 − v2) > 0 if K −H2 ≤ q11 < D1
The final scenario we consider is high supply.
High Supply (L1 +H2 ≤ K < H1 +H2)
The only difference from moderate supply is due to L1 + H2 ≤ K, which allows for
D1 < K −H2. In other words, the supply level is so high that the leftover from customer
2 is enough to satisfy the entire demand by customer 1. Hence we have an additional case,
namely case (iv), in which customer 1 is allocated his bid quantity with certainty at both
price steps.
Case (i): K ≤ D1 ≤ H1 (Region III)
Π1(q11) =

q11(v1 − p1) +
[
K−q11
2 +
1
2
∫ H2
L2
f2(x2)(K − q11 − x2)dx2
]
(v1 − v2)
if 0 ≤ q11 < K −H2
q11(v1 − p1) +
[
K−q11
2 +
1
2
∫K−q11
L2
f2(x2)(K − q11 − x2)dx2
]
(v1 − v2)
if K −H2 ≤ q11 < K
K(v1 − p1)
if K ≤ q11 ≤ D1
dΠ1(q11)
dq11
=

(v1 − p1)− (v1 − v2)12
[
1 +
∫ H2
L2
f2(x2)dx2
]
if 0 ≤ q11 < K −H2
(v1 − p1)− (v1 − v2)12
[
1 +
∫K−q11
L2
f2(x2)dx2
]
if K −H2 ≤ q11 < K
0 if K ≤ q11 ≤ D1
d2Π1(q11)
dq211
=

1
2(v1 − v2) > 0 if 0 ≤ q11 < K −H2
1
2f2(K − q11)(v1 − v2) > 0 if K −H2 ≤ q11 < K
0 if K ≤ q11 ≤ D1
Case (ii): K − L2 ≤ D1 < K (Region II)
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Π1(q11) =

q11(v1 − p1) + [K−q112 + 12
∫H2
L2
f2(x2)(K − q11 − x2)dx2](v1 − v2)
if 0 ≤ q11 < K −H2
q11(v1 − p1) + [K−q112 + 12 +
∫K−q11
L2
f2(x2)(K − q11 − x2)dx2](v1 − v2)
if K −H2 ≤ q11 < D1
dΠ1(q11)
dq11
=
 (v1 − p1)− (v1 − v2)
1
2
[
1 +
∫ H2
L2
f2(x2)dx2
]
if 0 ≤ q11 < K −H2
(v1 − p1)− (v1 − v2)12
[
1 +
∫K−q11
L2
f2(x2)dx2
]
if K −H2 ≤ q11 < D1
d2Π1(q11)
dq211
=

1
2(v1 − v2) > 0 if 0 ≤ q11 < K −H2
1
2f2(K − q11)(v1 − v2) > 0 if K −H2 ≤ q11 < D1
Case (iii): K −H2 ≤ D1 < K − L2 (Region I, K −H2 ≤ D1)
Π1(q11) =

q11(v1 − p1) +
[
D1−q11
2 +
1
2
(∫K−D1
L2
f2(x2)(D1 − q11)dx2
+
∫ H2
K−D1 f2(x2)(K − q11 − x2)dx2
)]
(v1 − v2) if 0 ≤ q11 < K −H2
q11(v1 − p1) +
[
D1−q11
2 +
1
2
(∫K−D1
L2
f2(x2)(D1 − q11)dx2
+
∫K−q11
K−D1 f2(x2)(K − q11 − x2)dx2
)]
(v1 − v2) if K −H2 ≤ q11 < D1
dΠ1(q11)
dq11
=
 (v1 − p1)− (v1 − v2)
1
2
[
1 +
∫ H2
L2
f2(x2)dx2
]
if 0 ≤ q11 < K −H2
(v1 − p1)− (v1 − v2)12
[
1 +
∫K−q11
L2
f2(x2)dx2
]
if K −H2 ≤ q11 < D1
d2Π1(q11)
dq211
=

1
2(v1 − v2) > 0 if 0 ≤ q11 < K −H2
1
2f2(K − q11)(v1 − v2) > 0 if K −H2 ≤ q11 < D1
Case (iv): L1 ≤ D1 < K −H2 (Region I, K −H2 > D1))
Π1(q11) = q11(v1 − p1) + (D1 − q11)(v1 − v2)
dΠ1(q11)
dq11
= v2 − p1
d2Π1(q11)
dq211
= 0
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Since the second derivative is non-negative in all cases considered, the expected revenue
is maximized at one of the extreme points (0 or D1), i.e., all-or-nothing bidding is the
dominant strategy for customer 1. 2
Proof of Proposition 17: To identify the bidding behavior of customer 1, we compare
his expected surplus from bidding D1 at step 2 to his surplus from bidding D1 at step 1.
Let Π1k denote the expected surplus of customer 1 if he bids D1 at step k.
We consider three ranges thatD1 can be in: (i) L1 ≤ D1 ≤ K−L2, (ii)K−L2 < D1 < K
and (iii) K ≤ D1 ≤ H1.
Case (i): L1 ≤ D1 ≤ K − L2
Π11 = (v1 − p1)D1
Π12 = (v1 − v2)
[∫ K−D1
L2
f2(x2)D1dx2 +
∫ K
K−D1
f2(x2)
(
1
2
D1 +
1
2
(K − x2)
)
dx2
+
∫ H2
K
f2(x2)
1
2
D1dx2
]
Π12 = (v1 − v2)
[
D1(F2(K −D1)− F2(L2)) + D1 +K2 (F2(K)− F2(K −D1))
−1
2
∫ K
K−D1
F2(x2)dx2 +
D1
2
(F2(H2)− F2(K))
]
Π12 = (v1 − v2)
[
1
2
D1 +
1
2
∫ K
K−D1
x2F2(x2)dx2
]
Customer 1 prefers to bidD1 at step 1 if Π11 ≥ Π12, i.e. v1−p1v1−v2 ≥
[
1
2 +
1
2D1
∫K
K−D1 x2F2(x2)dx2
]
.
We get the condition on the step 1 price as p1 ≤ wiL(D1).
Case (ii): K − L2 < D1 ≤ K
Π11 = (v1 − p1)D1
Π12 = (v1 − v2)
[∫ K
L2
f2(x2)
(
1
2
D1 +
1
2
(K − x2)
)
dx2 +
∫ H2
K
f2(x2)
1
2
D1dx2
]
Π12 = (v1 − v2)
[(
D1
2
+
K
2
)
(F2)(K)− F2(L2)) + D12 (F2(H2)− F2(K))
119
−1
2
(
KF2(K)− L2F2(L2)−
∫ K
L2
F2(x2)dx2
)]
Π12 = (v1 − v2)
[
D1
2
+
1
2
∫ K
L2
F2(x2)dx2
]
Customer 1 prefers to bid D1 at step 1 if
Π11 ≥ Π12, i.e. v1−p1v1−v2 ≥
[
1
2 +
1
2D1
∫K
L2
F2(x2)dx2
]
. We get the condition on the step 1 price
as p1 ≤ wiL(D1).
Case (iii): K < D1 ≤ H1
Π11 = (v1 − p1)K
Π12 = (v1 − v2)
[∫ K
L2
f2(x2)
(
1
2
K +
1
2
(K − x2)
)
dx2 +
∫ H2
K
f2(x2)
1
2
Kdx2
]
Π12 = (v1 − v2)
[
K(F2(K)− F2(L2) + K2 (F2(H2)− F2(K))
−1
2
(
KF2(K)− L2F2(L2)−
∫ K
L2
F2(x2)dx2
)]
Π12 = (v1 − v2)
[
K
2
+
1
2
∫ K
L2
F2(x2)dx2
]
Customer 1 prefers to bidD1 at step 1 if Π11 ≥ Π12, i.e. v1−p1v1−v2 ≥
[
1
2 +
1
2K
∫K
L2
F2(x2)dx2
]
.
Rearranging terms, we get the condition on step 1 price as p1 < wiiL(K).2
Bidding Behavior of Customer 1 in Moderate Supply (H2 ≤ K < L1 +H2)
In this level, supply is higher than the maximum demand of customer 2, so we only have
to consider regions I, II and III from the original set in Table 5 as given in Figure 5(b).
The next proposition identifies the optimal bid of customer 1 for any possible realization
of his demand.
Proposition 31. In a two-step markdown mechanism with prices p1, p∗2 = v2, H2 ≤ K <
L1 +H2 and K ≤ H1, customer 1 bids D1 at step 1 (and 0 at step 2) if
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PSi. p1 ≤ wiM (D1) = v1 − (v1 − v2)
[
1
2 +
K−H2
2D1
+ 12D1
∫ H2
K−D1 F2(x2)dx2
]
and L1 ≤ D1 ≤
K − L2, or
PSii. p1 ≤ wiiM (D1) = v1 − (v1 − v2)
[
1
2 +
K
2D1
− E[D2]2D1
]
and K − L2 < D1 ≤ K, or
TS. p1 ≤ wiiM (K) = v1 − (v1 − v2)
[
1− E[D2]2K
]
and K < D1 ≤ H1,
and bids 0 at step 1 (and D1 at step 2) otherwise.
Proof of Proposition 31: To identify the bidding behavior of customer 1, we compare
his expected surplus from bidding D1 at step 2 to his surplus from bidding D1 at step 1.
We consider cases (i) L1 ≤ D1 ≤ K − L2, (ii) K − L2 < D1 < K and (iii) K ≤ D1 ≤ H1.
i) L1 ≤ D1 ≤ K − L2
Π11 = (v1 − p1)D1
Π12 = (v1 − v2)
[∫ K−D1
L2
f2(x2)D1dx2 +
∫ H2
K−D1
f2(x2)
(
1
2
D1 +
1
2
(K − x2)dx2
)]
...
Π12 = (v1 − v2)
[
D1
2
− K −H2
2
+
1
2
∫ H2
K−D1
F2(x2)dx2
]
Customer 1 prefers to bid D1 at step 1 if Π11 ≥ Π12, i.e.,
p1 ≤ wiM (D1) = v1 − (v1 − v2)
[
1
2 − K−H22D1 + 12D1
∫ H2
K−D1 F2(x2)dx2
]
.
ii)K − L2 < D1 ≤ K
Π11 = (v1 − p1)D1
Π12 = (v1 − v2)
[∫ H2
L2
f2(x2)
(
1
2
D1 +
1
2
(K − x2)
)
dx2
]
...
Π12 = (v1 − v2)
[
D1
2
+
K
2
− 1
2
E[D2]
]
Customer 1 prefers to bid D1 at step 1 if Π11 ≥ Π12, i.e.,
p1 ≤ wiiM (D1) = v1 − (v1 − v2)
[
1
2 +
K
2D1
− E[D2]2D1
]
.
iii) K < D1 ≤ H1
Π11 = (v1 − p1)K
121
Π12 = (v1 − v2)
[∫ H2
L2
f2(x2)
(
1
2
K +
1
2
(K − x2)
)
dx2
]
...
Π12 = (v1 − v2)
[
K − 1
2
E[D2]
]
Customer 1 prefers to bid D1 at step 1 if Π11 ≥ Π12, i.e., p1 ≤ wM (K) = v1 − (v1 −
v2)
[
1− E[D2]2K
]
.
Combining the results from all three cases, we get the necessary condition for customer
1 to bid his entire demand at step 1. 2
Here wiM (.) and w
ii
M (.) are threshold prices, which give us the highest step 1 price in
the corresponding range that would induce customer 1 to bid his entire demand at step 1.
The proof follows the same idea as Proposition 17. Once again, as long as D1 < K, the
threshold price is a function of D1. If K ≤ D1, then the threshold price is constant due
to Observation 12(c). However, compared to low supply, we observe that the allocation to
customer 1 at step 2 is always positive, hence, compared to low supply, the increase in the
threshold price is less steep as D1 increases. Since the increase in D1 does not translate into
as much unmet demand as in low supply, the step 1 price that makes customer 1 indifferent
increases less rapidly. This only holds up to D1 = K − L2 though. When D1 exceeds this
value, the guaranteed allocation of D1 to customer 1 at both steps is no longer a possibility,
hence the proportional changes in allocations in both steps result in similar behavior under
low and moderate supply levels.
Bidding Behavior of Customer 1 in High Supply (L1 + H2 < K < H1 + H2)
If D1 ≤ K − H2, customer 1 will never bid at p1 for any p1, since there is no scarcity at
p2. Hence, we only need to consider the case K − H2 < D1 < H1 in detail. Fortunately,
for this range the bidding behavior of customer 1 is identical to his bidding behavior under
moderate supply, hence the following corollary describes the bidding behavior.
Corollary 32. In a two-step markdown mechanism with prices p1, p∗2 = v2 and L1+H2 <
K < H1 +H2, customer 1 bids D1 at step 1 (and 0 at step 2) if
PSi. p1 ≤ wiH(D1) = v1 − (v1 − v2)
[
1
2 +
K−H2
2D1
+ 12D1
∫ H2
K−D1 F2(x2)dx2
]
and K − H2 ≤
D1 ≤ K − L2, or
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PSii. p1 ≤ wiiH(D1) = v1 − (v1 − v2)
[
1
2 +
K
2D1
− E[D2]2D1
]
and K − L2 < D1 ≤ K, or
TS. p1 ≤ wiiH(K) = v1 − (v1 − v2)
[
1− E[D2]2K
]
and K < D1 ≤ H1,
and bids 0 at step 1 (and D1 at step 2) otherwise.
Proof of Proposition 18: We will evaluate the first derivative of the threshold func-
tions with respect to D1 in each scenario and show that they are non-negative.
wiL(D1) = v1 − (v1 − v2)
[
1
2 +
1
2D1
∫K
K−D1 F2(x2)dx2
]
∂wiL(D1)
∂D1
= (v1 − v2)
(
1
2D21
∫K
K−D1 F2(x2)dx2 +
1
2D1
F2(K −D1)
)
wiiL(D1) = v1 − (v1 − v2)
[
1
2 +
1
2D1
∫K
L2
F2(x2)dx2
]
∂wiL(D1)
∂D1
= (v1 − v2)
(
1
2D21
∫K
L2
F2(x2)dx2
)
wiM (D1) = v1 − (v1 − v2)
[
1
2 +
K−H2
2D1
+ 12D1
∫ H2
K−D1 F2(x2)dx2
]
∂wiM (D1)
∂D1
= (v1 − v2)
(
K−H2
2D21
+ 1
2D21
∫ H2
K−D1 F2(x2)dx2 +
1
2D1
F2(K −D1)
)
wiiM (D1) = v1 − (v1 − v2)
[
1
2 +
K
2D1
− E[D2]2D1
]
∂wiiM (D1)
∂D1
= (v1 − v2)
(
K
2D21
− E[D2]
2D21
)
∂wiM (D1)
∂D1
≥ 0, ∂wiiM (D1)∂D1 ≥ 0 and
∂wiiL(D1)
∂D1
≥ 0 follow from the observation that all the
terms in the expressions are non-negative. ∂w
ii
L(D1)
∂D1
≥ 0 holds since E[D2] < H2 < K (by
definition, moderate and high supply scenarios require H2 < K). 2
Proof of Proposition 23:
When p1 is set in this range, customer 1 always prefers to bid at step 1 for any realization
of his demand. This bidding behavior is dominant for all prices in this range, so the seller’s
revenue is maximized by setting p1 as high as possible in this range, which is wiL(L1).2
Proof of Proposition 26:
The seller’s revenue resulting from (SP1), which we denote with ΠSP1S is given below:
ΠSP1S =
 v1
(∫K
L1
x1f1(x1)dx1 +
∫ H1
K Kf1(x1)dx1
)
L1 ≤ K < H1
v1E[D1] H1 ≤ K
Substituting uniform distribution for f1 and f2 and taking the first derivative with
respect to K, L1, H1 and v1:
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∂ΠSP1S
∂K
=
 v1
(
H1−K
H1−L1
)
> 0 L1 ≤ K < H1
0 H1 ≤ K
∂ΠSP1S
∂L1
=
 v1
K2−L21+2(K−L1)(H1−K)+2L1(K−L1)
2(H1−L1)2 > 0 L1 ≤ K < H1
v1
2 > 0 H1 ≤ K
∂ΠSP1S
∂H1
=
 v1
(K−L1)2
2(H1−L1)2 > 0 L1 ≤ K < H1
v1
2 > 0 H1 ≤ K
∂ΠSP1S
∂v1
=

K2−L2+2K(H1−K)
2(H1−L1) > 0 L1 ≤ K < H1
E[D1] > 0 H1 ≤ K
2
Proof of Proposition 27:
The seller’s revenue resulting from (SP2), which we denote with ΠSP2S is given below:
ΠSP2S =

v2K 0 < K ≤ L1 + L2
v2 ((D1 +D2).prob{D1 +D2 < K}
+ K.prob{D1 +D2 ≥ K}) L1 + L2 < K ≤ H1 +H2
An increase in v2 increases the seller’s revenue since all terms multiplied by v2 are
positive.
Seller’s revenue either remains constant (if L1 + L2 > K), or increases with L1,H1, L2
or H2. If L1+L2 < K ≤ H1+H2, an increase in one of these terms leads to an increase in
probability ofD1+D2 ≥ K, conversely decreasing the probability thatD1+D2 < K. Hence,
the seller sells all K units for a higher percentage of the demand realizations, collecting a
higher revenue.
Seller’s revenue increases with K up to K = H1+H2 and remains constant beyond this
level. It is obvious that the revenue increases with K if K < L1 + L2. For the remaining
cases, assume that seller’s revenue increases from K to K
′
.
ΠSP2S (K
′
) = v2
(
(D1 +D2).prob{D1 +D2 < K ′}+K ′prob{D1 +D2 ≥ K ′}
)
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= v2
(
(D1 +D2).prob{D1 +D2 < K}+ (D1 +D2)prob{K < D1 +D2 < K ′}
+K
′
.prob{D1 +D2 ≥ K ′}
)
Since D1+D2 > K andK
′
> K holds for the second and third terms above, we conclude
that an increase in K (up to K = H1+H2) leads to a strictly greater expected revenue for
the seller.
2
125
REFERENCES
[1] “Travel advisory; metro planning to drop 1st class.” The New York Times, April 21,
1991.
[2] “New internet pricing models bring pain, and fortune to retailers.” Knowl-
edge@wharton, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=313,
February 22, 2001 (last accessed 12/06/2008).
[3] Anderson, C. and Wilson, J., “Wait or buy? the strategic consumer: Pricing and
profit implications,” Journal of the Operational Research Society, vol. 54, pp. 299–306,
2003.
[4] Aviv, Y. and Pazgal, A., “Optimal pricing of seasonal products in the presence
of forward-looking consumers,” Manufacturing & Service Operations Management,
vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 339–359, 2008.
[5] Bass, F., Krishnan, T., and Jain, D., “Why the bass model fits without decision
variables,” Marketing Science, vol. 13, pp. 203–223, 1994.
[6] Besanko, D. and Winston, W., “Optimal price skimming by a monopolist facing
rational consumers,” Management Science, vol. 36, no. 5, pp. 555–567, 1990.
[7] Bitran, G. R. and Mondschein, S. V., “Periodic pricing of seasonal products in
retailing,” Management Science, vol. 43, pp. 64–79, 1997.
[8] Bundschuh, R. G. and Dezvane, T. M., “How to make after-sale services pay,”
McKinsey Quarterly, no. 4, 2003.
[9] Cachon, G. and Lariviere, M., “Capacity allocation using past sales: When to
turn-and-earn,” Management Science, vol. 45, no. 5, 1999.
[10] Cachon, G. and Swinney, R., “Purchasing, pricing and quick response in the pres-
ence of strategic customers.” Working Paper, University of Pennsylvania, 2007.
[11] Carare, O. and Rothkopf, M., “Slow dutch auctions,” Management Science,
vol. 51, no. 3, pp. 365–373, 2005.
[12] Corbett, C. J., Zhou, D., and Tang, C. S., “Designing supply contracts: Contract
type and information asymmetry,” Management Science, vol. 50, no. 4, pp. 550–559,
2004.
[13] Coy, P., “The power of smart pricing,” Business Week, 2000.
[14] Dasu, S. and Tong, C., “Dynamic pricing when consumers are strategic.” Working
Paper, University of Southern California., 2005.
[15] Elmaghraby, W. and Keskinocak, P., “Dynamic pricing in the presence of in-
ventory considerations: Research overview, current practices and future directions,”
Management Science, vol. 49, pp. 1287–1309, 2003.
126
[16] Elmaghraby, W., Gulcu, A., and Keskinocak, P., “Optimal pre-announced
markdowns in the presence of rational customers with multi-unit demands,” Manu-
facturing & Service Operations Management, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 126–148, 2008.
[17] Elmaghraby, W., Lippman, S. A., Tang, C., and Yin, R., “Will more purchasing
options benefit customers.” Working Paper, Anderson School of Business UCLA, 2006.
[18] Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R. and Kahn, C., “Multi-unit pay-your-bid auctions with
variable awards,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 23, pp. 25–42, 1998.
[19] Federgruen, A. and Heching, A., “Combined pricing and inventory control under
uncertainty,” Operations Research, vol. 47, pp. 454–475, 1999.
[20] Feng, Y. and Gallego, G., “Optimal starting times for end-of-season sales and
optimal stopping times for promotional fares,” Management Science, vol. 41, pp. 1371–
1391, 1995.
[21] Ferguson, P. and Houston, G., Quality of service: Delivering QoS on the internet
and in corporate networks. 1998. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. New York, NY, USA.
[22] Gallego, G. and van Ryzin, G., “Optimal dynamic pricing of inventories with
stochastic demand over finite horizon,” Management Science, vol. 40, pp. 999–1020,
1994.
[23] Gans, N. and Savin, S., “Pricing and capacity rationing for rentals with uncertain
durations,” Management Science, vol. 53, no. 3, pp. 390–407, 2007.
[24] Harris, M. and Raviv, A., “A theory of monopoly pricing schemes with demand
uncertainty,” The American Economic Review, vol. 71, pp. 347–365, 1981.
[25] Kagel, J. and Roth, A., Auctions, The Handbook of Experimental Economics. 1995.
Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
[26] Kalish, S., “Monopolist pricing with dynamic demand and production cost,” Mar-
keting Science, vol. 2, pp. 135–159, 1983.
[27] Katok, E. and Kwasnica, A., “Time is money: The effect of clock speed on seller’s
revenue in dutch auctions.” Working Paper, Penn State University, December, 2002.
[28] Katzman, B., “A two stage sequential auction with multi-unit demands,” Journal of
Economic Theory, vol. 86, pp. 77–99, 1999.
[29] Kreps, D., A Course in Microeconomic Theory. 1990. Princeton University Press,
Princeton, New Jersey.
[30] Lazear, E., “Retail pricing and clearance sales,” The American Economic Review,
vol. 76, pp. 14–32, 1986.
[31] Lele, M. M., “After-sales service - necessary evil or strategic opportunity?,”Managing
Service Quality, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 141–145, 1997.
[32] Liu, Q. and van Ryzin, G., “Strategic capacity rationing to induce early purchases.”
Working Paper, Columbia Business School, October, 2005.
127
[33] Lucking-Reiley, D., “Using field experiments to test the equivalence between auction
formats: Magic on the internet,” The American Economic Review, vol. 89, pp. 1063–
1080, 1999.
[34] Maglaras, C. and Zeevi, A., “Pricing and desing of differentiated services: Approx-
imate analysis and structural design,” Operations Research, vol. 53, no. 2, pp. 242–262,
2005.
[35] Nocke, V. and Peitz, M., “Monopoly pricing under demand uncertainty: The op-
timality of clearance sales.” Working Paper, Department of Economics, University of
Pennsylvania, 2005.
[36] Odlyzko, A., “Paris metro pricing: The minimalist differentaited services solution.”
Proceedings of IEEE/IFIP International Workshop on QoS ’99, 1999.
[37] Pashigian, B., “Demand uncertainty and sales: A study of fashion and markdown
pricing,” The American Economic Review, vol. 78, pp. 936–953, 1988.
[38] Pashigian, B. and Bowen, B., “Why are products sold on sale? Explanations of
pricing regularities,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 106, pp. 1015–1038,
1991.
[39] Perakis, G. and Roels, G., “Regret in the newsvendor model with partial informa-
tion,” Operations Research, vol. 56, no. 1, pp. 188–203, 2008.
[40] Shen, Z.-J. M. and Su, X., “Customer behavior modeling in revenue management
and auctions: A review and new research opportunities,” Production and Operations
Management, vol. 16, no. 6, pp. 713–728, 2007.
[41] Silverstein, M. J. and Butman, J., “Treasure hunt: Inside the mind of the the new
consumer.” Portfolio, 2006.
[42] Smith, S. and Achabal, D., “Clearance pricing and inventory policies for retail
chains,” Management Science, vol. 44, pp. 285–300, 1998.
[43] Stokey, N., “Intertemporal price discrimination,” Quarterly Journal of Economics,
vol. 93, pp. 355–371, 1979.
[44] Su, X., “Inter-temporal pricing with strategic customer behavior.” Working Paper,
Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley CA, July, 2005.
[45] Su, X. and Zhang, F., “On the value of inventory information and availability guar-
antees when selling to strategic consumers.” Working Paper, University of California,
Berkeley., 2007.
[46] Tenorio, R., “On strategic quantity bidding in multiple unit auctions,” The Journal
of Industrial Economics, vol. 45, pp. 207–217, 1997.
[47] Tenorio, R., “Multiple unit auctions with strategic price-quantity decisions,” Eco-
nomic Theory, vol. 13, pp. 247–260, 1999.
[48] Varian, H., Microeconomic Analysis. 1992. Third Edition, W.W. Norton & Company,
New York, New York.
128
[49] Wang, R., “Auctions versus posted-price selling,” The American Economic Review,
vol. 83, pp. 838–851, 1993.
[50] Warner, E. and Barsky, R., “The timing and magnitude of retail store markdowns:
Evidence from weekends and holidays,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 110,
pp. 321–352, 1995.
[51] Williams, L. Vice President Pricing Science, Zilliant, presentation at University of
Maryland, 2005.
[52] Wilson, J., “On the optimal pricing policy of a monopolist,” Journal of Political
Economy, vol. 91, no. 1, pp. 164–176, 1988.
[53] Wreden, N., “Advantages of dynamic pricing.”
http://www.dmnews.com/Advantages-of-Dynamic-Pricing/article/80877/, May 13,
2003 (last accessed 12/06/2008).
129
